
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Xuecheng Liu

Department of Government
The University Of Texas at Austin

UNIVERSITY
PRESS OF
AMERICA



Lanham • New York • London

**Copyright © 1994 by
University Press of America,® Inc.**

4720 Boston Way
Lanham, Maryland 20706

3 Henrietta Street
London WC2E 8LU England

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
British Cataloging in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Liu, Xuecheng.
The Sino-Indian border dispute and Sino-Indian relations /
Xuecheng Liu.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. China—Boundaries—India. 2. India—Boundaries—China.
3. China—Foreign relations—India. 4. India—Foreign relations—China. I. Title.

DS740.5.I5L58 1994 327.51054—dc20 94-22742 CIP

ISBN 0-8191-9699-1 (cloth : alk. paper)



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.



Dedication

To my parents
Ronggang and Gushi Liu
and to my wife
Rong He

Contents

Maps and Figures	vii
Foreword	ix
Preface	xi
Acknowledgments	xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction: Analytical Framework and Research Design	1
Chapter 2 The Sino-Indian Border War	17
Chapter 3 The Sino-Indian Border	47
Chapter 4 The Sino-Indian Entente	79
Chapter 5 The Sino-Indian Cold War	105
Chapter 6 The Sino-Indian Detente	121
Chapter 7 Conclusion: Opportunities and Challenges	147
Appendixes	185
Bibliography	205
Index	211

Maps and Figures

1. The Sino-Indian Frontier.16
2. The Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border. 63
3. The Western Sector of the Sino-Indian Border. 64
4. Power Structure Related to Sino-Indian Relationship. 148

Foreword

In *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*, Dr. Xuecheng Liu, of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, provides the first analysis of the dispute by a Chinese scholar. The book is a revision of his doctoral dissertation, completed in the fall 1993, in the Department of Government, the University of Texas at Austin.

Drawing from both Chinese and English language documentary sources, Dr. Liu evaluates the evidence in the light of "background" interviews with Chinese officials conducted in Beijing. He casts his analysis in the framework of the larger context of United States-Soviet-Chinese relations, which, he argues, conditioned the nature of the triangular relationship of India-China-Pakistan. He thus examines the development of Sino-Indian relations, 1947 to 1993, as a function of the politics of the Cold War. With the major agreement on the border signed by China and India in September 1993 in Beijing, Xuecheng Liu offers a timely and useful account, from a Chinese perspective, on the conflict that had long kept the world's two most populous nations at odds.

Xuecheng Liu is the author of numerous publications in Chinese, including over 30 articles on South Asian politics and foreign affairs. He is co-author of two books, *India* and *Indian Political Parties*, and is chief editor of the volume on contemporary Indian history in the *South Asian Encyclopedia*, published in China.

Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr.
The University of Texas at Austin
May 1994

Preface

For the past decade, my interest has been in the Sino-Indian border issue. I have tried to identify the variables affecting their relations and explore the avenue leading to the solution of this dispute--a major barrier toward the rebuilding of Sino-Indian friendship. This book, as a result of my persistent endeavor, provides a comprehensive analysis of this issue from 1947 to 1993, within the context of American-Soviet-Chinese and Sino-Indian-Pakistani relationships.

The Sino-Indian border dispute is left over by history. Since the end of World War II, this dispute, as a major factor in the twists and turns of Sino-Indian relations, has been persistent on the three dimensions of legal argument, international circumstance and domestic politics. Legal claims have been subject to international and domestic politics; and their interplay has complicated the process of the border negotiations between the two nations. This book focuses primarily on the interplay of legal argument, international and domestic events in the ebb and flow of the border dispute.

Many authors have already ploughed the subject deeply, and they have made their admirable contributions. I will mention these authors at some length in Chapter 1. I classify these publications bearing on Sino-Indian relations into four categories: (1) focus on the Sino-Indian border war; (2) focus on the border dispute; (3) focus on theoretical or psychological analysis of policymaking in the case of the Sino-Indian border conflict 1959-1962; and (4) focus on Sino-Indian relations. My analysis falls in the fourth category, and my contribution is outlined as follows:

1. I interpret the differences of the McMahon Line marked in the Tawang area. Woodman inserts three maps into her book without

explaining the differences. Both Lamb and Maxwell mention the map of April 27, 1914, as much smaller than the map of March 24, 1914. Both Banerjee and Lamb notice the difference of the McMahon Line in the maps of March 24 and July 3, 1914, which was disclosed by the British-Indian government in the mid-1930s. I compare and analyze the three maps, and I find that each is different from the other in terms of the McMahon Line marked in the Tawang area.

2. Previous books focus on the description of major historical events in Sino-Indian relations and lack theoretical framework within which their relations were examined. My analysis of Sino-Indian relations is placed within the theoretical framework of power structures of three dimensional levels and two triangular relationships. My research leads to a four-point conclusion in Chapter 7. The core of this conclusion is that the development of Sino-Indian relations is examined as a function of the Cold War politics, and that the global power structure has conditioned the Sino-Indian relationship. This conclusion, as a guideline, can explain the ups and downs of Sino-Indian relations since the end of World War II and sketch the general trend of the changes in the relationships of the two big and small triangles during the post-Cold War period.

3. Guided by this conclusion, I worked out an approach to the solution of the border dispute. This is a two-step approach--first the line of actual control, and then a formal boundary. The recently-signed agreement on defining the line of actual control between China and India can be regarded as the first step.

Even if these arguments could be justified, I acknowledge that I have been sitting on the shoulders of the forerunners in this field.

With the end of the Cold War, and with the rebuilding of confidence and friendship between China and India, the two Asian giants may hopefully find a final solution to the border dispute as a historical legacy on the basis of the *status quo*, and with the attitude of "looking forward" within the context of the post-Cold War international order.

In the course of this endeavor, I have undertaken personal interviews with Chinese and Indian experts and scholars on Sino-Indian relations. Their views and comments greatly contribute to the formation of my own perspective on this issue. However, responsibility for the accuracy of fact and interpretation rests with me only.

Acknowledgments

This manuscript involves many people. I especially thank my adviser, Dr. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. for his sincere encouragement and intellectual guidance throughout my endeavor. I also thank the other members of my supervising committee, Dr. James R. Roach, Dr. Gordon A. Bennett, Dr. F. Tomasson Jannuzi and Dr. Barbara A. Brower for their invaluable material assistance, thoughtful criticisms and expert comments. It is impossible to adequately acknowledge their contributions in the development and completion of this project.

I can never adequately express my gratitude to the Ford Foundation, the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and the Center for Asian Studies of the University of Texas at Austin for providing financial aid during my study in the University of Texas at Austin.

I am indebted to Prof. Jagat S. Mehta, the former Indian Foreign Secretary, for permitting my personal interview with him and for offering me his valuable manuscripts. I am also indebted to Prof. Huang Xinchuan, Director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Prof. Lei Qihuai, Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at Sichuan University for their individual contributions. Among the other individuals who have contributed to this work, both directly and indirectly, are experts on Sino-Indian affairs from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Headquarters of the Chendu Military Region for their various kinds of support.

A special word of thank to my wife, Rong He, for her love and sacrifice throughout the years.

Documents, as listed in the appendixes, are reprinted from *The Hindu* by permission of its publisher.

Chapter I

Introduction: Analytical Framework and Research Design

China and India are the two largest Asian countries, whose combined population of 2 billion constitutes one third of the world's total. Sharing a border some 2000 kilometers in length, they are separated by the Himalayas in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border and by the Karakoram in the western sector. Since the 1913-14 Simla conference, the Sino-Indian border as part of the issue of Tibet's status has been a matter of dispute in the relations between the two countries. After India's independence and the founding of the People's Republic of China in the late 1940s, the boundary problem became a major barrier to the development of Sino-Indian relations. Today, this unresolved dispute remains at the core of their relations.

Review of Sino-Indian Relations

The Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and demarcated; and no boundary treaty has been mutually accepted by both governments. The Sino-Indian border is generally divided into the eastern, middle and western sectors. Indian negotiators identify five sectors rather than three ones, adding the Tibet-Sikkim and Sino-Pakistani borders on the agenda of the Sino-Indian border negotiations. The Chinese have consistently resisted their attempts on the ground that these borders involve a third party. The western sector involves the dispute over the Aksai Chin area India claims as part of Ladakh and China claims as part of Xinjiang. The middle sector involves a dispute over various points between the Tibet-Kashmir-Punjab border junction and the Nepal-Tibet-Uttar Pradesh border

junction. Between Bhutan and Burma lies the eastern sector which involves a dispute over the area between the pre-1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line. The disputed area lies within the territory claimed by India as part of Arunachal Pradesh--formerly the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of Assam and claimed by China as part of Tibet. The McMahon Line in the eastern sector and Aksai Chin in the western sector have been central to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The border dispute is a historical artifact. It originated from British and Russian expansion into Central Asia and their calculations of strategic security in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. After the end of World War II, the national security interests of India and China brought the two newly-born nations close to each other despite the border dispute between them. In the late 1950s, the border dispute poisoned the climate of Sino-Indian entente cordiale. Nehru's policy of no-dispute and no-negotiation and his forward policy finally led to a border war in 1962. Sino-Indian relations then entered an era of cold war which lasted nearly 20 years.

The Sino-Indian detente and the movement toward normalized relations began with the 1976 exchange of ambassadors. The Sino-Vietnamese border war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 temporarily arrested the momentum of the Sino-Indian thaw. The 1980s saw eight rounds of border talks that culminated in Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Beijing visit in December 1988. His visit marked the complete normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

During the border talks, the Indian government emphasized that the Aksai Chin area was crucial to the solution of this dispute, while the Chinese government stressed that the eastern sector was crucial to that solution. However, their real strategic interests are the opposite of their open claims. Both sides attempted to work out a general principle of resolving the border dispute and defining a new boundary. Their unrealistic negotiating strategies, with incompatible or conflicting tactical maneuvers, resulted in no agreement on the general principle for negotiating a new boundary. The Chinese side called for major mutual territorial adjustments by advocating "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation", while the Indian side insisted on minor territorial adjustments in the eastern sector and China's unilateral concession in the western sector by advocating "mutual understanding and mutual adjustments". These differences over words represents a fundamental difference over the basic principle. The eight rounds of border talks did not lead to a

breakthrough or even substantial progress in the solution of the border question. However, the Indian side has accepted the fact that the border dispute indeed exists. Both sides share the view that the border dispute should be settled through peaceful negotiation and friendly consultation. They have agreed that stability and tranquillity along the entire Sino-Indian border should be maintained pending a final solution.

Although the eight rounds of talks made no substantial progress in securing a mutually-accepted boundary solution, they accelerated the improvement of Sino-Indian relations and contributed to peace and tranquillity in the border areas along the Sino-Indian line of actual control, as each side refrained from armed border conflicts.

In December 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid an official visit to China and was warmly welcomed by the Chinese government. During his talk with Mr. Gandhi, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount Chinese leader, proposed the principle of "forget the past, look forward to the future" in re-establishing Sino-Indian friendship. Rajiv Gandhi responded favorably, but Indian officials later took a more cautious stance. Nevertheless, Gandhi's Beijing visit started a new era in which re-establishment of Sino-Indian friendship would be put on the agenda of the relations between the two countries.

In December 1991, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India. During his visit, he met all important officials of the Indian government and leaders of all major Indian parties. The Chinese premier proposed that the Sino-Indian boundary should become one of peace, friendship and cooperation. Both sides strongly expressed the hope in their joint communique that Sino-Indian friendship would be re-established on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence.¹ It is noteworthy that both sides declared that international oligarchy should be rejected in the new international political and economic order of the post-Cold War era, implying that they will resist the U.S. domination and hegemonism in the world affairs.

In September 1993, Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao visited China and all Chinese leaders met and talked with him under the "very harmonious" atmosphere. During his three-day Beijing visit, a "landmark" agreement was signed on recognizing the current line of actual control(or LAC) separating their troops since the 1962 border war. This pact--by far the most important--is conducive to promoting mutual trust and establishing stable relations by laying down the

framework for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. India and China agreed to respect and observe the LAC and where there are differences on alignment, to let experts check and determine the line. The two countries also agreed to undertake a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs), including the reduction of military forces along the border keeping their levels in conformity with the principle of "mutual and equal security." Prior notification of military exercises and measures to avoid air intrusions are included in the provisions of the agreement. It emphatically stipulates that references to the LAC do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question. Both sides agreed to continue to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually-acceptable settlement through friendly consultations. They promised not to use or threaten to use force in dealing with their bilateral relations.

Three fruitful visits of Chinese and Indian Leaders during the past five years show that Sino-Indian relations are now at an important juncture, as leaders of the two countries carry forward what has been achieved in the 1980s and look to the future of Sino-Indian friendship and cooperation in the coming years.

Dimensions of the Border Issue

The Sino-Indian border issue has persisted on the three dimensions: legal argument, international circumstance and domestic politics. Contending legal claims have been intricately interwoven with international and domestic politics; and their interplay has complicated the negotiating process of the border settlement. As Mehta points out, the boundary problem has to be seen in the context of the background of Sino-Indian relations and the world's conflicts.²

Since India's independence and the founding of the People's Republic of China, development of Sino-Indian relations may roughly be divided into four periods: peace and friendship for the most part in the 1950s; war and hostility in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s; and detente and negotiations in the 1980s; and, beginning in the early 1990s, joint efforts to re-establish Sino-Indian friendship during the post-Cold War era. Legal claims will not be my focus since a number of treatises have already plowed deep into them. Therefore, they will be introduced only as the historical background of the Sino-Indian border dispute. I will concentrate my analysis upon the question of what explains the variance in the Sino-Indian relations

since the late 1940s.

The origins and subsequent episodes of the Sino-Indian border dispute have involved two big and two small triangular security relationships in Central Asia. From the late 19th century to the end of World War II, the big triangular relationship involved Britain, Russia and China, and the small triangular one involved British-India, China and Tibet. Since the end of World War II, the big triangular relationship has involved the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and the small one has involved China, India and Pakistan. My examination of the Sino-Indian border dispute and Sino-Indian relations will be made within the context of these big and small triangular strategic relationships.

In the 1950s, particularly from the signing of the 1954 agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, or the Panchsheel agreement, to the 1959 Tibetan revolt, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by cordiality and brotherhood of "Hindi, Chini, Bhai Bhai!" (Indians and Chinese are brothers), based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The Panchsheel agreement between China and India was a political rather than trade pact in which the Indian government recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet and gave up all its extra-territorial rights in Tibet, inherited from the British in 1947. During this period, global and regional security concerns of both sides overweighed their bilateral differences, including the border dispute. Pakistan's military alliance with the United States and its membership of the CENTO and the SEATO sponsored by the West, as Indian policymakers concerned, constituted a grave threat to India's national security. Facing hostile Pakistan allied with the West, Indian policymakers saw friendship with China as the best guarantee for security on India's northern frontier. In terms of the interests of the Chinese strategic security, India played a mediating role during the Korean War, advocated China's representation in the United Nations and supported China on the question of integration of Taiwan with the Mainland. All these international issues deeply concerned China at that time.

After the signing of the 1954 Panchsheel agreement, both countries took part in the Geneva Conference concerning Indochina. They were also present at the 1955 Bandung Conference to discuss issues of peace and cooperation among the Afro-Asian countries. Under the U.S. economic embargo and military encirclement, India's sympathy and support became all the more valuable for China's diplomacy.

However, from the very beginning, conflicting territorial claims proved irreconcilable. As early as in 1946, 1947, and 1949, the Chinese Nationalist government repeatedly protested against the inroads that first the British, and then the Indians, were making into the tribal areas to the east of Bhutan. They reminded the Indian government that China did not recognize the 1914 Simla convention and the McMahon Line.³ On November 20, 1950, Nehru formally announced in the Indian parliament that "The frontier from Bhutan eastward has been clearly defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Simla Convention of 1914." When a new Chinese map showing the Sino-Indian boundary on the Brahmaputra valley was mentioned, Nehru stated that all Chinese maps had showed it like this "for the last thirty years," and stressed that "Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary--map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary, and we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary."⁴

During this period, the general objective of Chinese diplomatic strategy was to unite all possible nations to break through U.S. economic embargo and military encirclement. The Chinese government tried to evade border disputes with India in order to focus its attention on the "eastern front"--the on-going Korean war and tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, Sino-Indian friendship constituted an important part of Chinese strategy of an anti-U.S. international united front. The Nehru government saw the American-Pakistani alliance as a primary threat to India's national security. Development and strengthening of Indo-Soviet and Indo-Chinese relations were designed to address such a threat.

From 1959, through the 1962 border war, to the mid-1970s, Sino-Indian relations experienced the coldest period--the Sino-Indian cold war which was interwoven with American-Soviet-Chinese triangular relations within the context of the global Cold War. During this period, Sino-Indian relations embodied confrontation and hostility and the parallel support of the United States and the Soviet Union to India contributed to the worsening of Sino-Indian relations.⁵ Various international, regional and domestic factors contributed to the Sino-Indian cold war.

On the international plane, Sino-Soviet friendship was replaced by Sino-Soviet hostility. With the deepening of ideological differences between the two largest communist parties in the world, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated dramatically. The 1969 Sino-Soviet border war

demonstrated the intensity of this hostility. The Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 marked the beginning of America's Vietnam war. China at once felt direct security pressure from the United States to her southern frontiers. The United States and the Soviet Union became her arch enemies. Under these circumstances, China's South Asia policy was to develop and strengthen Sino-Pakistani friendship to counter India's antagonism. India's strategy of diplomacy was to consolidate and cement Indo-Soviet friendship to counter Sino-Pakistani cooperation. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, China stood firmly with Pakistan. The Soviet Union, as a mediator, got involved directly in Indo-Pakistani disputes by sponsoring the Tashkent conference held in 1966. The worsening Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations brought India and the Soviet Union closer to each other. Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation developed rapidly in all the fields, and culminated in the signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. The Soviet Union became India's firm supporter in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, while China resolutely sided with Pakistan.

Kissinger's secret diplomacy led to President Nixon's Beijing visit. The 1972 Shanghai Communique declared the restoration of Sino-American relations, marking the opening of Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet Union within the context of the global power structure. Following this historic event, India predicted the possibility of the formation of the America-China-Pakistan axis against India. This judgment further pushed India to consolidate Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

During the decade of Sino-Indian hostility and confrontation, China's cooperation with Pakistan (India's enemy) and India's friendship with the Soviet Union (China's enemy) were the dynamic mechanism of the Sino-Indian cold war.

On the domestic front, political turmoil persisted in both India and China during this period. In India, Prime Minister Nehru died in 1964, and a year later, Prime Minister Shastri also died. Power struggles in the ruling Congress Party, now led by Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, resulted in the party's split in 1969. After Mrs. Gandhi's wing of the Congress won the 1971 general election, communist-led armed uprisings, separatist movements in northeastern tribal areas, nation-wide labor strikes and opposition-sponsored large-scale popular agitations challenged her government. The two-year rule of the Emergency, imposed in 1975, defamed her government and party, and

both she and the party were defeated in the 1977 general election. India's internal tensions left no room for Indian leaders to take measures to alleviate Sino-Indian tensions, although the two countries did agree to restore their relations.

Following the 1959 Tibetan revolt, some 100,000 Tibetan refugees crossed into India. The Tibetan separatists established their government-in-exile at Dharamsala, a town in the mountains of northern India, and their military operations in the Sino-Indian frontier areas were encouraged and supported by the Indians. Some Indian opposition leaders even asked the Indian government to recognize the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile in India and openly support Tibet's agitation for independence.

In China, power struggles in the Chinese Communist Party intensified during the same period. International anti-revisionist campaigns and internal political duels led to the Cultural Revolution, pushing the whole country into the abyss of national disaster. Left extremists of the Chinese leadership controlled the process of policymaking in China. India was treated as an accomplice of the Soviet Union, and overthrow of Congress Party rule, by encouraging and supporting Communist revolts in India, became a part of China's strategy of world revolution. The encirclement of the Indian embassy in Beijing, expulsion of Indian diplomats on charges of espionage, secret support to tribal revolts in Northeast India and open support for the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)-led armed Naxalite uprisings denied any possibility of improving relations with India.

From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by detente. In the late 1970s, the thaw in Sino-Indian relations was primarily motivated by Chinese intentions to weaken Indian-Soviet relations and by Indian efforts to reduce pressure from the possible American-Chinese-Pakistani axis. One's efforts were aimed at alienating the other's strategic partnership with one of the two superpowers rather than exploring the possibilities of substantial improvements in the relations between the two countries.

The eight-round border talks in the 1980s eased Sino-Indian tensions and at least resulted in agreement on the disagreements. This relieved both governments of pressing too hard on matters of substance while procedural disagreement seemed to be employed as excuse for no-progress. This suggests that neither government found it urgent to resolve the border question in the 1980s. Both sides hoped to improve bilateral relations, but they felt it premature to resolve the

border dispute. Although major political events happened in both India and China, they did not affect the momentum of the Sino-Indian rapprochement. The 1988 Sino-Indian summit was the first meeting of the leaders of the two countries in the 28 years since Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to India in 1960.

Looking back at the history of Sino-Indian relations, we can see that cause and effect are often illogical. The U.S. and India, two democratic nations, did not stand together, while the Soviet Union and China, two socialist countries, became enemies. As Jay Taylor observes, events of the Cold War led India and China to seek a security link with a different superpower. The fact that India sought association with the Soviet Union contributed, in some degree, to China's link with the United States.⁶

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988 ushered in a new era of Sino-Indian friendship. With the collapse of the East European bloc and the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure of power is moving toward a multipolar one within the global context. Broadly speaking, China's independent foreign policy and India's non-alignment policy both originated from the old world structure of power. India's diplomacy has lost the fulcrum of Indo-Soviet friendship, while China's diplomacy has lost the pillar of Sino-American cooperation. China and India suddenly found that they needed to re-orient their foreign policies within the context of the changed world power structure. The five principles of peaceful co-existence initiated and advocated by the two countries in the mid-1950s again became the common basis of their foreign policy re-orientations. Political challenges and economic developments in both countries will increasingly require mutual understanding and cooperation between the two governments. Sino-Indian relations are likely to develop steadily in the post-Cold War period, even as they confront the inevitable problems of two great nations in competition for trade, investment, and influences. Stability and peace are expected along the Sino-Indian border with the signing of the agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas along the line of actual control(LAC).

Academic Argument over the Border Dispute

Immediately following the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, most scholarly writings attributed the all-out border conflict to the Chinese

policy of expansion and aggression. India was the victim of the Chinese territorial expansion. China, devoid of gratitude, had betrayed India's friendship. This argument lacked historical analysis and reflected sympathy for the weak and the defeated. This argument was primarily presented by Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback,⁷ Dorothy Woodman,⁸ P. C. Chakravarti⁹, and Parshotam Mehra.¹⁰

During the same period, Alastair Lamb¹¹ made remarkable contributions to analysis of the evolution of the Sino-Indian frontiers and origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute by examining the then-accessible historical documents. His academic efforts changed the general scene of leaning toward one side. His writings proved valuable because they presented a historical picture of the games of power politics to balance writings that reflected an emotional sense of sympathy with India.

Since the early 1970s, the orientation of the academic argument over the Sino-Indian border in the 1960s was reversed by Neville Maxwell¹², a British journalist, and Karunakar Gupta¹³, an Indian scholar. Their writings focused on careful examination and analysis of the recently accessible official documents, the Nehru government's rigid attitudes toward the Sino-Indian border issue, and wrong policies which eventually led to the disastrous Sino-Indian border war. Their academic argument has been quite influential in the field of the Sino-Indian border issue.

Over the past thirty years, a number of works have focused on the Sino-Indian border war itself.¹⁴ Though the authors' motivations were apparently different, their conclusions were roughly congruent. Their arguments concentrated on the causes of India's defeat in the war, such as blindness of the information system, tardiness of the logistical system, malfunction of the commanding system, and insensitivity of the decision-making authorities. Most point to Nehru's rigidity and the provocative nature of his forward policy on the border issue. Most of these more recent analyses and assessments have strengthened the academic argument presented by Neville Maxwell and Karunakar Gupta.

The Research Design

This research project focuses on the interplay of legal argument and international and domestic events in the ebb and flow of the

border dispute in Sino-Indian relations. Compared with the boundary treaties signed by China with Burma and Pakistan, my judgment is that, with the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers and with the deepening of mutual understanding and trust, the Sino-Indian border dispute will be settled as a historical legacy on the basis of the *status quo* and with an attitude of "looking forward" under the climate of Sino-Indian friendship within the context of the post-Cold War international order.

In exploring the twists and turns of Sino-Indian relations, I will analyze their contending positions, identify the concerns or interests of each side, and explain how one views the other. I will also try to design possible approaches to the solution of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and within the context of an emerging multipolar international order, the patterns of political and security organization of Asian countries are changing. Stable and friendly relations between India and China as two Asian giants will be a major aspect of peace and stability in Asia. In the years to come, continuous improvement and development of Sino-Indian relations is an important aspect of China's Asia diplomacy. Solution of the complicated and emotional border dispute depends upon the development and maintenance of this stable relationship. The solution depends, to a great extent, on the wisdom, courage and determination of the political leaders of the two countries, not on their contending legal claims. In the meantime, historical and objective analyses of the border dispute will assist in abandoning political bias and distrust and overcoming emotional impulses among the peoples of the two countries, so they can contribute to a fair and reasonable solution that is accepted by both sides.

Since the Sino-Indian border war, there have been many books, articles, monographs and official documents bearing on the subject. These publications have given contradictory views and left the reader confused about the actualities of the case. However, almost all these descriptions and analyses are based on British and Indian official documents. It is difficult for these authors to avoid one-sided views in their studies. In my book, I base my analysis more on Chinese sources and try to make some fresh contributions in this respect.

This book is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is a comprehensive introduction of the whole research project, including brief review of Sino-Indian relations, three dimensions of the border

dispute, academic argument on the border issue and research methodology.

Chapter 2 briefly describes the Sino-Indian border war in 1962--its origin, episodes and outcome--with my assessment of its impact on the development of Sino-Indian relations. This chapter ends with the Colombo proposals and the reactions of the two governments.

Chapter 3 reviews the story of the Sino-Indian border dispute on the basis of claims and counterclaims, charges and countercharges, leaders' speeches, official documents, maps, etc. The focus is on the historical origins of the dispute during the British rule. It stresses that the Sino-Indian border dispute is left over by history.

Chapter 4 addresses the motivations of the policymakers and the major internal and external factors promoting the Sino-Indian entente in the 1950s. This chapter examines several episodes in the development of the Sino-Indian border dispute which eroded the Sino-Indian friendship developed within the context of the American-Soviet Cold War.

Chapter 5 identifies the background and major episodes of the Sino-Indian cold war. Discussion is focused on the changes in the American-Soviet-Chinese and Sino-Indian-Pakistani relationships and the impact of those changes upon the relations between China and India. Political upheavals and internal turmoil in both the countries left no room for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations.

Chapter 6 analyzes the internal and external factors of the Sino-Indian detente and discusses essential issues during the eight-round talks of the 1980s regarding improvement of Sino-Indian relations. These negotiations led to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's China visit in 1988. As a result of these talks, the Indian government ceased to insist that the settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute be the requisite for the improvement and development of Sino-Indian relations. The two governments agreed to disagree on the solution to the boundary dispute and began to turn to more positive and substantial activities and mutually valuable relations. The 1980s negotiations demonstrate that the procedural disagreement over China's "package deal" or India's sectoral approach obscures the fact that there is still disagreement on fundamentals such as security strategy.

Chapter 7 analyzes challenges and opportunities faced by the two countries during the post-Cold War era, explores the possibility of a solution to their border dispute, and discusses the basis for the

development of Sino-Indian relations in the future. I try to explore the concerns of India and China and how each views the concerns of the other by reviewing the negotiating records, including points where one or the other makes any modification in its position, points of impasse, concessions proposed by either government, meaningful change in language of agenda or end-of-meeting communique, and significant changes in government leadership of either side. I also explore the atmosphere and attitudes which may have been influenced (a) by the general state of Sino-Indian relations, (b) by internal politics of each country, and (c) by each country's changing foreign interests and relations with other major powers.

There are three possible options for the border settlement: (1) political settlement on the basis of a take-and-give deal; (2) settlement by force under certain circumstances; and (3) placement of the border issue in cold storage while developing their relations in other fields. In conclusion, I argue that any mutually-accepted approach could only be a diplomatic or political solution on the basis of the *status quo*, with mutual adjustments as required. Mutual recognition of the line of actual control between the two countries is an encouraging forward step in the right direction.

Research Methodology

Guided by geopolitical perspectives, I intend to interpret the strategic background and main historical episodes of the Sino-Indian border dispute and the development of Sino-Indian relations. My approach combines the examination of historical records and official documents with personal interviews with government officials and academic researchers dealing with Sino-Indian relations. These interviews are used to complement information from other sources.

Unavoidably, the study is subject to certain limitations. Under the Chinese law and some official rules, in view of the sensitivity of the continuing diplomatic issue between China and India, diplomatic records and historical documents are not open to the public unless access has been approved by the authorities concerned. Personal interviews are not allowed to be published unless they have been reviewed by the authorities concerned. Because of these restrictions, I have investigated all materials available in the United States. I have also made efforts to get access to the available Chinese documents, articles, and speeches. For personal interviews conducted in China, I

do not quote their words directly and try only to express their views, comments and assessments in my own words, or find similar views expressed in other published sources. Even though I quote their comments indirectly, I prefer not to identify their names. In other words, all views and assessments gathered from my personal interviews and readings in China have been extracted and generalized. I am solely responsible for all analyses and assessments which follow.

Notes

1. China and India signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, or the Panchsheel Agreement, on April 29, 1954. In the amble of the agreement, both sides put forward five principles guiding their bilateral relations. They include (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. These principles are known as the five principles of peaceful co-existence.

2. From my interview with Prof. Jagat S. Mehta, the former Indian foreign secretary, at the University of Texas at Austin in May 1991.

3. *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961), Chinese Report, p. 8.

4. Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-negotiated Dispute," in *The China Quarterly*, July-September 1970, p. 48.

5. Zhao Weiwen, "Changes in Indian Foreign Relations," in *Contemporary International Relations*, No. 1, 1982, p. 42.

6. Jay Taylor, *The Dragon and the Wild Goose: China and India* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 232.

7. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

8. Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

9. P. C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); and *India-China Relations* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadaya, 1961).

10. Parshotam Mehra, *The McMahon Line and After* (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1974).




11. Alastair Lamb, *The China-India border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries* (London, Oxford University Press, 1964); *The McMahon Line: A*

Study in the Relations Between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); and *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973).

12. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1970).

13. Karunakar Gupta, *The Hidden History of Sino-Indian Frontier* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates Pvt. Ltd., 1971); and *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers* (Calcutta: New Book Center, 1982).

14. B. M. Kaul, *The Untold Story* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967); J. P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to Sino-Indian War of 1962* (New Delhi: Thacker, 1969); J. R. Saigal, *The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979); Niranjan Prasad, *The Fall of Towang* (New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1981); D. K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962* (London: Hurst & Company, 1991). These authors primarily describe the story of the war and identify major causes of India's defeat in terms of military equipment, logistical supplies and commanding system. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); and Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). These two authors explore the causes of India's defeat in terms of policymaking process.



1. The Sino-Indian Frontier

Chapter 2

The Sino-Indian Border War

The Chinese all-out counterattack along the entire Sino-Indian border from October 20 to November 21, 1962, has usually been defined as the Sino-Indian border war. I intend to unfold the scroll of this border war by identifying several major episodes from September 1958 to October 1962. Among these, the arrest and release of an Indian armed reconnaissance party in the Aksai Chin area was the fuse of the Sino-Indian armed conflict along the entire border; the armed conflicts at Longju and the Kongka Pass were its prologue; the Tibetan rebellion and the Zhou-Nehru talks were two key interludes; the Chinese all-out counterattack was the climax of the border flare-up; and the Colombo proposals provided its epilogue.

In the Karakoram borderlands between India and China lies the high plateau of the Aksai Chin, an extension of the Tibetan plateau reaching into Kashmir. In September 1958, an Indian reconnaissance party, which had been sent to the area to identify where the Chinese Xinjiang-Tibet highway ran, was detained and then deported by Chinese frontier guards. This border incident was the beginning of the subsequent Sino-Indian border dispute. In the following months, increasingly intensive armed clashes took place along the entire border. The Longju incident in the eastern sector and the Kongka Pass incident in the western sector were preludes to the all-out armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border from October 20 to November 21, 1962. India's border policy of "non-recognition and non-negotiation," its forward policy, and the Chinese tit-for-tat countermeasures pushed the inevitability of war. The battlefields covered the disputed areas in both the eastern and western sectors.

In terms of the nature of this border operation, I prefer the term "all-out armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border". That is because the

outcome of this operation did not change the *status quo* of the Sino-Indian border, and the Chinese side only demonstratively asserted its territorial claims by this operation. In the Indian version, the war was a Chinese invasion of Indian territory, while the Chinese term it as a war of self-defense counterattack. They justified their respective war behaviors on the basis of the disputed areas being their own territories. The Chinese won the war, but they unilaterally withdrew their fighting forces to where they had earlier started; and the defeated Indian forces, which were pushed back to the Assam plains in the eastern sector and to the areas beyond the Chinese-claimed line in the western sector, quickly returned to where they had been earlier deployed. After brief, but fierce fighting, the alleged winner of the war gained none of the territories it had strongly claimed, while the so-called loser regained the lost land without shooting or shelling.

As a matter of fact, the war resulting from the boundary dispute was fought only to demonstratively assert China's territorial claims. The Chinese asserted that they had taught India a good lesson, and the Indians accused China of an ungrateful betrayal. The war solved nothing; on the contrary, it would lead to the icy freeze of Sino-Indian relations for nearly twenty years. What factors contributed to the military showdown along the disputed border? What are the real lessons both sides should draw from this brief, but dramatic war?

From India's independence in 1947 to the Tibetan rebellion of 1959, the primary issue on the agenda of Sino-Indian relations was the legal status of Tibet. The two governments were preoccupied with this thorny problem. The march of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) into Tibet in 1950, the Sino-Indian Panchsheel agreement in 1954, and the Tibetan revolt in 1959 were the three major episodes. Although each side knew that the other had territorial claims to the eastern and western sectors of its border, neither was prepared to lay its cards on the table for consideration and deliberation.

Krishna Menon, then Indian Defense Minister, once denied the judgment that Tibet was the cause of the border troubles, but he did not explain what the real causes might be.¹ However, Prof. Jagat S. Mehta, personally dealing with the Sino-Indian border issue, and later Indian Foreign Secretary, thinks that the boundary question was not the trigger to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations; and that the Indian reaction to the Tibetan revolt angered the Chinese, who then openly made claims to Indian territory for retaliation.² This assessment does not mirror the actual development of the dispute over

the Sino-Indian border. The primary and direct cause of the war was the border dispute, while the Tibetan revolt was its catalyst.

Conflicting Map Claims

The Tibetan rebellion took place in March 1959. However, the curtain of the Sino-Indian border dispute was raised earlier in the summer 1958, with the exchange of notes over the Xinjiang-Tibet road running through the Aksai Chin area. A report, in the July 1958 issue of *China Pictorial*, of the completion of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway across the Aksai Chin area alerted the Indians.³ Although an invitation to an inaugural ceremony was sent to the Indian Embassy in Beijing, no Indian representative was present.⁴ However, the Indian government could not determine where the road did run. Two Indian patrol parties were then sent for investigation in the summer 1958. One of them reported that the road did cross the area India claimed, and the other was detained by the Chinese frontier guards and later released. On October 18, 1958, in a note to the Chinese government, the Indian government for the first time made its formal claim to the Aksai Chin area by stating that the area crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet road had been "part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries."⁵ Then another Indian note raised the question of Chinese maps. That note argued that Chinese maps continued to ignore the McMahon Line and showed the boundary along the foot of the hills in the eastern sector, and that in the western sector, the maps showed the boundary running south-east from the Karakoram Pass to the Changchenmo valley.⁶ These maps, India asserted, constituted cartographic aggression in violation of India's territorial integrity. The Chinese reply of November 3, 1958, complained that Indian armed personnel had unlawfully intruded into Chinese territory, and that "in the spirit of Sino-Indian friendship," the Indian personnel had been deported. The Chinese note asked the Indian government for no repetition of such incidents.⁷ As for the question of the Chinese maps, the Chinese note stated that old maps were being reproduced because the Chinese government had had no time to survey China's boundary nor consult with the countries concerned. The note also stated that without such survey and consultations China would make no changes on her own.⁸ Thus, the Chinese made it clear that there had been no delimited Sino-Indian boundary, and that a new delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary would be decided in accordance with the results of the

consultations and the survey.⁹ It was with this exchange of notes that the two governments formally made conflicting claims to their entire borderlands.

On December 14, 1958, in his letter to Zhou Enlai, Nehru disputed the Chinese map claims of the Sino-Indian border. He denied any border differences by stating that the 1954 agreement had settled all outstanding problems between the two countries, and stated that "there were no border disputes between our respective countries." He reminded Zhou Enlai that when he visited China in 1954, he had raised the question of the Chinese maps. According to Nehru, Zhou had explained that those maps were just "reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had had no time to revise them.... I expressed the hope that the borderline would be corrected before long."¹⁰

Nehru complained that four years elapsed and the Chinese government had not yet undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned. He impatiently asked what kind of surveys could affect "these well-known and fixed boundaries".¹¹

Nehru also referred to the McMahon Line. He recalled that when Zhou Enlai visited India in 1956, Zhou told him that the McMahon Line had been discussed and accepted by China as the Sino-Burmese border during Burmese Prime Minister U Nu's visit to Beijing. Nehru further recalled that "whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognize this border with India also."¹²

On January 23, 1959, Zhou Enlai's reply bluntly disputed Nehru's interpretation of the Sino-Indian border, and proposed the Chinese approach to solving the border problem. Zhou Enlai's letter made it clear that the Sino-Indian border was not a settled matter and that "border disputes do exist between China and India." He pointed out:

The Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been signed between the Chinese central government and the Indian government.¹³

Zhou also explained that the matter was not raised during the 1954 talks "because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question."

He further explained the necessity for negotiation:

We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds. But it would be inappropriate for us to make changes without having made surveys and without having consulted with the countries concerned.¹⁴

In this letter Zhou emphasized that Aksai Chin "has always been under Chinese jurisdiction." But, Zhou explained his position on the McMahon Line at some length.

[The] "McMahon Line" was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China.... Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognized by the Chinese central government. Although related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction.... In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion.¹⁵

Here, Zhou only agreed to negotiate the boundary of the eastern sector on the basis of the McMahon Line "on account of the friendly relations between China and India". Tibet's dissatisfaction, Zhou mentioned here, concerned the Tawang Tract. This dispute has been the central issue of the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. I will examine it at some length in the third chapter. As a provisional measure, Zhou proposed that "the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them."¹⁶

Nehru's reply of March 22 reiterated the Indian position on the entire border. It seemed to the Chinese that Nehru foreclosed the possibility of the differences being bridged by stating that

Not only is the delineation of our frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and geographical features but that it also coincides with tradition and over a large part is confirmed by international

agreements.¹⁷

As a counterproposal, while ostensibly agreeing to respect the *status quo*, Nehru added a substantial precondition to Zhou's proposal. Nehru stated,

I agree that the position as it was before the recent disputes arose should be respected by both sides and that neither side should try to take unilateral action in exercise of what it conceives to be its right. Further, if any possession has been secured recently, the position should be rectified.¹⁸

Unfortunately, the differences on the meaning of "*status quo*" could not be bridged. Nehru's version of the *status quo* suggested the restoration of previous positions, while Zhou's meant the retention of the present positions. Nehru's proposal amounted to the demand for the Chinese evacuation from the Aksai Chin area.

All the exchanges show that Nehru's rigid policy of non-recognition and non-negotiation set the course to confrontation. It should be pointed out that these exchanges had not been made public by the eve of the Tibetan rebellion. As Maxwell pointed out, this collision course was set by Nehru and his advisers on their own judgment, and political pressure later made it extremely difficult for Nehru to change course.¹⁹

Tibetan Rebellion

Almost concurrently with growing tensions in the Sino-Indian relations, the situation in Tibet steadily worsened in early 1959. Some separatist rebellions had broken out in eastern and central Tibet. On March 10, most of the kalons (the title of minister of the Tibetan local government) of the then Tibetan Kasha (government) openly joined and led the rebellious forces.²⁰

The Dalai Lama was originally scheduled to attend a theatrical performance in the P.L.A. auditorium in Lhasa that day. The rebels spread the rumor that the P.L.A. would detain the Dalai Lama. Using protection of the Dalai Lama as a pretext, the rebels staged the armed rebellion. They surrounded the headquarters of the Tibet Military Region and the offices of the central government's agencies in Lhasa. On March 19, they launched an armed attack against the P.L.A.

garrison in Lhasa. Acting on the order of the State Council of China, the P.L.A. had put down the Tibetan rebellion by March 22. With the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States and the Tibetan rebels, the Dalai Lama and his followers fled to India. Political asylum was given to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels with an impressive welcome as heroes. Nehru paid a warm visit to the Dalai Lama as soon as he arrived at Mussoorie, the Indian hill station where he made his first headquarters.

During the Tibetan rebellion, the Chinese government requested the Indian government to halt the subversive activities against China on the Indian territory, and pointed out that the separatist elements were using the Indian bordertown of Kalimpong as a base. The Indian government denied Chinese charges and stated that there was no evidence of such activities in India. In his statement of April 2, Nehru indicated that "I cannot guarantee any secret thing."²¹ However, the observer of the *People's Daily* then commented, "But it does not warrant the conclusion that we, too, are surely not aware of it."²²

It became known later that the CIA was involved in the rebellious activities in Tibet, and there was even a CIA radio operator in contact with the Agency in the Dalai Lama's fleeing party. It was widely believed that without the CIA's assistance, it was impossible for the Dalai Lama to escape the P.L.A.'s pursuit.

Indeed, the Chinese possessed both the evidence of the CIA's involvement and the evidence of the Tibetan rebels' activities in Kalimpong. During the rebellion, the documents captured by the P.L.A. proved that Kalimpong was indeed the commanding center from where the Tibetan rebellion was organized and directed.²³ I will examine this more fully in Chapter Four.

The denial of the Indian government made the Chinese believe that the Indian government was indulging and supporting subversive activities in Tibet. It became known later that Nehru had been informed of this information, but his government's policy was to turn blind eyes to those activities in Kalimpong and even use those rebels to collect information inside Tibet. The Chinese suspicion of the Indian government's role in the Tibetan rebellion was intensified by the fact that the Tibetan local government invited Nehru to visit Lhasa without the consent of the Chinese central government in 1958, when rebellious activities were spreading in eastern and central Tibet. Nehru accepted the invitation and insisted on his visit to Lhasa. Zhou Enlai had to inform Nehru that he himself would meet him in Lhasa, but the

invitation was not renewed.

In Chinese eyes, political asylum given to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels and the warm welcome Nehru himself extended to the Dalai Lama at this moment were at least an unfitting reception, if not a provocative act, for a government to give rebels against a friendly neighboring state.

In the communique issued by the Xinhua News Agency on March 28, 1959, the document captured from the Tibetan rebels sketched the international background of this rebellion,

[I]f we [the rebels] bring a large group of forces to Lhasa from other places to deal them [the offices of the Central Government's agencies and the P.L.A. units in Lhasa] a blow, they will surely run away; if not, we can seize the Dalai Buddha, take him to Loka and gather forces for a counterattack to retake Lhasa; if we fail, we can run to India; India sympathizes with us and may help us.²⁴

It was suggested that India had been involved in the Tibetan rebellion. After the Tibetan rebellion, there was so much talk about "independence" for Tibet in the Indian press and in Indian Parliament, and some Indian politicians advocated that they only "recognize Chinese suzerainty but do not permit China to interfere in Tibet's internal affairs." While addressing the National People's Congress held in April 1959, the Panchen Lama asked, "What difference is there between these utterances and those of the British in the past?"²⁵

While the Chinese government welcomed Nehru's statement of March 23 on non-intervention in China's internal affairs, "It considers such discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country to be impolite and improper."²⁶ The Chinese leaders expressed their apparent dissatisfaction or indignation with the anti-Chinese remarks in Indian Parliament and demonstrations in big Indian cities.

In a leading article published in the *People's Daily* on March 31, "foreign reactionaries" appeared for the first time with "imperialism" and "the Chiang Kai-shek bandits" since the Tibetan rebellion. It warned that "No foreign country should interfere in the matter of the rebellion in Tibet which is purely China's internal affair." It further expressed the hope that the Chinese and Indian governments "will continue to observe the five principles [of peaceful co-existence] faithfully, will not allow friendly relations between our two countries to be impaired."²⁷

Nehru later expressed the hope that those Indians who had talked much about Tibet "should exercise wisdom and restraint and feel a sense of responsibility in saying anything on this matter."²⁸ But he disputed the Chinese statement by stating that "The Indian Parliament is not going to be limited in the exercise of its rights of discussion by any external or internal authority, wherever it may be."²⁹ He also stressed that "our sympathies are with the Tibetans. We want them to progress in freedom."³⁰

On April 15, 1959, Nehru explained India's Tibet policy as governed by three factors, namely, preservation of the security and integrity of India, desire to maintain friendly relations with China, and deep sympathy for the Tibetan people.³¹ At the same time, the deputies of the Chinese National People's Congress, who were meeting in Beijing, condemned the Indian government for fomenting the Tibetan rebellion and interfering in China's internal affairs.³²

What made the Chinese leaders more suspicious was the statement of the Dalai Lama, issued through an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in Tezpur, India, on April 18, 1959. A Xinhua News Agency political reporter, in a commentary released on April 20, raised the question of whether the statement was indeed a statement by the Dalai Lama himself. The reporter stated that in Dalai Lama's own statement "not a single 'I', the pronoun of the first person, could be found, while 'he', the pronoun of the third person, was used in every case. Furthermore, the reporter pointed out that the term "Chinese suzerainty" was used in the statement, but this term was "a creation of the British imperialists," and it had never been used "in the documents of the Chinese Central People's Government or those of the local government of Tibet." The reporter did not directly mention the fact that this term had been frequently used in the Indian press and during the discussions in Indian Parliament. But the reporter concluded that what was meant by Tibet's independence "is in fact to turn Tibet into a colony or protectorate of a foreign country."³³ It seems that "a foreign country" here pointed to India.

The Tibetan rebellion was the catalyst of the existing tensions in the relations between China and India. The heated quarrel over the border was interwoven with the old question of the Tibet's legal status, which seemed to have been solved by the 1954 agreement between India and China. With these developments, the Tibetan rebellion, which the Chinese took to be an internal affair, was being internationalized. The Chinese policy-makers believed that India was

representing a threat from the imperialist West on the western frontier of China, and that India was meddling in China's Tibetan affairs in collusion with the United States, in an attempt to separate Tibet from China. Public opinion was roused to a boiling point in both India and China. As Maxwell pointed out, these developments attracted world-wide attention and had an immediate and damaging effect on Sino-Indian relations.³⁴

India's Forward Policy

India launched Operation Onkar in 1959 and established many military posts in both eastern and western sectors to assert its sovereignty on the territory it claimed.³⁵ Under this "forward policy", Longju in the eastern sector and Kongka Pass in the western sector became the first major scenes of armed clashes between the Indian and the Chinese troops.

Armed Clash at Longju

Although the Chinese have never accepted the McMahon Line as a legal boundary between China and India, they have regarded this line as the line of actual control by both the sides since the P.L.A. march into Tibet in 1950. After the Tibetan rebellion, the defeated rebels fled into India by crossing the McMahon Line. The P.L.A. forces then moved up to the McMahon Line to prevent this massive outflow. The Chinese military presence on the Chinese side of the line immediately brought the Indian troops on the other side, with check posts right up to the line.

The McMahon Line has never been demarcated since it was drawn on the small two-sheet map. Answering a question about the McMahon Line in Parliament on August 25, 1958, Nehru accepted the fact that "It may make a difference of 50 miles or more if the line is thick or thin."³⁶ According to Maxwell, somewhere it is drawn over indeterminate topographical features and there the only way to determine the lie of the boundary is to trace out on the ground the coordinates of McMahon's original map. Furthermore, since the line marked thickly on the original, eight-miles-to-the-inch map covers about a quarter of a mile, even this could produce no precise delineation on the ground. He concludes that without a joint Sino-Indian demarcation, it is impossible to fix the McMahon Line.³⁷

Longju and Migyitun are two small villages. Migyitun stands on a pilgrimage route of importance to the Tibetans. In order to leave it within Tibet, the McMahon Line, following no feature at all, runs about two miles south of Migyitun. The Indians considered that the Tsari River, running roughly west-east immediately south of Migyitun, should make a boundary alignment. Accordingly, they unilaterally set up a border post by crossing the McMahon Line and advanced the boundary to the Tsari River. This forward movement put Longju, on the other side of the valley from Migyitun, within India.

In his letter of September 7, 1959, to Nehru, Zhou Enlai complained that

Changing unilaterally the long-existing state of the border between the two countries, they not only overstepped the so-called McMahon Line as indicated in the map attached to the secret notes exchanged between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn on current Indian maps which is alleged to represent the so-called McMahon Line. Indian troops invaded and occupied Longju, intruded into Yasher, and are still in occupation of Shatze, Khinzemane and Tamaden--all of which are Chinese territory--shielding armed Tibetan rebel bandits in this area.³⁸

The Longju clash took place on August 25, 1959. The Chinese Premier described the Longju incident as armed attacks by Indian troops occupying Longju on the Chinese soldiers who stationed at Migyitun. The Chinese were forced to fire back in self-defense.³⁹ Then the Indians themselves withdrew from Longju and the Chinese took it over. But the Indians complained that the Chinese had intruded into the Indian territory and opened fire, forcing the Indian withdrawal from Longju. The Indian note protested China's "deliberate aggression" and threatened to "use force on the trespassers if necessary."⁴⁰ In addition to Longju, the Indians unilaterally adjusted the McMahon Line at Tamaden and Khinzemane. According to Maxwell, the Indian troops, soon after the Longju incident, withdrew the Tamaden post, admitting that it had been on Chinese territory.⁴¹ It became known three years later that the Khinzemane area would become a direct and immediate fuse of the final flare-up on the entire border in 1962.

Armed Clash at Kongka Pass

During the summer of 1959, the Indian government decided to establish border posts northeast of Leh, in Ladakh, and simultaneously send a patrol party to go up to the Lanak Pass along the Changchenmo valley, well within territory claimed by China. The Lanak Pass is far northeast of the Kongka Pass. The Chinese see the Kongka Pass as the boundary feature, as the Indians see the Lanak Pass. Before October 20, 1959, the Chinese frontier guards had already established a check post at the Kongka Pass. That day the Chinese disarmed and detained three Indian soldiers south of the Kongka Pass. Then on the next day the Indian patrol party, more than seventy in number, attempted to encircle and advance on a Chinese patrol party from two directions in the same area. During the exchange of fire, nine Indians were killed and seven captured by the Chinese. It was said that the Chinese side also suffered casualties.⁴² The Indians protested that the Indian patrol party had been ambushed by the Chinese from a hill-top.

However, it seemed that Nehru still desired a compromise settlement in the western sector. Addressing to the Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959, he stated definitely that "This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it."⁴³ He issued a secret directive to the cabinet members on September 13, 1959, saying that any questions in relation to Aksai Chin could only be considered, when the time arose, in the context of the larger question of the entire border. For the present India had to put up with the Chinese occupation of this sector and the Chinese road on it.⁴⁴ However, on October 20 and 21, 1959, the Indian Home Ministry, despite Nehru's directive, still sent forward patrols into the Kongka Pass area which led to serious armed clashes.

The Longju and Kongka Pass incidents are usually regarded as the prelude of the Sino-Indian border war. At the meeting called by Nehru on October 23, 1959, these forward patrols were condemned by senior army officers as "expansionism" and "causing provocations on the frontier." However, the Indian government openly accused China of "unprovoked aggression."⁴⁵ After the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents, the Indian Army was ordered to take over the operational control of frontiers in both western and eastern sectors.⁴⁶

Zhou-Nehru Talks

After the Longju and Kongka Pass clashes, on September 9, 1959, the Indian government published a White Paper giving details of Sino-Indian exchanges of memoranda and letters from 1954 to 1959. This document revealed to the world the real story of Sino-Indian relations. The notes in the White Paper showed that India would not recognize the existence of the boundary dispute and would not negotiate a overall boundary settlement. India's rigid attitude of non-recognition and non-negotiation and its forward policy led to the failure of the New Delhi summit and inevitably to the disastrous border war.

The Longju and Kongka Pass clashes brought the Sino-Indian relationship almost to a breaking point. In an attempt to ease the growing tensions and settle the border dispute, Zhou Enlai sent a letter to Nehru on November 7, 1959, suggesting that the two prime ministers meet as soon as possible. In his letter, Zhou put forward a comprehensive proposal of maintaining the *status quo* and ensuring the tranquillity on the entire border pending a settlement. He proposed that

[T]he armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order.⁴⁷

This proposal was actually an extension of India's proposal, contained in its note of September 10, that each side should refrain from sending armed personnel to Longju, to the entire Sino-Indian border. In his reply of November 16, Nehru put forward a counter-proposal that in the western sector Chinese personnel withdraw to the east of the boundary as shown on Indian maps and Indian personnel withdraw to the west of the boundary as shown on Chinese maps. According to Nehru's proposal, India essentially had no personnel there to withdraw except from some sporadic outposts recently established, while China would withdraw from the whole Aksai Chin area. However, Nehru did not want to apply the same principle to the

eastern sector, namely, Indian personnel should withdraw to the south of the boundary as shown on Chinese maps. India's demand for China's complete withdrawal from the Aksai Chin area became a precondition for negotiations on maintaining the *status quo* and ensuring the tranquillity on the Sino-Indian border. In his letter dated December 17, 1959, to Nehru, Zhou disputed Nehru's position and once again appealed for talks between the two Prime Ministers, to be held at any place and as soon as possible, for the interests of the two countries.⁴⁸

At first Nehru refused Zhou's proposal unless the Chinese evacuated check posts and ceased threats and intimidations.⁴⁹ Nehru threatened that India would not hesitate to take the only language the Chinese seemed to understand--that of force--in defense of her territorial integrity.⁵⁰ Nehru believed that no agreement could be reached "upon principles when there was such complete disagreement about facts".⁵¹ Later, Nehru changed his mind, and decided to invite Zhou to New Delhi for a meeting, but not for negotiation.⁵²

The Indian government might consider that India's refusal for negotiation could be taken as a negation of her own stand that problems between nations should be settled by negotiation. Before Zhou visited India, he visited Burma and signed a boundary agreement with the Burmese government. The New Delhi summit was held from April 19 to 25, 1960. The negotiations did not resolve the deadlock. There was no movement from the fixed positions of both sides. The Indians maintained that the boundaries were already delimited and ran just where they said. The Chinese, the Indians stated, must withdraw before there could be any discussion on minor adjustments. They bluntly refused Zhou's "package" approach, by which China would accept Indian claims in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian recognition of China's claims in the western sector--essentially acknowledgment of the *status quo* in terms of actual control.

The joint communique issued at the termination of the Zhou-Nehru talks admitted that the talks had not resolved the differences. However, they agreed that officials of the two governments should meet and examine all the materials relevant to the boundary question and draw up a report for submission to the two governments. The two official teams met first at Beijing, then in New Delhi, and finally at Rangoon in November and December in 1960. As anticipated, nothing fruitful emerged from their efforts. As a result of these three rounds of official level talks, two reports, one by the Chinese and the other by the Indians, were later published, repeating their respective

positions. Both sides cited various historical documents and maps they could dig out in support of their claims and counterclaims. The two reports were submitted to the two governments for consideration in early 1961. Zhou had hoped that his visit could produce some positive result. He seemed to believe that his package approach and the boundary agreements with Burma and Nepal might break the stalemate. But in failure, he returned from India with frustration and indignation.

The Final Showdown

After the failure of the Zhou-Nehru summit, Sino-Indian relations steadily deteriorated, with growing tensions and frequent border clashes. Both the sides were busy preparing for any possible eventuality. From the Indian point of view, acquiescence in the status quo on the boundary would lead to an unacceptable settlement of the boundary on the basis of the lines of actual control by both the sides along the entire border. The new forward policy pursued by the Indian government was aimed at breaking the status quo and improving its legal claims by the fact of possession. Such forward movements in both the western and eastern sectors inevitably led to armed skirmishes which culminated in a full-fledged border conflict.

Nehru's forward policy was formulated and implemented in 1959. It was a logical extension of his policy of non-recognition and non-negotiation. It was also based on the belief that India's prolonged failure to penetrate into the Chinese claimed and occupied areas in the western sector and patrol up to the Indian version of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector would imply "a tacit acceptance of Chinese occupation."⁵³ The logic of this policy was that whoever succeeded in establishing a check post would establish a legal claim to that territory, since possession was nine tenths of the law.

The objective of the Indian forward policy was, on the one hand, to prevent the Chinese advance and "get that aggression vacated" and, on the other, establish the physical presence of Indian troops in the disputed areas up to the Indian-claimed line. The measures of implementing this policy depended upon the specific actualities in the different sectors of the Sino-Indian border. In the western sector, since the line of actual control was largely the Chinese-claimed line, and the Chinese had already established their check posts along that line, the Indian armed patrol parties would penetrate into the spaces between

the Chinese check posts and even deeper into the areas far behind the Chinese-established check posts. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese had never accepted the original McMahon Line as a legal boundary, they accepted it as a line of actual control for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquility on the frontier. The Indian government believed that in some places the McMahon Line did not follow any topographical features, and that it could thus rectify the line to meet topographical requirements or, rather, India's own needs.

How was India to implement that forward policy? Nehru answered that question before the Lok Sabha in 1961: "By diplomatic means, by various measures, and ultimately if you like by war." He further stated that India would build up her position of strength to deal with the situation.⁵⁴ In February 1962, Lt.-General Kaul presided over a meeting in Gauhati, attended by senior civil and military officials who were dealing with the defense affairs in the eastern sector. They agreed that it was imperative in the national interests of defense to establish as many posts as possible along the border of the eastern sector, despite the difficulties.⁵⁵ However, it seemed to be curious that although the Indians threatened to vacate Chinese "aggression" by force or by war, they believed that the Chinese would not launch armed attacks to defend their territorial claims. This was the fundamental and illogical premise and the tragic crux of India's philosophy of forward policy.

I have already explained, at some length, India's version of the McMahon Line in the Longju area. Now I will provide some details about the Che Dong and Khinzemane areas in the eastern sector.

Che Dong is a cluster of herders' huts which sits at the Nyamka Chu or Kechilang valley. To the south of the valley, the Tsangdhar range runs eastward from the knot of mountains that form the crossing point of the McMahon Line and Bhutan's eastern borderline. To the north of the valley, the Thagla ridge runs almost parallel to the Tsangdhar range. Between them a mountain river called the Nyamka Chu or the Kechilang River flows from west to east. During the monsoon the river runs fast, but in the dry season people can walk across it in some places without using bridges.

The final flare-up started with the establishment of Indian check posts in Khinzemane and Che Dong areas at the western extremity of the McMahon Line. These are both located north of the original McMahon Line. The Indian government alleged that the McMahon Line did not follow topographical features here, and the rectified line

should follow the Thagla ridge. This rectification would put Khinzemane and Che Dong within India. The Chinese disputed India's unilateral rectification of the McMahon Line. The original McMahon line actually runs along the southern slopes of the Tsangdhar Range.⁵⁶

In September 1960, the Indian Fourth Infantry Division was deployed in Tezpur from the Punjab plains. Its task was to defend the frontiers of the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. In 1962, under Operation Onkar,⁵⁷ a series of border check posts was established. According to Niranjan Prasad, the field commander of the Fourth Infantry Division, between Khinzemane and Bhutan's eastern border, the McMahon Line was "not an accurate projection of the Himalayan watershed." Sir Henry McMahon just guessed at geography and "drew a thick blue line." The line just comes down the Pungbosi ridge to Khinzemane, and then, instead of following the main watershed of the Thagla ridge, it is drawn in as a straight line running to Bhutan's eastern border. Therefore, "the position of the Thagla ridge was, to say the least, left ambiguous."⁵⁸ The Indian Government claimed that the Thagla ridge was Indian territory, but the military maps showed the McMahon Line as running to the south of it. The Chinese regard the McMahon Line as running along the Tsangdhar range. In June 1962, the Indian troops established a post at Che Dong, below Dhola on the Tsangdhar range. In August the Chinese appeared on the Thagla ridge, dominating the Nyamka Chu or Kechilang valley. Major K. C. Praval explicitly pointed out that

As part of the forward policy an Assam Rifles' post was set up in June 1962 at an isolated place called Che Dong, which happened to be a few kilometers north of the map-marked McMahon Line but was claimed by India as her territory.⁵⁹

For some reason, the post was later called Dhola post instead of Che Dong post. When Brigadier D. K. Palit, the Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, visited Tezpur on August 14, 1962, Brigadier Niranjan Prasad told him that if the Dhola post in fact lay north of the India's claim line, it could lead to very serious consequences. He asked the higher authorities for a clear-cut definition of India's claim. However, no reply had been received by September 8, when about 600 Chinese soldiers were reported to have descended from the Thagla ridge on the Che Dong post and cut off the line of

communication.⁶⁰ When the report reached New Delhi, top-level officials decided that the Indian troops should drive out the Chinese from the Thagla ridge.⁶¹ On September 11, in his letter to Corps Headquarters, Niranjana Prasad emphasized that it was just possible that the Che Dong post lay on the Chinese side of the McMahon Line.⁶² However, the next day, Lt. General. P. Sen, the Eastern Army Commander, insisted at the military conference that the Thagla ridge was Indian territory and the Chinese would have to be "driven out".⁶³ He ordered the troops to cross Nyamka Chu or Kechilang River and reinforce the Che Dong post. The first exchange of fire on September 18 resulted in casualties to both sides.

India's original operation plan demanded that capture of the Thagla ridge should be completed by October 1. Since General Umrao Singh, the then XXXIII Corps Commander, refused to collaborate with those who insisted on steering a collision course with the Chinese on the Thagla ridge, the command structure was reshaped on October 4. Lt. General B. M. Kaul, the Chief of General Staff, became the new IV Corps Commander and took over direct command of operations in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, including the Thagla ridge area. The task of capturing the Thagla ridge was first changed to October 5, then to October 10.

General Kaul personally flew to Lumpu and deployed Indian fighting forces in the Nyamka Chu area on October 5. He also ordered Indian troops to enter the Dhola area on October 8, and the next day, the Indians occupied Tseng Jong.⁶⁴ General Kaul further sent Indian troops to Yumtsola on October 10 to sit behind the Chinese.⁶⁵ On the morning of October 9, General Kaul realized the impossibility of evicting the Chinese from the Thagla ridge, but he admitted that he had no option but to make some move on October 10--whatever the cost--since this was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet.⁶⁶ The appointment of Lt.-General Kaul with the task of "speeding up operations," the move of VII Infantry Brigade to the Nyamka Chu area and the Thagla ridge, and the Indian occupation of Tseng Jong inevitably led to a major skirmish at Tseng Jong on October 10. It was reported that six Indians were killed and eleven wounded, but the Chinese had 100 casualties. According to Dalvi, the Tseng Jong skirmish was not a prepared operation against the Chinese defense on the Thagla ridge, but a hurried resumption of a weary advance to set up a post at Yumtsola on the Thagla ridge.⁶⁷ Kaul also confessed that the occupation of the Tseng Jong demonstrated that it would

remain India's and unchallenged--as in the past.⁶⁸ Indian military and political leaders were naive and arrogant to believe that they would not be punished when they crossed the McMahon Line and set up a military post side by side with the Chinese positions.

Krishna Menon, Indian Defense Minister, indicated that "The Government policy is to make an impact on the Chinese in NEFA before they settled down for the winter."⁶⁹ On his way to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) on October 12, Nehru declared at Madras that he had ordered the army to throw the Chinese out. He also disclosed that the order had been issued and the date of its implementation would be decided entirely by the Army.⁷⁰ Nehru was reported to tell the field commanders that he had good reason to believe that "the Chinese would not take any strong action against us."⁷¹ He also told Kaul that "We must contest by whatever means at our disposal."⁷² After the fall of Tawang, Major General Niranjan Prasad was called to see President Radhakrishnan. He quoted the Indian President as saying:

We had no business to have sent the army on this mission. We seemed to have gone mad about Thag la. At best Thag la is disputed territory. What does Nehru mean by saying "I have ordered the army to throw the Chinese out?" Is this the language to be used in international affairs? Is this the manner in which grave national issues are handled?⁷³

The military confrontation was inevitably leading to the war. After reviewing the rapidly deteriorating situation on the border and the latest military developments on the other side of the border, the highest Chinese military authorities decided in early October to launch an all-out counterattack along the entire Sino-Indian border. In a last-minute effort to win a peaceful settlement, the Chinese government proposed on October 6 that the two governments should hold talks at once on the border question unconditionally, and that the Chinese government would be prepared to receive the Indian delegation on October 15. The Indian government bluntly rejected the Chinese proposal and closed the door to negotiations. On October 12, Nehru publicly stated that India would drive the Chinese out of Indian territory. He went so far as to disclose that the order had been issued and the time of its implementation would be decided by the troops.

General Zhang Guohua, the Commander of the Tibet Military Region Headquarters, left Beijing for Tibet with the war order on

October 8. One day after the October 10 skirmish he rushed to the front command. On the early morning of October 20, 1962, massive attacks were started along the entire border. On the evening of the same day, the Chinese troops entered Tawang. India's VII Brigade was wiped out and its commander, Brigadier Dalvi, was captured. In the western sector, almost all of the Indian outposts were removed. On November 15, the Chinese troops launched the second phase of offense. The next day Walong fell, and on November 19, Bomdila fell. The whole area between the McMahon Line and the Outer Line to the south was under Chinese control by November 19.

After the Chinese victory on the battlefield, the Chinese government unilaterally announced on November 21, 1962, that within twenty-four hours, its forces would cease fire and halt their advance. In addition, within another nine days, their troops would withdraw twenty kilometers behind the line of actual control that existed on November 7, 1959.⁷⁴ However, the Indian government asked for the restoration of status quo ante of September 2, 1962, in all sectors of the Sino-Indian border. The Indians intended to hold the disputed areas occupied by their forces under Nehru's forward policy between November 7, 1959, and September 2, 1962. The Chinese bluntly rejected it.

The Indian government intended to take advantage of the China's diplomatic isolation and domestic difficulties to secure its territorial claims, as it had done in the Tawang Tract during the Korean war. However, the Indians underestimated the determination of the Chinese leaders and the strength of the Chinese armed forces stationed in Tibet. Despite unfavorable domestic and international conditions, Chinese fighting forces did not hesitate to push into the disputed areas, nor to pull out after accomplishing their operation plans. During the 30-day border conflict, India suffered a traumatic defeat. Indian losses were substantial: 1,383 killed, 1,696 missing, and 3,968 captured.⁷⁵ The invincibility of the Indian army was shaken to the roots. On the Chinese side, no soldier was captured and the casualties are unknown. All the captured Indians had been released by May 25, 1963, six months after the war curtain fell.

Politics of the Border War

China was forced to fight a limited war with India under the circumstances unfavorable to China. China was therefore unwilling to

prolong or expand the war. Domestic and international situations did not permit Chinese troops to continue the fighting. On the domestic front, on-going trouble following the rebellion in Tibet, growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the failure of the Great Leap Forward drew Chinese leaders' attention to urgent domestic problems. Internationally, there was continuing animosity between China and the U. S., and Sino-Soviet relations had been increasingly strained because of the ideological controversy.

Heated quarrels between China and the Soviet Union over the theory and strategy of the Communist movement rapidly poisoned their relations. The Soviet experts working in China were recalled and many industrial projects had to be halted or abandoned. All Soviet economic and military aid programs were canceled. The relationship of brotherhood became hostile.

Since China was still a member of the socialist family and India was a friend, the declared Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border dispute was to keep neutral. After Khrushchev attended the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1959, he visited India, reaffirming the Indo-Soviet friendship. Soon afterwards, a Soviet delegation headed by Marshal Vorosilov paid a three-week goodwill visit to India. These visits gave an impetus to India's position in the context of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet schisms and they were interpreted as Soviet tacit support to the Indian stand.

After the two armed clashes on the border in 1959, Soviet leaders expressed "regret" and "distress" over the border incidents. In a verbal note to the Communist Party of China in February 1960, the Soviet leaders denounced China's handling of the border question as "an expression of a narrow nationalist attitude." The note argued that

one cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it.⁷⁶

Apparently, the Soviet leaders saw the Sino-Indian border conflicts as Chinese provocations. Twelve years later, Khrushchev's memoirs revealed the actual Soviet attitude at this critical juncture.⁷⁷ He argued that

I believe it was Mao himself who had stirred up the trouble with India. I think he did so because of some sick fantasy.... I think Mao created the Sino-Indian conflict precisely in order to draw the Soviet Union into it. He wanted to put us in the position of having no choice but to support him.⁷⁸

It is obvious from this passage that the Soviet leader sympathized with and supported India. Despite the Chinese complaint, the Soviet Union supplied India with 24 transport planes for the use in the Ladakh area in 1960. A Soviet-Indian agreement signed in 1962, provided for the sale of MIGs and for the setting up of a MIG factory in India.⁷⁹ Tse Soviet military sales to India apparently angered the Chinese leaders.

However, the Cuban missile crisis pushed the Soviet leaders to the Chinese side after the outbreak of the border war. The Soviet Union declared that "the notorious McMahon Line" was never recognized by China and foisted on the Chinese and Indian peoples. The Soviet Union supported the proposals made by the Chinese government by stating that they provided an acceptable basis for negotiations.⁸⁰ But, a few days after the end of the Cuban crisis, the Soviet Union began to condemn the Chinese leaders by stating that to end a conflict it was necessary to start with a ceasefire--overcoming the war hysteria.⁸¹

With the Tibetan rebellion and the Taiwan Strait crisis, Sino-American hostility deepened during the course of the Sino-Indian border crisis. The United States naturally sided with India. The Chinese perspective on this interlocking of external threats from both the eastern front and the western front was being strengthened by a series of concurrent events.

In early 1962, American high-level administrative, intelligence and military officials visited Taiwan frequently. Chiang Kai-shek issued a decree calling for preparations of counter-offense to the mainland on March 31.⁸² The action committee for counter-offense headed by Chiang was established as a policy-making body. War mobilization measures were taken and military dispositions for an invasion of the coastal areas were made. All political activities which might interfere with the war preparations were banned.⁸³

In a report in *Peking Review*, the U. S. was depicted as "the instigator and supporter" of Chiang's war adventure. At the same time, a number of armed raids from the offshore islands coincided with frequent American officers' visits to Quemoy and the appoint-

ment of Admiral Alan G. Kirk--an expert in amphibious warfare--as American ambassador in Taipei. The dramatic increase in American military aid to Taiwan was interpreted as the proof that Chiang's adventure had been planned jointly, and under the American direction. Some responsible U.S. officials were reported to hold that "the time is ripe" for an invasion of the Chinese mainland and advocated a "push now".⁸⁴

Facing American-Chiang military pressure in the Taiwan Strait and the Indian forward push in the Himalayas, Chinese leaders were concerned about the prospect of attacks from both Taiwan and India. On May 29, 1962, in an interview with Japanese journalists, Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, indicated the linkage of threats facing China from the United States, Taiwan, and India. He stated that the Pentagon generals might support the Nationalists in starting a "counter-offence on the mainland" along the coastal areas. Further, he pointed out that incidents might occur on other borders, suggesting the possible trouble on the Sino-Indian border.⁸⁵ Later, *People's Daily* raised the specter of war on two fronts. The Chinese newspaper quoted an article in *The Hindustan Times* of June 8, 1962 as saying that

the recent intensified Indian intrusions into China were connected with the Chiang Kai-shek gang's preparations, with the support of U.S. imperialism, to invade the mainland. This paper had the effrontery to declare that China must be made to understand that it "might have to face prospects of war on two fronts simultaneously."⁸⁶

From the Chinese perspective, continued CIA-Nationalist activities in Tibet could be logically linked with India's uncompromising stance and risky forward pushes beyond the line of actual control. Increased Indian military operations could be easily interpreted as part of an overall design, coordinated by the U. S., the Chinese Nationalists and India, to increase pressure on China from the two fronts.

During the Sino-Indian border war, the United States and Britain offered to ally with India and provided India with emergency airlift of arms. Ambassador J. K. Galbraith formally announced that the U.S. recognized the McMahon Line as the accepted international border.⁸⁷ On November 3, 1962, a U.S. arms shipment arrived in four C-130 transport planes in Calcutta. Under India's request, a squadron of U.S.

C-130 planes came to India in November, and flew, from central India to Leh, 15 to 17 runs a day, carrying 150 to 180 tons of military supplies to the front.⁸⁸ A formal American-Indian pact was signed on November 14. In order to meet the impending Chinese threat, on November 19, Nehru asked the U.S. and Britain for 15 bomber squadrons to interdict the advancing Chinese troops.⁸⁹ President Kennedy warned openly on the same day that "If China advanced any further, they would be forcing the hand of the President of the United States."⁹⁰

Facing such difficult internal and external situations, timing of the starting and halting of the war was extremely important for the Chinese. While the two superpowers were entangled in the Cuban missile crisis, the Chinese took advantage and removed the pressure from the western front by destroying India's military facilities and capability of undertaking major military operations on the Sino-Indian border. As far as the climate in the Himalayan Mountains was concerned, from mid-December until April, the passes would be closed and no large-scale movements possible. Therefore, the Chinese had to accomplish their operation plans before the winter came and before the two superpowers could become directly involved in this war.

China's war objective was not to occupy the disputed areas, but to punish India with a decisive strike. China's principle of war was to fight a quick battle to force a quick decision. Praval explained the natural conditions for the Chinese withdrawal, but he did not touch the international factors. He said,

Had the Chinese tried to continue the fight in the winter across their Himalayan line of communication, on the plains of Assam, matters may have been very different. It was an awareness of this military reality that prompted the Chinese to declare a unilateral ceasefire.⁹¹

Based on these considerations, Chinese policy-makers decided that the operation would be a punishing action and that the operation would be implemented within the disputed areas and brought to an end before the winter came. Quick and firm American and British responses to Nehru's urgent appeals and successful advances of the Chinese armed forces in the battlefields might have shortened the fighting along the entire border.

Proposals of the Colombo Conference

In an attempt to bring India and China back to the conference table, Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike convened a conference at Colombo in December 1962, attended by six Afro-Asian countries--Ceylon(or Sri Lanka), Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma(or Myanmar), Egypt and Ghana. The conference produced some proposals, but the document became controversial because of different interpretations by the two antagonist powers. The Colombo conference produced the following proposals:

Firstly, with regard to the western sector, the Chinese government should carry out the withdrawal of 20 kilometers they had promised in its ceasefire order of November 21, 1962. That took the Chinese troops back across the line of actual control between the two sides as of September 7, 1959. The Indian government should keep their existing military positions on and up to this line. Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese troops would be treated as a demilitarized zone to be administered by the civilian posts of both sides. These proposals were based on the facts that prior to November 7, 1959, India exercised administrative control to the west of the traditional customary line claimed by the Chinese, and had sent out patrols to the east of that line from time to time. The Chinese administrative control reached somewhere to the east of that line. Between 1959 and 1962, India had established over 40 military check posts to the east of the traditional customary line, while the Chinese also had established a number of military posts up to the east of that line, and later Chinese troops reached that line during the 1962 war. However, the two countries did not agree on the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959.⁹²

Secondly, with regard to the eastern sector, the leaders of the six countries agreed that the line of actual control, namely, the McMahon Line, in the areas recognized by both the governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions, except for the two disputed areas--the Thagla ridge and the Longju area. In these two cases China and India differed on the line of actual control, and the Colombo conference left them for future discussions between the Chinese and Indian governments.⁹³

Thirdly, with regard to the middle sector, the leaders proposed that the status quo should be maintained and neither side should do

anything to disturb it. The disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.⁹⁴

The Chinese government argued that the principle of maintaining India's military positions should be applicable to the entire border, and not to the western sector alone. That meant that the Indian troops, as the Chinese troops had promised to do, should stay 20 km south of the McMahon Line. They argued that as long as the Indian troops were not to reappear in the areas under dispute, China was prepared to vacate the areas and not set up civilian posts there.⁹⁵ The Chinese accepted the Colombo proposals as conditional on the basis that India would not set up civilian posts in Ladakh and that Indian troops would stay 20 kilometers south of the McMahon Line, and thus a 40-kilometer demilitarized zone would be created. On the other hand, the Indian government insisted that India would only negotiate with China on the condition that China accepted the Colombo proposals without any reservations. The Indian government held that it had the right to establish civilian posts in the demilitarized zone in the western sector, and it would also have the right to control the areas south of the McMahon Line, except for the two disputed areas of the Thagla ridge and Longju. But the Indian government did not accept the November 7, 1959 line of actual control.

The essence of the dispute over implementation of the Colombo proposals was that both the Chinese and the Indians retained their respective claims to the disputed areas. The post-war history has shown that the so-called lines of cease-fire or the demilitarized zones have actually been regarded as the *de facto* boundaries. Any proposals unfavorable to Chinese or Indian territorial claims were inevitably refused. The Colombo conference proved unsuccessful in bringing the two countries back to negotiations on their border dispute.

The 1962 border war and the positions assumed by China and India with respect to the Colombo proposals are rooted in the unresolved legacy of the history of the border dispute. It is to a closer examination of that history that we must now turn.

Notes

1. *The Times of India*, January 10, 1960.

2. From my interview with Prof. Jagat. S. Mehta in May 1991. Also see Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1990), p. 61.

3. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, *White Paper No. 1*, pp. 46-47. India, in its note dated August 21, 1958, raised border differences over eastern, middle and western sectors and asked China to correct its maps with reference to India's official map published in 1956. China, in its note dated November 3, 1958, pointed out that a new way of drawing the boundary of China would be decided in accordance with the results of the consultations with the countries concerned and a survey of China's boundary. It should be noted that these notes were exchanged seven months before the Tibetan rebellion.

4. John Lall, *Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1989), p. 241.

5. *White Paper, No. 1*, p. 26.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

9. *Ibid.*.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

14. *Ibid.*.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

19. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1970), p. 102.

20. There were six Kalons in the then Tibetan Kasha. Two of them, Ngapo Ngawang Jime and Sampo Tsewang Rentzen, supported the 17-article agreement signed between the Chinese Central Government and the Tibet local government in 1951. One of them, Yuto Chahsidong-chu, fled to India's Kalimpong to join the Tibetan rebels there in 1957. And the three others openly joined the rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959. Before the rebellion they had taken advantage of their legitimate status to secretly organize and direct the rebel forces in the eastern and southern regions of the Tsangpo River.

21. *Peking Review*, April 21, 1959, p. 39.

22. *Ibid.*.

23. *Ibid.*, May 5, 1959, p. 7.

24. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1959, p. 7.

25. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1959, p. 9.

26. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1959, p. 9.

27. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1959, pp. 6-8.

28. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1959, p. 15.
29. Prithwis C. Chakravarti, *India-China Relations* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadaya, 1961), p. 97.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
32. *Peking Review*, April 29, 1959, pp. 6-14.
33. *Supplement to Peking Review*, April 12, 1959.
34. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
35. J. R. Saigal, *The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers pvt. Ltd., 1979), p. 19.
36. Lall, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
37. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
38. *Peking Review*, September 15, 1959, p. 8.
39. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1959, p. 8. and p. 15.
40. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 109. Also see *Peking Review*, September 15, 1959, p. 8.
41. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
42. *Peking Review*, October 27, 1959, p. 11.
43. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1959, p. 7.
44. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
45. B. N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: the Chinese Betrayal* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 243-244.
46. K. C. Praval, *Indian Army After Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), p. 154.
47. *Peking Review*, November 17, 1959. p. 13.
48. *Ibid.*, December 22, 1959. pp. 6-8.
49. *White Paper, No. II*, p. 45.
50. *The Hindustan Times*, October 29, 1959.
51. Praval, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
52. Chakravarti, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
53. *The Times of India*, October 11, 1959; and also see Maxwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.
54. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
55. J. P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-Indian War of 1962* (New Delhi: Thacker, 1969), pp. 69-70.
56. See the original map of the McMahon Line of March 24, 1914 in two sheets in *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), pp. 38-39.
57. Operation Onkar was the code name given to a plan to set up military posts along the McMahon Line from Khinzemane to the India-China-Burma tri-junction. It was to have been completed by the end of July 1962.
58. Niranjan Prasad, *The Fall of Towang* (New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1981), p. 16. and p. 23.

59. Praval, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
60. Prasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25; and also see Praval, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
61. Saigal, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
62. Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
64. *White Paper No. VII*, p. 106.
65. Dalvi, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
70. *The Statesman*, October 13, 1962.
71. Dalvi, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
73. Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
74. *People's Daily*, November 22, 1962.
75. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 424.
76. *Peking Review*, November 8, 1963, p. 19.
77. Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Vol. II* (Harmond Sworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 356.
78. Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 308-311.
79. T. N. Kaul, *Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991), p. 113.
80. *Pravda*, October 25, 1962. As quoted by Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 290.
81. *Pravda*, November 5, 1963. As quoted by Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day* (Agra, India: MG Publishers, 1991), p. 125.
82. *The New York Times*, March 30, 1962.
83. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 65.
84. *Peking Review*, June 29, 1962, p. 6.
85. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 63-64.
86. *People's Daily*, July 21, 1962; and also see Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
87. *The Hindu*, October 28, 1962; and also see John K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 439-440.
88. *The New York Times*, April 21 and July 5, 1963; and also see Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-456.
89. Dalvi, *op. cit.*, p. 478-479.

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 479-480.
91. Praval, *op. cit.*, p. xi.
92. B. N. Banerjee, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute* (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1985), pp. 82-87.
93. *Ibid.*.
94. *Ibid.*.
95. *Peking Review*, February 1, 1963, p. 10.

Chapter 3

The Sino-Indian Border

The relations between India and China have been entangled in the unresolved border dispute over the last four decades. Although the entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited by any mutually-accepted treaty, there has existed a boundary line of actual control between the two countries. It took shape on the basis of the extent of each side's administrative jurisdiction over a long course of time. As mentioned in the first chapter, the dispute involves all three sectors of the Sino-Indian border.

The Indian claim line in the eastern sector ran roughly along the foothills of the Himalayas from the late 19th century onward.¹ It had been observed by the British-Indian government as its Outer Line by 1914.² Before 1914, although the Chinese-Tibetan authorities had claimed the tribal areas beyond the British Outer Line within the Tibetan jurisdiction, the Chinese-Tibetan administrative jurisdiction actually covered only the Tawang tract, the Walong area along the Lohit valley, and some other scattered enclaves in the tribal areas. Later on, the British and the Indians adopted the "forward policy" and gradually pushed their administration north to the McMahon Line, running roughly along the crest of the Himalayas. Today the line of actual control by both sides in the eastern sector conforms to the McMahon Line. The disputed area between the pre-1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line covers a total area of 90,000 square kilometers. According to China, this area comprises Tibet's three districts of Monyul, Loyul and Lower Zayul; and according to India, this area is its Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North-East Frontier Agency(NEFA) of Assam State.

In the western sector, the line of actual control runs roughly along

the Karakoram range, conforming to the Chinese claim. The Indian government, however, claims that the boundary runs along the Kunlun range from the Karakoram Pass. The disputed area is the Aksai Chin region between the two ranges, covering a total area of about 33,000 square kilometers. This area falls mainly in China's Xinjiang and part of it belongs to the Ari District of Tibet. The Indian government claims that it is part of its Ladakh area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This area is sparsely inhabited, serving only as the traffic artery linking Xinjiang with Tibet.

The McMahon Line

After the British expanded their power over the whole of India, their primary security concern was focused upon the North-Western frontier with Afghanistan. Afghanistan had been historically the hub of commerce and trade between India, Iran and Russia, and had thus become the dueling ground of power expansion in Central Asia. The British launched two major wars against Afghanistan in 1838 and in 1878 for the purpose of preventing Russian influence from penetrating into Afghanistan and bringing Afghanistan under their own control. After the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-1879, the Anglo-Afghan convention was signed in May, 1879, making Afghanistan a British protectorate that had to deal with other countries through the intermediary of the British-Indian government. In 1893, Britain and Afghanistan signed an agreement under which the boundary, i.e., the Durand Line, was delimited, and the Afghan frontier tribal areas were brought within the British-Indian territory. Finally, Britain and Russia jointly delimited the Afghan northern boundary line with Russia in 1895. This British frontier policy was what Lord Curzon depicted as "the three-fold frontier". The three frontiers were interpreted as different degrees of territorial claims and administrative jurisdiction. The first frontier, i.e., the inner administrative boundary, limited the territory over which the British-Indian government exercised direct administration; the second frontier, i.e., the Durand Line, marked the Indo-Afghan boundary line, placing the frontier tribes under the British rule; and then came the third frontier line, the Afghan-Russian boundary or "the outer strategic frontier", which served as the limit of the Russian influence. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 defined their respective spheres of influence in Central Asia as well as in Tibet. Afghanistan became a buffer state between British India and Russia,

and Tibet was nominally left within the sphere of Chinese influence as a buffer zone between British-India and Russia.

According to the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, British policy toward Tibet was dominated by what was seen as the menacing Russian advance toward India. Both sides recognized the suzerain rights of China over Tibet, respected the territorial integrity of Tibet, and agreed to refrain from entering into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese government.³ Thus, each side attempted to use China to deter a possible advance by the other.

With the Chinese expedition in Eastern and Central Tibet from 1907 to 1911, and with their announcement after the 1911 Republican revolution that Tibet would be turned into a full province, the British attempted to obtain a security boundary in Northeast India and adopted a forward policy of pushing the British administration northward from the Outer Line into the tribal areas. From then on, the British began to work out a Sino-Indian boundary strategy which was analogous to the three-fold frontier in the Northwest. The nucleus of this frontier strategy was to acquire a satisfactory Indian-Tibetan boundary and a clearcut Sino-Tibetan boundary. This goal was fully evident in the Simla conference in 1913-1914. If this British attempt had been successful, the Sino-Tibetan boundary would have functioned as the Russian-Afghan frontier and the McMahon Line as the Durand Line.

Viceroy Lord Hardinge explained the frontier policy to London, stating that "Endeavour should be made to secure, as soon as possible, a sound strategic boundary between China-cum-Tibet and the tribal territory," and make this "the object of our policy."⁴ According to a memorandum of India's Foreign Office in September, 1912, this arrangement was that while Tibet nominally remained an autonomous state under China's suzerainty, it would actually be placed in a position of absolute dependence on the Indian government--keeping the Chinese out on the one hand and the Russians on the other.⁵ The basic British policy was that "British influence should be recognized at Lhasa in such a manner as to exclude that of any other power."⁶ During the period of 1911 and 1912, several expeditions were sent to the tribal areas to explore and survey this region, thus providing the knowledge requisite for the determination of a suitable boundary between India and China, "keeping her as far as possible removed from our present administered area."⁷ Sir Robert Reid, Governor of Assam from 1937-1942, admitted that at that time the British knew

practically nothing about that locality.⁸

Several Missions Beyond the Outer Line

In the tribal areas to the east of Bhutan, either beyond the Outer Line or beyond the Himalayan watershed, except the Tawang Tract and the Walong area, no organized administration had existed from British-India or from China cum Tibet. However, because of religious or economic activities, both sides had established contacts of varying degrees with the tribal communities within the reach of their respective influence.

Prior to 1914, the British-Indian government had observed the Outer Line as its external frontier. Sir Lancelot Hare, the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, addressed a letter to the Viceroy on November 24, 1910, stating that

We only now claim suzerainty up to the foot of the hills. We have an inner line and an outer line. Up to the inner line we administer in the ordinary way. Between the inner and the outer lines we only administer politically.⁹

It is not difficult to understand that the areas beyond the Outer Line were definitely not British-Indian territory. In the Tawang Tract, the Indo-Tibetan boundary was, in fact, fixed officially. It had been demarcated jointly by British and Tibetan officials in 1872 according to the 1853 agreement.¹⁰ The British General Staff in India noted in 1912 that "the present boundary is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Udalguri to the southern Bhutanese border."¹¹

Before 1914, there were two boundary lines, the Inner Line and the Outer Line along the Brahmaputra valley. According to the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873, the Inner Line was created to serve as an administrative boundary beyond which no taxes were collected. Its intention was to avoid possible friction between the tribes of the area and those people who penetrated into these areas from the Assam plains for trade or commercial purposes. In 1875-76, while the Inner Line was defined, the Outer Line was established as well from the Indo-Bhutanese border to Nizamghat where the two lines met. The Inner and Outer Lines ran very close to each other, less than ten miles apart. The Outer Line was created to serve as the

external frontier beyond which there was no British administrative jurisdiction. According to the map appended to Volume II of the 1909 edition of *Aitchison's Collection of Treaties*, the Outer Line was defined as the international boundary, and the tribal areas, including the region south of the Se La range, were colored with a yellow wash, which possibly meant that those tribal areas should, sometime in the future, fall within the British sphere of influence.

In the tribal areas between Bhutan and Burma, the Tibetans and Chinese called the tribes the Monbas (in the Tawang Tract) and Lobas (in the rest of the tribal areas). Ethnically, they are Mongoloid and speak languages of the Tibetan-Burmese family. However, the British divided these hill tribes into five major tribal groups--the Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors and Mishmis. Lamb vividly compared the tribal areas to a three-layered cake. The lowest layer represents the tribes in direct contact with the Assam plains; the top layer represents the tribes in contact with the Tibetans; and the middle layer represents the tribes without direct contact either from the British or from the Tibetans or Chinese.¹² Evidence provided by both the Chinese and Indian governments shows that, up to 1914, there had existed no administrative institution in the tribal areas established by either the British or the Tibetans, although the Tibetans and the Chinese regarded the foothills as the traditional customary boundary line between India and Tibet. The British paid cash subsidies to some of the hill tribes beyond the pre-1914 Outer Line with whom they were in contact. This fact has been construed by the Indian government to mean that these tribes had thus become British-Indian subjects. However, the Tibetans also paid subsidies to and collected dues from the hill tribes to their south. By the same token, the Chinese-Tibetan authorities regarded these tribal areas within their administrative jurisdiction. Historically, for the purposes of grazing and trade, population movements and dual relationships were often found in the tribal areas between British India and China's Tibet.

The Tawang Tract is situated between the Tibetan plateau and the Assam plains, and a traditional trade route runs through it. Geographically, the Tawang Tract may be divided into two regions and the Se La range serves as a dividing line. To the north of the Se La sits the great Tawang monastery, a daughter house of Drepung Monastery, one of the Three Great Monasteries at Lhasa. Tawang was also the winter residence of the two Dzungpons of the Tsona district in Tibet. They, as representatives of the Tibetan authorities, directly

administered this region. The sixth Dalai Lama was born near Tawang in the late 17th century. From the Se La range southward to the edge of the Assam plains, the region, as the monastic estates of the Tawang monastery, was administered by the officials appointed by the Tawang monastery. The Senge Dzong at the foot of the Se La range was a private estate of the Tsona dzongpons.

In the Tsari district of Tibet, where Migyitun is situated on the upper reaches of the Subansiri River, every year the Tibetans made the Kinkor or "Short Pilgrimage", and every twelve years they made the Ringkor or "Great Pilgrimage". These pilgrimages involved a journey southward to the junction of the Subansiri-Tsari with its tributary, the Chayul Chu. This junction is about twenty miles south of the McMahon Line. According to McMahon's March 24 note to Lonchen Shatra, if the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within one day's march of the British side of the frontier, they would be included within Tibetan territory. On the Subansiri valley, Tali was the farthest point reached by the British on the upper reach of the Kamla River.

Where the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra cuts through the main range, the Tibetans had already established some measure of political control over the nearest tribal communities by the end of the 19th century. The Tibetans claimed jurisdiction down to a point below Karko and Simong. Mipi on the upper reach of the Dibang River and Geling on the upper reach of the Dihang River were Tibetan settlements below the McMahon Line. Lhatsa was a Tibetan estate on the upper reach of the Siyom River.

In the Lohit valley, the Tibetans had established close contact with the Mishmis in the pre-McMahon years. In 1911, while F. M. Bailey went down the Lohit valley, he found some Mishmi chiefs were on their way to Rima (a center of Tibetan authority in the region) for a tribal conference summoned by the Chinese. Also, in the same year, Chinese officials were found on the upper reaches of the Delei River to have issued to the Mishmi chiefs documents stating that the Mishmis had tendered their submission to Zhao Erfeng.¹³ From December 1907 to January 1908, an expedition party led by Noel Williamson, Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya (1906-1911), went up the Lohit River towards Rima. They arrived at Sati, a village south of Walong that paid tributes to the Governor of Rima, a major town in East Tibet. Sir Lancelot Hare considered that Sati was a frontier village between China and India. Williamson had orders not to enter

Tibet and, therefore, he did not go beyond that village.¹⁴ In 1910, on the Chinese side, Zhao Erfeng's expedition reached the Yepak River, two miles west of Walong or 30 miles west of Rima, and planted flags there. In 1912, the Chinese put up a fresh pine plank near the old boundary markers, bearing an inscription in Chinese, Tibetan and English. It read that "The Southern Boundary of Chuan Tien Zayul of C.R. established by Special Commissioner Chiong Fong Chi and Magistrate of Tsa-yu-kes Win Chin-tsa-yu, June 9th 1912." In 1914, the Chinese boundary pillars, old or fresh, were removed by T. P. M. O'Callaghan, Assistant to W. C. M. Dundas in administering the Eastern Section of the tribal hills.¹⁵ This pine plank shows that the Chinese accepted the Tibetan boundary running along south of Walong at that time.

Mr. Williamson made another tour in the Mishmi Hills in early 1911. During this expedition in the Abor country, Mr. Williamson and most members of his party were killed by the tribals in March 1911. In retaliation, a punitive expedition was undertaken in the Abor country in 1911-1912. This expedition also undertook surveys and exploration in order to secure information for a suitable boundary in the Abor and Mishmi tribal areas. The British-Indian government instructed Major-General H. Brower, who led the Abor expedition, that the Mishmi and Abor countries should be put under British control, and that the Chinese should be prevented from establishing their influence over the Abors and the Mishmis. In other words, the traditional Outer Line should be advanced. The proposed boundary line was described as follows:

the external boundary should run, approximately, from the east of the wedged-shaped portion of Tibetan territory known as the Tawang district, which runs down to the British frontier north of Udalguri in a north-easterly direction to latitude 29 degree, longitude 94 degree, thence along latitude 29 degree to longitude 96 degree; thence in the south-easterly direction to the Zayul Chu as far east as near as possible to Rima; thence across the Zayul Chu valley to the Zayul Chu-Irrawaddy watershed; and then along that watershed until it joins the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed.¹⁶

Apparently, at that time, the British-Indian government accepted the fact that the Tawang tract belonged to Tibetan territory. In the Walong area, it was proposed that one cairn should be required in the

neighborhood of Menilkrai on the Lohit valley, opposite the flags erected by the Chinese, to mark the limits of their territory.¹⁷ Here the boundary line was considered to run somewhere between Walong and Menilkrai, and Walong would be put within Chinese territory.

The Simla Conference

To further this objective, Sir John Gordon, British Minister in Beijing, was instructed to send a threatening memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Office. It stated that the British government was not prepared to admit China's right to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet, and that they would not tolerate the presence of an unlimited number of Chinese troops in Tibet. The British threatened that all communications with Tibet via India would be closed to the Chinese until an agreement was concluded.¹⁸ The Chinese government argued that the existing treaties had clearly defined Tibet's status, and that there was no need to negotiate a new one.¹⁹ Then, John Gordon bluntly told the Chinese Foreign Office that if China refused to conclude a new treaty, the British government would not recognize the new Chinese government in Beijing and would negotiate one directly with Tibet alone.²⁰ Under such pressure, the weak Beijing government was forced to attend the Simla conference.

The tripartite conference was held in Simla from October 13, 1913 to July 3, 1914, with Indian Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon as the host and mediator. Chen Ivan and Lonchen Shatra, respectively, represented China and Tibet. The agenda of the Simla conference centered on the status of Tibet and the division of Outer and Inner Tibet, without discussing the Sino-Indian or Tibetan-Indian boundary question.

However, there were actually two parallel conferences. One was the tripartite conference focusing on the status of Tibet in the Sino-Tibetan relations, and the other was the secret British-Tibetan conference focusing on the division of the Indian-Tibetan boundary behind the back of the Chinese government. In early 1914, McMahon, through Charles Bell's coordination, negotiated with the Tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra on the boundary between Assam and Tibet.²¹ According to Sir Charles Bell, one of his duties was to negotiate with the Tibetan delegate the boundary line between Tibet and Northeast India, and the other was to negotiate a new trade treaty to govern trade and commercial relations between Outer Tibet and

British India. He said that "as far as I can remember, I was free to follow my own ideas."²² An agreement was reached through a secret exchange of notes in Delhi on March 24 and 25, 1914. This boundary line, which later came to be known as the McMahon Line, was shown on a map in two sheets. On this two-sheet map, the Tawang tract was put within Indian territory. But it was not until 1960, half a century later, that this map was for the first time published with its inclusion included in *An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India*, published by Indian Ministry of External Affairs.²³

On the other hand, at the Simla conference, the three representatives focused on McMahon's proposal, which referred to China's suzerainty over Tibet and the two-zone division of Tibet. They did not discuss the Indo-Tibetan or Indo-Chinese boundary line. On the map attached to the draft convention of the conference, two lines were drawn, one red and the other blue. The red line showed Tibet as a geographical and political unit, and the blue line divided Inner from Outer Tibet. In its southern extension, the red line curves around along the crest of the Himalayas, roughly conforming to the McMahon Line except in the Tawang Tract. On this map the McMahon Line reached short of the Tawang tract, implying that the Tawang tract was still part of Tibetan territory. This line was roughly in conformity with the line proposed by the British-Indian government in its instructions to Major-General H. Brower in 1911.

Without the consent of the Chinese government, Chen Ivan, under McMahon's threat and pressure, initialed the draft convention with McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on April 27, 1914, but with the clear understanding that "to initial and to sign are two different actions," and that his initials would not bind his government, whose views he would immediately seek.²⁴ On April 28, 1914, the Chinese government instructed Chen Ivan that "The Chinese representative was forced to initial the draft convention. The Chinese government cannot accept it. You should declare it invalid."²⁵ Since the Chinese representative refused to sign the draft convention, it was then amended and initialed by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on July 3, 1914. At the same time, a new set of trade regulations was signed, replacing those of 1893 and 1908. The declaration signed by the British and Tibetan representatives stated that "We acknowledge the annexed convention as initialed to be binding on the governments of Great Britain and Tibet."²⁶ Also, a map was attached to the July 3 convention. On this map the McMahon Line was marked across the

town of Tawang, indicating that the area to the north of Tawang would fall within Tibetan territory.²⁷

In fact, neither the Indian government nor the British government authorized McMahon to sign a treaty with the Tibetan representative without the participation of the Chinese representative. On July 1, just two days before the signing of the Simla convention, the Earl of Crewe, Secretary of State for India, sent a telegram to Lord Hardinge, instructing McMahon not to sign the convention with Lonchen Shatra if Chen Ivan refused to sign. He also stated that "negotiations should definitely be terminated by Sir Henry McMahon. He should express great regret at failure to arrive at a settlement..."²⁸ Crewe's telegram, dated July 3, also stated that "separate signature by Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries can not be authorized by His Majesty's Government."²⁹ Viceroy Hardinge forwarded McMahon's report on the Simla conference to London on July 23, 1914, stating that the Indian government recognized that a consideration of the northeastern frontier did not form part of the functions of the conference, and that the views and proposal put forward might be regarded as personal to Henry McMahon, not carrying the endorsement of the Government of India.³⁰

On the Chinese side, Chen Ivan was instructed to declare that he had received his government's order not to sign the draft convention, and that the Chinese government "would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might now or hereafter be signed between Great Britain and Tibet."³¹

Moreover, the Tibetan authorities only regarded the McMahon Line as part and parcel of the general arrangements of borders contemplated in the 1914 convention. They understood that without securing the Sino-Tibetan boundary, they could not accept the Indo-Tibetan boundary.³²

In terms of McMahon's note of March 24, 1914, the Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the McMahon Line would not be disturbed, and certain dues then collected by the Tibetan government at Tsona Dzong and in Kongbu and Kham "may still be collected." If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa on the Tsari-Subansiri valley fall within one day's march of the British side of the McMahon Line, they would belong to Tibet.

Apparently, the Tsona Dzongpons and the Tawang monastery would not be deprived of their right to collect revenues from their possessions south of the McMahon Line in the Tawang Tract. The

Kongbu authority would have the right to go on collecting dues down the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra valley. The Kham authority with the administration of Zayul district, which had been extended down below Walong on the Lohit valley, would also have the right to continue revenue collecting.

The controversy over the McMahon Line in part rests on the legal status of Tibet as a signatory to the British-Tibetan agreement of July 3, 1914, and the notes of March 24 1914. The Simla conference failed to secure the formal approval of the tripartite agreement from the Chinese government. Although India upholds the legal validity of the McMahon Line, China has denied the binding force of the Simla convention.

According to the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1906 and the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, the British agreed not to annex Tibet or any part of it; and the British would not enter into any negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese government. The British and Russians at least recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.³³ Other powers, including the U.S. government, had never questioned the status of China in Tibet.³⁴ Thus, the British themselves had no legal right to negotiate and sign a treaty with the Tibetans without Chinese consent or participation.

Even in the July 3 Simla convention signed by the British and Tibetan representatives, the British recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, and they also recognized that Tibet was part of Chinese territory. Thus, the text itself of the Simla convention of July 3, 1914, indicated that the British did not regard Tibet as an independent and sovereign state enjoying international personality. As L. C. Green states, an agreement signed and accepted by one state and another under suzerainty has no general validity in international law, although it may be valid to the extent that the parties concerned recognizes each other and such a recognition does not affect any existing rights of the suzerain state.³⁵ Since the British did not recognize the sovereign status of Tibet and the agreement signed by the British and Tibetan representatives affected China's territorial integrity, the McMahon Line itself had no legal significance.

The Dalai Lama even recognized the logic relationship between the status of Tibet and the McMahon Line. In his 1959 address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, he contended that if Tibet had no sovereignty when the Simla Convention laid down the McMahon Line, that line was invalid. He challenged Nehru that "If you deny

sovereign status to Tibet, you deny the validity of the Simla Convention, and therefore you deny the validity of the McMahon Line."³⁶

After the Simla conference broke up, dialogue continued between Britain and China on the Tibet question. In 1918 alone, John Gordon pressed the Chinese Foreign Office at least nine times to reopen negotiations for settling the Tibetan problem.³⁷ In September 1916, the British Legation at Beijing produced the *Memorandum on Tibetan Question* which summarized the previous British-Chinese dialogues and served as a point of reference for subsequent British diplomacy. This document indicated that a new tripartite treaty should be negotiated to replace the Simla convention.³⁸ Later, as a result of discussions between John Jordon and members of Chinese Foreign Ministry, Eric Teickman worked out a draft for a new tripartite treaty in 1919, a draft substitute for the abortive Simla convention of 1914. This draft proposed that the concept of the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer zones should be abandoned.³⁹ All these diplomatic contacts showed that the Simla convention was not considered conclusive even in the eyes of the British.

As mentioned above, there are three maps which are related to the Simla conference: one is attached to the March 24 notes; one to the April 27 convention; and the third to the July 3 convention. As far as the Tawang Tract is concerned, the three maps show the McMahon Line quite differently. On the first map, the McMahon Line was shown running along south of the Thagla range far north of Tawang; on the second one, it is not shown in the Tawang tract; and on the third one, it is superimposed on the word "Tawang". If India bases its claims on the March 1914 notes, the two-sheet map was attached, neither to the draft convention of April 27, nor to the convention of July 3.

Moreover, in terms of the texts of the notes exchanged between Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, the boundary line should be seen as a provisional one that might need some modifications in the light of further information.

If India bases its claims on the July 3 convention which does not refer to the map attached to the March 24 Notes, she would find it difficult to lay her claims to the entire Tawang tract. According to the maps attached to the Simla tripartite conference, a dilemma faces India--if India insists on the McMahon Line as its boundary in the eastern sector, it cannot shut her eyes to the northwestern extremity

of this line. The red line at its northwestern extremity curves roughly around where Aksai Chin would be situated if it were marked. The northwestern extremity of the McMahon Line puts the area south of the Kunlun range within the territory of the proposed Outer Tibet. This area can be clearly identified as at least a large part of the present Aksai Chin area.

Therefore, if the Simla maps give legal strength to the Indian claims for a McMahon Line in the eastern sector, then they would also give just the same weight against her claims to the Aksai Chin area in the western sector.⁴⁰

As far as the objective of the Simla conference was concerned, it was certainly aborted. The McMahon Line was only McMahon's personal diplomatic intrigue. Later, the British put the McMahon Line in cold storage, and the Tibetan authorities continued to exercise administrative jurisdiction in the tribal areas as they did before. On the official maps published by the Survey of India, the McMahon Line was not shown, but instead the Outer Line along the foothills of the Himalayas was shown. As to the Simla conference, the first official record appeared in Volume XIV of the 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties*.⁴¹ It did not refer to the McMahon Line, but to the discussion on the Sino-Tibetan frontier. It was stated that a tripartite convention was drawn up and initialed in 1914, but the Chinese government refused to permit its representative to proceed to full signature.⁴²

From the Mystery to the Reality

From 1914 to 1935, the McMahon Line was never shown on any official British map or mentioned in any official British document. The Outer Line remained as India's external frontier in the Assam Himalayas. The Simla convention was shelved with the three conferees disgraced. The Simla conference went down in history as an unaccomplished cause.

Tibetans arrested Captain Kingdon Ward, a British explorer and botanist, on the charges of illegal entry into Tibet through the Tawang Tract in 1935. Olaf K. Caroe, Deputy Secretary in the Foreign and Political Department of the British-Indian Government, in dealing with this case, unearthed the secret documents of the Simla conference. Caroe realized that the northeastern frontier might become a matter of dispute with the Chinese, and pressed for the rudiments of admini-

stration into the areas abutting the McMahon Line. His proposal included the revision of the official record of the Simla conference in Aitchison's Treaties and the official maps on which the McMahon Line should be shown. He argued that the absence of the Simla agreements from such a publication as Aitchison's Treaties, if it became known to the Chinese government, might well be used by them in support of the argument that no ratified agreement existed between India and Tibet.⁴³

The British government approved his proposal, and this volume of the 1929 edition was soon withdrawn from circulation and replaced by a spurious edition, actually printed in 1938, but with an imprint of 1929.⁴⁴ However, at least three copies of the original 1929 edition survived, one in Peking Library, one in Harvard University library, and one in the India Office. In the 1938 edition, it was stated that the Simla conference negotiated an agreement on the status of Tibet and the boundary of Tibet with both China and India and that the Simla convention was ratified by Great Britain and Tibet by means of a declaration accepting the terms as binding on themselves.⁴⁵ Such a revision was nothing but scandalous diplomatic forgery. In the meantime, the Surveyor-General of India was told to show the Indo-Tibetan frontier on the basis of the red line on the Simla convention maps. It was then that the McMahon Line began to appear on the Indian official maps. However, it was still marked as "Undemarcated Boundary".

Although the British steadily pushed forward in the tribal areas after 1914, they had made no real attempt to disturb Tibet's possession of Tawang. Nothing was done to give effect to McMahon's recommendation for extension of administration there. Considering the fact that official Chinese maps showed the traditional Outer Line as the Sino-Indian boundary, and that the Tibetans were exercising administration and collecting revenues in the Tawang Tract, the Assam government was concerned that the continued exercise of jurisdiction by Tibet in the Tawang area might enable China to claim prescriptive rights over this part of Tibetan territory recognized as within India by the notes of March 24/25, 1914.

The Sheng Pao, a Chinese newspaper, published an officially authorized *Atlas of China* in April 1934, which shown the Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern sector along the foothills of the Himalayas. Olaf Caroe asked the British government to lodge a protest with the Chinese government. However, the British Foreign Ministry and the

India Office reminded Caroe of the fact that the boundary line was similarly shown on maps of Great Britain and maps of the India Office.⁴⁶

In autumn 1936, Basil Gould, Political Officer in Sikkim, was dispatched to Lhasa and discussed the Tawang issue with the Tibetan government. The Tibetan attitude was that

(1) up to 1914 Tawang had undoubtedly been Tibetan; (2) they regarded the adjustment of the Tibet-Indian boundary as part and parcel of the general adjustment and determination of boundaries contemplated in the 1914 Convention. If they could, with our help, secure a definite Sino-Tibetan boundary, they would of course be glad to observe the Indo-Tibetan border as defined in 1914; (3) they had been encouraged in thinking that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India sympathized with this way of regarding the matter owing to the fact that at no time since the Convention and Declaration of 1914 had the Indian Government taken steps to question Tibetan, or to assert British, authority in the Tawang area.⁴⁷

Considering the Tibetan attitude and the possibility that China would regain control of Tibet, the Assam government proposed in September 1936 that the collection of revenues for the Tibetan government should be discontinued, and that replacement of Tibetan officials by British administration should be considered. The Assam government also proposed that it should be highly desirable to emphasize the interest of British India in the Tawang area either by actual tours or by collecting the revenue themselves.⁴⁸

In 1937, Robert Reid, the governor of Assam, sent a expedition headed by Captain G. S. Lightfoot, the Political Officer in Balipara Frontier Tract, to Tawang to collect revenues, demonstrating that the Tawang Tract was under the British authority. In April 1938, when the Lightfoot expedition reached Tawang, the Tibetan government protested to Basil Gould, and demanded that Lightfoot withdraw. The local officials were collecting revenues before Lightfoot's eyes. After Lightfoot returned, he and Reid proposed that all the Tibetan officials should be made to withdraw from the Tawang area, and that British officials should be stationed permanently in Tawang and Dirang Dzong. However, their proposal was rejected by the Indian government, stating that they would not take any action which "would commit them to permanent occupation and further


expenditure."⁴⁹

In October 1944, Basil Gould informed the Tibetan authorities that his government was willing to modify the McMahon Line so as to exclude Tawang from the territory it claimed. It was proposed that the Se La range should be a new boundary line.⁵⁰ By the time the British left India in 1947, the British had already established military posts in the area south of the Se La range and Dirang Dzong had become an administrative center. However, the Tibetans still continued their administrative control over the entire Tawang Tract.


Following independence in 1947, the Indian government pursued an even more forward policy in the tribal belt than had the British. The Indians gradually extended their scope of actual control northward to the vicinity of the McMahon Line, taking over the Tawang Tract by force in February, 1951, just before the whole Tibet was placed under control by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This event was not made public by the Indian media. The Tibetan authorities organized protest demonstrations in Tawang and Lhasa against India's occupation of the Tawang Tract, but to no avail. The Chinese government did not react to this event, and the Indian government saw it as tacit acceptance of India's occupation of the Tawang tract. The fact is that the Chinese Nationalists had been expelled by the Tibetan authorities in July 1949, and the Chinese Communists had not yet entered Tibet. The new Chinese government did not know of the Indian incursion into Tawang. After Tibet was liberated, the Tibetans reported it to the central government and asked the central government to liberate the Tawang tract. Considering that the Korean war was going on, and that attention could not be diverted away from the eastern front, it was decided to postpone settlement of the Tawang issue. Thus, the Indians accomplished what the British had been seeking since the Simla conference, and pushed their administration to the McMahon Line by force in 1951.

Aksai Chin

In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, the dispute has centered on the Aksai Chin area. In terms of topography, the Karakoram range is the main range in the Aksai Chin area. As D. K. Palit, the Director of Military Operations during the Sino-Indian border war, states that "The Karakoram range constitutes a genuine



2. The Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border



3. The Western Sector of the Sino-Indian Border

watershed between the Indus and Central Asian river systems and eminently qualifies as a natural boundary."⁵¹ The British left Aksai Chin undefined at the time of their transfer of power in 1947. As late as in 1959, Indian Prime Minister Nehru himself admitted this fact by stating that

It is a matter of argument as to what part of it [Aksai Chin] belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else....The point is, there has never been any delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged area.⁵²

He also admitted that "It is an uninhabitable area and it has not been under any kind of administration. Nobody has been present there. It is a territory where not even a blade of grass grows, about 17,000 feet high."⁵³

Before the British left India, the British-Indian government had shown no boundary at all in that area on its official maps. In Volume XII of Aitchison's *Treaties* published in 1931, it was stated that "The northern as well as the eastern boundary of the Kashmir state is still undefined."⁵⁴ The Survey of India maps published in the 1920s and 1930s did not indicate any boundary alignment or show any color difference in this area, and wide spaces between Kashmir and Xinjiang and between Kashmir and Tibet were shown blank.⁵⁵

The British-Indian authorities had, for a period, privately abided by the 1898-99 proposal as the boundary line between Kashmir, on the one hand, and Xinjiang and Tibet, on the other. On July 4, 1907, Louis Dane, Indian Foreign Secretary, made it clear in a letter to the India Office that Aksai Chin was in Chinese Xinjiang.⁵⁶ The neighborhood of the Lanak Pass at the head of the Changchenmo valley was supposed to be the most northerly boundary point on the Kashmir-Tibet border.

After the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904, the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1906 and the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 were signed, the British gained a foothold in Tibet by excluding Russian and Chinese influence there. British strategists anticipated that Chinese Xinjiang would probably fall into the sphere of Russian influence. In 1905, they revised the 1899 boundary line and pushed it several miles to the north of the main Karakoram range, putting Khunjerab Pass, Shimshal Pass and Darwaza within the British-Indian territory; and on the other, they attempted to place the Aksai Chin region within the

Tibetan territory. In his letter of July 4, 1907, to the India Office, Louis Dane suggested that the Aksai Chin region might be transferred to Tibet.⁵⁷ The maps of the 1914 Simla conference indicated the British attempt to move the Aksai Chin region from Xinjiang to Tibet. It was quite clear that the region between the 1899 boundary line to the east of the Karakoram Pass and the western extremity of the proposed Outer Tibetan boundary, or the "Red Line" on the maps of the 1914 Simla conference, was the Aksai Chin plateau.

In 1945, under the guidance of Olaf Caroe, Foreign Secretary of India, on new Survey of India maps the Aksai Chin area began to be shown by a color-wash with the words "Boundary Undefined" marked on it.⁵⁸ However, in 1947, the Indian Army in its "top secret" map submitted to the British Cabinet Mission accepted the Karakoram range as the northern boundary of India in the western sector.⁵⁹ From 1947 to 1954, on India's official maps a color wash covered a wide tract of territory north of the Karakoram range, where Aksai Chin plateau falls. But this area was still marked as "Boundary Undefined".

Professor K. Zachariah, the first Director of the Historical Division of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, told the North and North-East Border Committee (1951-1953) that no boundary had been well-defined along the northern and northeastern periphery of Kashmir, and that three versions of boundary had been put forward by British officials, cartographers and explorers at various periods since 1846 when Kashmir came under the British rule.⁶⁰

However, after the signing of the trade agreement concerning Tibet in 1954, following Nehru's instructions, new Survey of India maps began to show an international boundary in the western sector running along the crest of the Kunlun range, which for the first time placed the whole Aksai Chin area within the Indian territory.

In 1959, Dr. S. Gopal, Director of the Historical Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, was sent to London to go through the documents on the Sino-Indian border in the India Office and Foreign Office archives. He told Prime Minister Nehru that India's claim to the Aksai Chin area was stronger than China's.⁶¹ However, except for evidence of the unilateral British boundary proposals and India's arbitrary revisions on its official maps, what historical evidence Dr. Gopal found there, which could establish Indian claims to Aksai Chin in terms of international law, remains a mystery. On September 4, 1959, Nehru still stated in Lok Sabha that

the actual boundary of Ladakh with Tibet was not very carefully defined. It was defined to some extent by British officers who went there. But I rather doubt if they did any careful survey. They marked the line. It has been marked all along in our maps.⁶²

However, three weeks later, in a letter to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, he returned to his position of 1954 by stating that "the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides"; and that "beyond doubt the whole of Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory".⁶³

The Indian government holds that the boundary line was fixed by a treaty concluded between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842. As a matter of fact, the treaty was a non-aggression pact which bound each to respect the territory of the other. It did not specify where "the old, established frontiers" lay between them.⁶⁴ Moreover, about 80 percent of the Aksai Chin area had been part of China's Xinjiang, but Xinjiang was not a party to the treaty. According to William Moorcroft,⁶⁵ the Chinese boundary was located at the Karakoram Pass. South of the Pangong Lake, the boundary was located between Chusul and Spanggur, and Demchok on the Indus belonged to Gartok in Tibet. However, between the Karakoram Pass and the Pangong Lake no boundary was indicated by Moorcroft.⁶⁶ Moorcroft's description of the boundary line is generally closer to the Chinese claim.

Since 1846, when the British placed Kashmir including Ladakh under their rule, there have been three major versions of the northern and eastern boundary of Kashmir advocated by British officials at various periods.

The Karakoram line was shown on the earlier Indian maps. The map of the Northern Frontier of British Hindustan published by Survey of India in 1862 showed the Karakoram range as forming this frontier. The "Sketch Map of Eastern Turkestan of 1870" by G. W. Hayward and the "Sketch Map of the Country North of India of 1871" by Robert Shaw⁶⁷ showed a frontier closely approaching the line indicated on the 1862 map. Both Shaw and Hayward conducted actual surveys in the region under British official aegis. Hayward stated clearly that

The natural boundary of Eastern Turkistan to the south is the main chain of the Karakoram; and the line extending along the east of this

range, from the Muztagh to the Karakoram, and from the Karakoram to the Changchenmo passes, may be definitely fixed in its geographical and political bearing as constituting the limit of the Maharaja of Kashmir's dominions to the north.⁶⁸

The map prepared by the India Office for the Foreign Office in 1873 showed that natural alignment for a boundary between the Karakoram Pass and the Changchenmo valley. It would run largely southeastward from the Karakoram Pass to the Changchenmo valley, and the Aksai Chin area would be excluded from Kashmir.

In 1865, a survey of the northeastern border area of Kashmir was entrusted to W. H. Johnson. He crossed over the Aksai Chin area from Leh to Khotan. His survey included, on British maps, a sizable tract of land which had been considered to be outside Kashmir's territory. The proposed boundary line pushed Kashmir's northeastern border some hundred miles to the north of the Karakoram Pass and far beyond the main Karakoram range. Johnson's boundary proposal followed the crest of the main Kunlun range, including the upper reaches of the Yarkand river and its tributaries, the Karakash valley and the entire Aksai Chin plateau within Kashmir's territory. Johnson's border approach represented the forward school of British-Indian frontier policy.⁶⁹

In the late 19th century, the British policy on the northwestern frontier was to prevent contact between their territory and Russia's in Central Asia. The British wanted China to become the buffer between them.⁷⁰ In 1889, Viceroy Lord Lansdowne stated that the country between the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges was of no value and very inaccessible. He thought that the British might encourage the Chinese to take it, if they showed any inclination to do so. That would be better than leaving a no-man's land between India and China. Thus, China would become an obstacle to Russian advance.⁷¹

In 1890, Captain Francis Younghusband (who had been sent to the Pamirs to trace the geographical limits of China's claims) was stationed as a British officer at Kashgar. The Chinese told him that China's boundary ran along the Karakoram range and the watershed between the Indus and the Tarim basin.⁷² Two years later, the Chinese erected a boundary marker at the Karakoram Pass with an inscription stating that the Chinese territory began there. This move was welcomed by the British.⁷³ Thus, the Karakoram Pass became a mutually accepted point on the Sino-Indian boundary. In the winter

of 1890, when the Chinese retook Shahidula on the Karakash valley, the Indian Foreign Department accepted the Chinese action. A despatch sent to London stated that

We are inclined to think that the wisest course would be to leave them in possession.... It is evidently to our advantage that the tract of territory intervening between the Karakoram and Kuen lun mountains should be definitely held by a friendly power like China.⁷⁴

In 1896, the Chinese told George Macartney, the British representative at Kashgar from 1891 to 1918, that Aksai Chin was their territory when Macartney showed Johnson's version of the boundary on a copy of an atlas putting Aksai Chin within British territory.⁷⁵ Later Macartney himself considered that "it was probably the case that part was in Chinese and part in British territory."⁷⁶

Following the Chinese defeat by the Japanese in 1895, Chinese rule in Xinjiang was expected to collapse and to be replaced by the Russians. In 1897, Sir John Ardagh, then Director of Military Intelligence of the British General Staff, asserted that, in order to forestall the Russian advance toward India, the British should include within their territory the whole of Aksai Chin, since China was too weak to act as a buffer between Russia and the northern frontier of India. He considered that although the Karakoram range generally formed an acceptable defensive boundary, easy to define, difficult to pass, measures requisite for security and for information on movements of an enemy could not be carried out adequately unless the British held a series of ranges to the north of the main Karakoram mountains. This proposed boundary line, known as the Johnson-Ardagh Line, ran along the crest of the Kunlun range. This proposed boundary alignment was rejected by Viceroy Lord Elgin on the ground that this line would lead to strained relations with China and might precipitate the Russian advance.⁷⁷

The Viceroy adopted Macartney's proposal that Aksai Chin should be divided between Britain and China along the boundary following the Lak Tsang range. On March 14, 1899, Sir Claude McDonald, British Minister in Peking, put this proposal to the Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs. This proposed boundary line was later known as the Macartney-McDonald Line. However, the Chinese neither rejected nor accepted it. According to the 1899 British proposal, the boundary line in the Aksai Chin area is described as

follows:

From the Karakoram Pass the crests of the range run nearly east for about half a degree, and then turn South to a little below the 35th parallel of North Latitude. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kizil Jilga and from there, in a South-easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung Range until that meets a spur running south from the Kuen Lun Range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° East-Longitude.⁷⁸

Later, the British proposal was conveyed by the Beijing government to the Xinjiang provincial government. It was said that the Xinjiang provincial government had raised no objections, either to the proposed alignment or to the method for its definition.⁷⁹ There is no evidence that the Beijing government conveyed this proposal to the Tibetan authorities. In 1938, the British and Chinese representatives discussed the border incidents in Kashgar. Chinese representative General Jiang was said to mention the 1899 boundary proposal, and he did not recognize the proposed line as a valid border definition. However, he indicated that the Chinese did not agree to negotiate the 1899 border proposal, mainly because they did not want to accept the British annexation of Hunza, not because they disagreed with the proposed boundary alignment.⁸⁰

The Indian government, however, mistakenly interpreted this proposed boundary (whether intentional or not). The proposal clearly described "a spur running south from the Kunlun Range" as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. But the Indian government distorted the Kunlun range as the northern boundary of Ladakh. During the 1960 border talks, the Indian government interpreted the 1899 British proposal to mean that "the northern boundary ran along the Kunlun range to a point east of 80° East Longitude where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh...."⁸¹

Such misquotations of the 1899 proposal have been made by some prominent Indian writers on the Sino-Indian border dispute, such as P. K. Chakravarti.⁸² This misinterpretation has been repeated in many Indian official publications, confusing public opinion.

The Chinese delegates to the 1960 talks were so unprepared that they could not point out India's distorted description of the 1899

proposed line in the Aksai Chin area. They could only argue that these proposals showed that "the boundary question had not been settled."⁸³ It is understandable that the Chinese did not accept this proposed line as a valid boundary line for two reasons: the proposed line put within China only about half of the Aksai Chin area which the Chinese government claims; and also because the unilateral proposal of the British, which had not been accepted by the Chinese government, could not be regarded as the legal basis of India's territorial claims.

According to the Indian Foreign Department's *Note on the History of the Boundary of Kashmir between Ladakh and Kashgaria*, dated July 4, 1907, Sir Louis Dane, the Indian foreign secretary, proposed that, even if China could be excluded from Aksai Chin by modifying the 1899 line, this tract should be confirmed in the possession of Tibet, which would serve as a buffer between British India and Russia in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty. Dane stated that

The object in showing the boundary as far north as possible was to prevent the possibility of the road being improved right up to the Karakoram.... We hope, however, to be able to keep Aksai Chin in Tibet in order to adhere to the Kuenlun boundary for that country, as far as possible, and we are having enquiries instituted with a view to determining, if possible, the southernmost marks of Chinese jurisdiction in the neighbourhood of the Kuenlun Range.⁸⁴

Dane's intention was later reflected in the maps attached to the convention of the Simla conference. In these maps Aksai Chin was intentionally included in Outer Tibet.

Following Viceroy Elgin, Lord Curzon, Lord Minto and Lord Hardinge had different ideas on a boundary alignment in the northwestern frontier. They rejected the Macartney-MacDonald line in favor of the more northerly Johnson-Ardagh line along the Kunlun range. After the Chinese Republic Revolution, On September 12, 1912, Lord Hardinge dispatched a telegram to Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India. In it he analyzed the situation of the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Chinese empire in Central Asia. In order to deter a possible Russian advance in Central Asia, Lord Hardinge proposed a boundary line similar to the one proposed by Sir John Ardagh in 1897. He stated that

A good line would be one commencing from Baiyik Peak running eastwards to Chang Pass, leaving Taghdumbash and Dehda on British side, thence along crest of range through Sargon Pass and crossing Yarkand River to crest of Kuen Lun Range, north of Raskam, and along crest of that range through...Kukahang and Dozakh and Yargi and Kilik Passes, to Sanju or Grim Pass, thence crossing Karakash River along Kuen Lun watershed to Tibetan frontier, including Aksai Chin plain in our territory.⁸⁵

In 1927, the British decided to abandon a claim of the Maharaja of Kashmir that his domains were bounded to the north by the northern watershed of the Kunlun ranges since they found it insupportable. But they did not correct the Survey of India maps accordingly. After 1947, finding that decision in the files, the Indian government modified its maps according to the Macartney-MacDonald line beyond the Karakoram Pass, but did not do so in the Aksai Chin area.⁸⁶

According to Sir H. A. F. Rumbold, an official in the India Office until the end of the British rule in India, the Simon Commission wished to include a map of India in Volume I of their report in 1929. Rumbold found nothing in the India Office to justify the line on the Kunlun range shown on some maps. The commission accordingly adopted a line roughly along the crest of the Karakoram range, excluding the Aksai Chin area.⁸⁷

On the other hand, Chinese maps have shown the Karakoram range as its boundary in the western sector at least since the 1920s. There was no evidence that British-Indian authorities ever disputed this with the Chinese government before they left India in 1947.

These historical facts reveal that no formal boundary line between the two countries was drawn in the western sector. The British-proposed lines were never confirmed by a treaty between China and India. As Lamb points out, one consequence of divergent views on frontier policy was that by 1947 the British had never come to any final decision as to which line they really wanted.⁸⁸ Even Nehru, on August 28, 1959, stated in the Lok Sabha that "This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it."⁸⁹

The widely accepted modern concept of boundary marking involves three steps: delimitation, delineation and demarcation. Delimitation involves defining the boundary in written terms through

treaties and agreements. Delineation involves sketching the boundary in maps through joint boundary surveys. Demarcation involves marking the boundary line on the ground through pillars, chains and other markers. Reviewing the historical facts for the entire Sino-Indian border, such a Sino-Indian boundary has never existed, though each side has made its own territorial claims. Historical facts also demonstrate that, in the old days, wide desolate tracts in the remote high mountains between the two countries were physically inaccessible. There was no detailed geographical information that could pinpoint exactly where the boundaries should run. Therefore, from a historical point of view, the Sino-Indian border dispute has been the dispute on the "zone", rather than the "line" in the eastern and western sectors. The Sino-Indian border dispute originated from expansions of the two neighboring powers, British India and China, collisions of their influences and their overlapping territorial claims in those inhospitable frontier areas. In my view, these collisions, which resulted from the inevitable meeting of the two Asian powers in those areas, are the essence of their border dispute. Consensus on the historical evolution of the Sino-Indian border should become the starting point for the future border settlement.

Notes

1. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London : Jonathan Cape Limited, 1970), p. 39.

2. Since uncontrolled commercial penetration into the foothills bred trouble with the hill tribes, the British drew a line in 1873, short of the foothills, which no one could cross without a pass or license. This came to be known as the Inner Line, serving as a barrier to prevent unlicensed entry into the foothills of the Himalayas and as an administrative boundary (taxes were not collected beyond it). The Outer Line corresponded to the Chinese-claimed traditional and customary line running along the foothills, coextensive with the southern border of Bhutan.

3. D. K. Banerjee, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute* (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing house, 1985), pp. 88-90.

4. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

5. Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 149.

6. Tieh-Tseng Li, *Tibet: Today and Yesterday* (New York: Bookman

Associates, 1960), p. xii.

7. Sir Robert Reid, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam* (Shilong: Government of Assam Press, 1942), p. 224.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

10. Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line , Vol. II* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 301.

11. Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of Disputed Boundaries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 121. Cited by Lamb from India Office, Pol. External Files 1910, Vol. 14, No. 3057.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-137.

14. Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 210 and p. 222.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 251; and also see Lamb, *The China-India Border*, p. 160.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

18. John Gordon's note of August 17, 1912 to Chinese Foreign Office, in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue* (Beijing: Xinhua News Press, 1959), pp. 292-293.

19. Note of Chinese Foreign Office dated on December 23, 1912 to John Gordon in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue*, pp. 293-94.

20. "The Story of Dealing with the British Concerning the Simla Conference," in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue*, p. 295.

21. Charles Bell was then Political Officer in Sikkim. During the Simla conference, from 15th to 31st January, 1914, he secretly held talks with Lonchen Shatra on the Indo-Tibetan boundary between Tibet and Assam.

22. Sir Charles Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 206.

23. Liu Shenggi, "Why Volume XIV of *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries* Published in 1929 Has Two Different Editions," in *China Tibetology*, No. I, 1990, p. 9.

24. "Chen Ivan's Notes Concerning the Simla Conference," in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue*, p. 299.

25. The Chinese Foreign Office's telegraph of April 28, 1914 to Chen Ivan in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue*, p. 301.

26. Frederic A. Greenhut II, *The Tibetan Frontiers Question* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1982), p. 41.

27. In terms of the differences of the three maps, refer to Woodman's *Himalayan Frontiers*, pp. 180-181. I confirmed the differences of these three

maps when I undertook interviews with the Chinese experts who are familiar with the Sino-Indian border issues.

28. Subramaniam Swamy, "Does the Sino-Indian Border Exist?" *Sunday*, 28 March-3 April, 1982, p. 21.

29. Woodman, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

30. Karunakar Gupta, *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers* (Calcutta: New Book Center, 1982), p. 114.

31. "Chen Ivan's Notes Concerning the Simla Conference," in *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue*, pp. 300-301.

32. Karunakar Gupta, *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates Pvt. Ltd., 1971), p. 75.

33. In the spring 1914, when the Simla conference was going on, Britain proposed the revision of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. The British first suggested that Russia and Britain mutually recognize the respective spheres of influence--Mongolia to Russia, Tibet to Britain. The Russians did not agree to this proposal. They demanded the British concessions in Afghanistan and Persia in return for Russian concession to Britain concerning the Yangtze Valley. According to the Russian Foreign Office, the British proposal apparently amounted to converting Tibet into Britain's virtual protectorate. See Tieh-tseng Li, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-43.

34. The British urged the U S. government to recognize the Tibet's right to "exchange diplomatic representatives with other powers" in 1943. The U.S. rejected this proposal when it stated:

The Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of those claims.

See Edgar Snow, *Red China Today: The Other Side of the River* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1970), p. 561.

35. L. C. Green, "Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," in *The China Quarterly*, July-September 1960, p. 44.

36. *The Times*, September 8, 1959.

37. She Bin, *Xi Zang Jiao She Luo Shi* [Brief History of Dealing with the Tibetan Issue] (Shanghai: China Books House, 1926), p. 69.

38. Alastair Lamb, *Tibet, China & India, 1914-1950* (Hertfordshire, Great Britain: Roxford Books, 1989), pp. 31-42.

39. *Ibid.*, pp.70-71.

40. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

41. Aitchison's Treaties are the official record of all treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighboring countries which

were edited by Sir Charles U. Aitchison under the authority of the Foreign and Political Department, the Government of India.

42. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

43. Gupta, *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier*, p. 73.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

45. Woodman, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

46. Liu Shengqi, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

47. Lamb, *The China-India Border*, p. 296.

48. Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 297-99.

50. *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1961), Chinese Report, p. 106 and p. 211.

51. D. K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962* (London: Hurst & Company, 1991), p. 23.

52. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 148-149.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

54. Sir Charles U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Volume XII*, (New Delhi: The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, 1931), p. 5.

55. Gupta, *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*, p. 82.

56. Lamb, *Tibet, China & India, 1914-1950*, p. 390.

57. Alastair Lamb, *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh* (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 11-12.

58. Gupta, *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*, p. 82.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

60. Karunakar Gupta, "Myths About a Frontier Dispute", in *The Statesman*, Calcutta, November 28, 1978.

61. Gupta, *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier*, p. 167.

62. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. I*, p. 120.

63. *White Paper No. II*, pp. 34-46.

64. Zhou Weizhou, "Tibet-Ladakh Relations and Border Issues Around the Nineteenth Century," in *China Tibetology*, Beijing, No. I, 1991, p. 162.

65. Before Ladakh was merged into Gulab Singh's Kashmir, William Moorcroft had resided at Leh, the capital of Ladakh. During the period of 1820-22 he traveled broadly in this region.

66. Lamb, *The China-India Border*, pp. 61-62.

67. Robert Shaw had visited Eastern Turkestan in 1868-1869, and was one of the official members of the first Forsyth Mission in 1870.

68. G. H. Hayward, "Journey from Leh to Yarkand and Kashgar," in *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1870, p. 49.

69. During the British rule, India's security strategy for its north and northeast frontiers was to keep the Russians as far as possible from India. This frontier strategy resulted from the fear of the Russian advance in Central Asia. However, there were two schools of policymaking in accordance with different attitudes and tactics, namely, the forward school and the moderate school. The former advocated that India should push its boundary as far away as possible from the Indian plains to meet the Russian threat directly. The latter advocated that the aim of preventing the Russian advance could be best served by establishing a buffer zone between India and Russia. The alternation of the tactics was decided by the attitudes of those policymakers at various periods.

70. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

71. W. F. Van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 161.

72. Lamb, *The China-India Border*, p. 92.

73. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

74. Palit, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

75. W. H. Johnson drew the boundary line as a result of his survey north of the Karakoram Pass in 1864 and his traverse of the Aksai Chin area in 1865. Johnson was reprimanded by the British government for crossing into Khotan without permission, and felt obliged to resign from the Survey of India. See Lamb, *The China-India Border*, pp. 82-83.

76. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 69. Geographically, the disputed Aksai Chin area may be divided into three parts. On the north is the Aksai Chin wasteland--no man's land; on the south is the Lingzitung plateau; and lying between them the Lak Tsang range. It seemed to Macartney that the Aksai Chin wasteland was Chinese and the Lingzitung plateau British.

77. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

78. The full text of the British proposal signed by C. M. MacDonald on March 14, 1899 is cited by R. A. Huttenback in his article, "A Historical Note on the Sino-Indian Dispute over the Aksai Chin," in *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1964, pp. 202-203.

79. Lamb, *The China-India Border*, p. 104.

80. S. Shahid Hamid, *Karakoram Hunza: The Land of Just Enough* (Karachi: Ma'aref Limited, 1979), pp. 37-39.

81. *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question*, Indian Report, p.55; and *White Paper No. III*, p. 87.

82. Chakravarti, *India-China Relations*, pp.140-141. Chakravarti states that this proposal clearly stated that "the northern boundary of Ladakh ran along

the Kuen Lun range to a point east of 80 degree east longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh." Then he concludes that this proves beyond doubt that Aksai chin was a part of Indian territory.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

84. Lamb, *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, p. 12.

85. Lamb, *The China-India Border*, p. 109.

86. *The Times*, March 6, 1963, p. 9.

87. Karunakar Gupta, "Myths About a Frontier Dispute," in *The Statesman*, Calcutta, November 28, 1978.

88. Lamb, *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, p. 2.

89. *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Peking: The Foreign Languages Press, 1962), p. 56.

Chapter 4

The Sino-Indian Entente

I have described the Sino-Indian border war as a dynamic and developing process of military showdown on the entire border. I will now attempt to explore its geneses from a multi-dimensional perspective. Within the context of American-Soviet Cold War and Indo-Pakistani confrontation, Strategic security interests brought India and China closer to each other during the 1950s, but with conflicting perspectives on British territorial legacies.

Conflicting Perspectives

The Republic of India and the People's Republic of China were born almost at the same time after the end of World War II. The international circumstances they were facing were the growing confrontation between the two political and military blocs headed respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. These newly independent nations, which had been colonies or semi-colonies of the Western powers, suddenly found the challenge of security and political choice within the context of the new international order. Dark clouds of the Cold War were spreading rapidly from Europe to Asia with the fall of the Chinese Nationalists and the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 and with the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950.

Indeed, India and China had experienced the common sufferings of foreign aggression and rule, and they were facing the common task of building their own nations. What they had inherited from their respective previous governments, however, was quite different and conflicting. The Indian government regarded all British territorial claims and interests which had been advanced by power politics and

military conquest as its legitimate inheritance and sought to secure them. On the other hand, the Chinese government saw these claims as the legacies of imperialist aggression and tried to make corrections or rectifications through new international conventions. The legacies centered around the political status of Tibet and the dispute over the Sino-Indian border.

In China, the Chinese Communist Party, as the ruling party, came to power through a prolonged armed revolution on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Its political aim was to turn China into a socialist country siding with the Soviet Union. In India, the Indian National Congress, as the ruling party, came to power through the peaceful transfer of the British power. Its domestic policy of political democracy and mixed economy was defined as capitalism and its foreign policy of non-alignment was regarded as "riding on the fence" by China.

Against this international and domestic background, the two Asian giants stood side by side, with conflicting views on the legacies of the British rule and conquest. They also served as cases competing show of capitalism and socialism in the developing world under the circumstances of the Cold War.

With the peaceful transfer of British power to the Indian National Congress, the Indian government inherited all the British privileges or extraterritorial rights in Tibet. On the very day of India's independence, the British Mission at Lhasa was renamed the Indian Mission. The same British representative, H. E. Richardson, became the head of the Indian Mission at Lhasa¹ and his entire staff was retained. Only the flag was changed.² He stayed in Tibet until 1950 when Dr. Sinha succeeded him. All this symbolized the continuation of the British Tibet policy. Richardson explicitly stated that

the new government of India continued, as its predecessor had done, to deal with Tibet on the basis of its de facto independence, by supplying arms and ammunition and maintaining direct diplomatic contact.³

Thus, all the Anglo-Chinese disputes over the Tibetan and border issues became the disputes between India and China. Tibet's status and the border dispute became the central question in their relations.

Although India was one of the first countries that recognized the People's Republic of China, it recognized it as a potential enemy, not

as a friendly neighbor. Before the Indian cultural delegation left for China in 1952, Nehru told the delegation members,

Never forget that the basic challenge in South-East Asia is between India and China. That challenge runs along the spine of Asia. Therefore, in your talks with the Chinese, keep it in mind. Never let the Chinese patronize you.⁴

When N. B. Mullik, Director of Intelligence Bureau, asked Nehru about India's targets, Nehru stated that the two enemies India would have to confront would be Pakistan, which would utilize Pan-Islamism in its support, and China, which would use international communism for its ends. Mullik recalled that

He counselled us not to be led away by the open professions of the [Indian] Government in these matters, but to judge everything in India's interests and seek his advice whenever there was conflict.⁵

On the eve of India's independence, K. P. S. Menon, Nehru's chief adviser of foreign affairs, traveled from China's Chungking(now Chongching) to Delhi via Xinjiang and Kashmir. His travel diary, published in 1947, shows that he saw China as a potential enemy. He wrote that

Whether India attains dominion status or formal independence, it will be to her interest to adhere to the main lines of her present frontier policy....Questioned how he would ward off an invasion from the direction of Afghanistan, Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence, is reported to have said, 'By love'. That day seems farther off than ever in the present state of international politics. Kautiliya, known as the Indian Machiavelli, defined an enemy 2,200 years ago as 'that State which is situated on the border of one's own State'. In other words, what constitutes a state an enemy, actual or potential, is not its conduct but its mere proximity. A brutal definition, this; but borne out by world history. China and India have been exceptions and, let us hope, they will remain so. However, the realism of Kautiliya is a useful corrective to our idealism in international politics.⁶

What was India's image in the Chinese policymakers' eyes? As early as July 1949, when the Tibetan authorities expelled the Chinese officials from Tibet, a New China News Agency editorial pointed out

that this incident had been engineered "by the British, American reactionaries and their lackey, India's Nehru Government". It stated further that "In order to annex Tibet, the British-Indian reactionaries even dare to deny the fact that Tibet is part of China. This is an aggressors' day dream."⁷ The editorial concluded that

Tibet is China's territory; No foreign country will be allowed to invade it. The Tibetan people are an inalienable part of the Chinese people; no foreign country will be allowed to separate them from the Chinese people.⁸

On October 19, 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong sent a message to the Indian Communist Party. Mao declared that

I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People's Democratic family;...⁹

It was clear that the Chinese leaders--before as well as after the liberation of China--regarded Nehru's government not as a friend, but as an enemy.

Controversies Over the Status of Tibet

India won its independence only two years before New China was born. However, prior Sino-Indian disputes over Tibet's status contributed to shaping their mutually hostile images. I will now address major controversies between India and China over: the status of Tibet during the Asian relation conference; the renewal of the 1908 trade agreement; the dispatch of the Tibetan trade mission abroad; and the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist mission from Tibet. These controversies showed how newly-independent India inherited the British policy toward Tibet and how China insisted on its traditional stance on Tibet. They helped explain China's determination to liberate Tibet.

Asian Relations Conference

The interim government of India headed by Nehru was formed in

September 1946. Nehru actively prepared and personally convened the first Asian relations conference in New Delhi from March 23 to April 4, 1947. The conference (attended by the delegates from 28 Asian nations and regions) was initiated by the Indian Council of World Affairs, a non-governmental organization. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist government received letters of invitation. Since the Nationalist government refused to issue passports to the Communist delegates, they could not enter India. However, the Tibetans could attend the conference without passports issued by the Chinese government. It was announced that the conference would primarily discuss economic, social and cultural problems common to all Asian nations, and that it would not consider any controversial political issues of any participating nation.¹⁰

Before the conference, Nehru did not consult with the Chinese government about its objective. India separately invited China and Tibet to the conference, with Tibet treated as an independent country. The Chinese side interpreted this as an indication that India's new government had some ulterior motive.¹¹ According to former Tibetan officials, H. E. Richardson, then in charge of the Indian mission in Lhasa, discussed the necessity of Tibet's attending the conference with the Tibetan foreign minister. The Tibetan official later reported to the Tibetan Kasha (the Tibetan government) that the Asian relations conference was going to be held in New Delhi, and that Mr. Richardson had received a letter of invitation to the Tibetan delegation for this conference. He quoted Richardson as saying that

If the Tibetan government sends a delegation to this conference, it can show Tibet an independent country. Under the current world circumstances, it is a golden chance to assert the independence of Tibet. Make sure that the Tibetan delegates will go to attend the conference. The British government will give full support in this respect. Additionally, in order to avoid possible interferences from the inside or outside, this matter should be kept secret.¹²

Richardson also proposed that the Tibetan delegation take a Tibetan national flag with them to be shown at the conference. However, the Tibetan delegation had already arrived at Yatung. The Tibetan Kasha had to send the "Snow Mountains and Lion" flag to the delegation.¹³ Their flag was later displayed side by side with the national flags of other Asian countries.

Immediately after their arrival in New Delhi, the Chinese delegation took up the issue of the Tibetan representation at the conference with the Indian government. The Chinese delegation stressed that China's sovereignty and its territorial integrity were not to be misinterpreted. Only after the strong opposition of the Chinese delegation was Tibet no longer listed at the conference as an independent state. However, at the preparatory session, a world map showed Tibet outside the national border of China. The Chinese observer insisted that unless the map was corrected, the Chinese would walk out of the conference. At first Nehru was reluctant to make any change in the map, but later, with the Chinese threat of withdrawal, he agreed to make the correction. However, the map remained unchanged until the opening of the conference. The Chinese observer had to amend the map himself by painting the Tibetan region in the same color as that used for China.¹⁴

In spite of this unpleasant episode, Nehru still put Tibet together with Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma in his inauguration speech at the conference.¹⁵ The leader of the Tibetan delegation also addressed the conference as a representative of a country. Although the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, received the Chinese and Tibetan delegates together at the end of the conference, the Tibet issue apparently made an impression upon the Chinese participants. The only action at the conference was to establish the Asian Relations Organization, and Nehru was elected president. The second conference was to be held in China, but the fall of the Nationalist government in 1949 made that impossible.

Demand for Reviewing the Trade Agreement

The Sino-British Agreement on Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet (1908) was to be reviewed in 1948. As prescribed, the agreement could be renewed or revised at the end of every ten years at the instigation of any one party; otherwise, the regulations would remain valid. The Chinese government notified Britain, India and Pakistan that the trade agreement was to be terminated. Britain replied that it had forsaken all its privileges derived from the old treaties in China and proposed that China should negotiate directly with India and Pakistan. Pakistan acceded to China's demand, but India refused. Nehru asserted that: (1) India had inherited all the rights and obligations derived from the conventions concluded between British

India and Tibet since the establishment of the Indian government; and (2) the relationship between India and Tibet was now governed by the 1914 Simla Convention and the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of the same year.¹⁶ Apparently, India held that the 1908 trade agreement had been replaced by the 1914 Trade agreement and thus consideration of either its renewal or termination was irrelevant. China could not accept India's explanation since China had never signed or accepted the 1914 Simla convention and the Anglo-Tibetan trade agreement. The conflicting positions and intransigent attitudes of both sides prevented them from reaching any agreement concerning Tibet.

Tibetan Trade Mission Sent Abroad

While China and India were exchanging notes and disputing the validity of the 1914 trade agreement concerning Tibet in 1948, the Tibetan authorities sought to strengthen Tibet's links with the outside world by sending its trade mission abroad. The trade mission, headed by Tsepon Shakabpa, a member of the Kasha in charge of the treasury, visited India, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Before the Tibetan trade mission went abroad, and at the insistence of the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, Luo Jialun, they first visited Nanjing, the seat of the Nationalist government. The trade mission asked the Nationalist government for a grant of two million American dollars. Later, a compromise was reached by providing the trade mission with a sum of U.S. \$50,000 and a large consignment of silk fabrics at a bargain price.¹⁷ Although the Nationalists asked them to use Chinese passports, they ignored this demand.

During their stay in Nanjing, they discussed this matter with the American ambassador. He advised them that they should go to Hong Kong and apply for their visas at the American Consulate there.¹⁸ Their passports, issued by the Tibetan authorities, were accepted by all the governments listed above.

The Tibetan trade mission ostensibly explored the possibility of establishing trade and economic links with these countries, but it was fundamentally a diplomatic campaign for Tibet's independence. The trade mission arrived at Washington in July 1948 and stayed in the United States until October 1948. The trade mission announced in Washington, D. C. that "Tibet has only religious ties with China. China has no right whatsoever to govern Tibet. China has no right to

talk about what passports we should use for going abroad."¹⁹

Remarkably, the Tibetan mission visited India three times between February 1948 and January 1949. The mission, accorded the status of representing an independent country, was officially received by the Indian government. Dr. Luo Jialun, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, in a tactful letter to Indian Prime Minister Nehru on December 31, 1948, pointed out that the Tibetan trade mission had unavoidably been affected by some imperialist attempt during their travel in America and Europe, and their speeches on some occasions seemed to be harmful to China. He hoped that the Indian government would reject and not encourage discussions which would be harmful to China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. He made it clear that the results of such discussions would not be recognized by the Chinese government.²⁰

In a reply on January 3, 1949, Deputy Foreign Minister K. P. S. Menon pledged that India did not want to discuss with that mission any issue which might be harmful to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.²¹ However, the Chinese thought that the Indians said one thing, but did another. They did not believe Mr. Menon's pledge.

The Chinese Nationalist Mission Expelled

After the end of the Second World War, large-scale civil war broke out in China. The deteriorating position of the Kuomintang government irrevocably weakened its official mission in Lhasa. In July 1949, the Tibetan authorities took advantage of China's embarrassment to oust the Chinese Nationalist mission on the pretext of "preventing the Communists from entering Tibet." They believed that by evicting all the Chinese Nationalist officials from Lhasa they could announce Tibet's independence. On July 9, 1949, the Tibetan Kasha dispatched a telegram to Canton's Nationalist government, justifying its action. It stated that as the fighting between the Nationalists and the Communists was going on, Communist instigation occurred wherever the Chinese government officials and military units were stationed. It declared that without an effective means of screening all Communist suspects, Tibet requested that all the staff of the Chinese mission, radio station, schools, hospitals and other suspects leave for China by a definite date.²²

Luo Jialun dismissed the report of Communists in the Chinese

mission there as pure fabrication. The Chinese central government rejected the Tibetan message of ouster, and asked the Tibetan authorities to recall all expelled Chinese officials and other personnel,²³ but to no avail. The head of the Chinese mission at Lhasa was informed of the Kasha's decision requiring all the Chinese to leave within a week.²⁴ On July 20, 1949, the Chinese Mission at Lhasa was formally expelled by the Tibetan authorities.

The expelled mission had to leave for China via India.²⁵ The Chinese halted at Yatung for some time to wait for a transit permit from the Indian government. When Chinese Ambassador Luo Jialun met K. P. S. Menon on July 30, Menon told him that members of the Chinese mission at Lhasa were close to India's boundary and that every one of them should have a transit permit. Luo replied that he only knew the passport requirement and knew nothing of a transit permit. Luo further emphasized that the Tibetans who would come to India did not need any passport.²⁶ The leading Indian newspaper, *The Statesman*, commented that the Indian government was even reluctant to grant the diplomatic representatives of a friendly country a transit permit.²⁷

On July 25, 1947, Luo Jialun held a news conference in New Delhi. He denounced the Tibetan authorities for expelling the Chinese Mission at Lhasa. He stressed that

There is no doubt that Tibet is part of the Chinese territory. The National Congress held its conferences in 1947 and 1948, and the Tibetan representatives sent by Lhasa attended both the conferences. The current Constitution of the Republic of China, promulgated by the first session of the National Congress, not only confirmed the Chinese Government's sovereignty over Tibet, but also stipulated that the Tibetans are as equal as all the other nationalities constituting the Chinese nation. They enjoy the same rights. The existing Tibetan social system will be retained.²⁸

The government-run Press Trust of India reported, on July 28, 1949, that Tibet had never recognized China's suzerainty.²⁹ This news report was apparently a reaction to Luo's statement of July 25. When Luo Jialun met K. P. S. Menon on July 30, he pointed out that

When the British had adopted an aggressive policy toward Tibet, they had recognized China's suzerainty, if not sovereignty, over Tibet. As recounted by the India's official news agency, now free

India would not even accept China's suzerainty. You have probably gone a little too far.³⁰

Luo asked Menon to read the report, but Menon declined to make comments on it. Menon argued that India had to accept the fact of Tibet's independence. Luo retorted that "I am afraid that the fact might be after your promise."³¹ K. P. S. Menon later disclosed that he had understood that the British government of India had undertaken to support the independence of Tibet, subject to suzerainty of China.³² But, how could acceptance of China's suzerainty and support of Tibet's independence coexist? Nehru stressed in 1950 that "We have accepted that policy. We take the two positions together."³³ He further explained that "India vaguely recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet, but nobody knew the extent to which the suzerainty was exercised."³⁴

When the Tibetan authorities expelled the Chinese officials, Tibetan visitors frequented Richardson's office in Lhasa. In 1948, the Lhasa authorities intensified their military preparations and approached India for weapons and equipment. India responded favorably and sent senior officers to Gyantse for consultation.³⁵ After the Chinese mission departed from Lhasa in July 1949, India was the only foreign country officially represented there. In Chinese eyes, the expulsion of the Chinese mission at Lhasa was part of an international conspiracy. Dr. Luo Jialun later stated that Richardson really acted as an envoy to Tibet and had actually been engaged in planning the annexation of Tibet to the empire of Great Britain.³⁶

During the 1947-1949 period, heated disputes between the Indian government and the Chinese Nationalist government over the Tibet's legal status demonstrated that Independent India had inherited the British policy towards Tibet. The Chinese noticed the attempt of the Tibetan authorities to seek Tibet's independence with the support of both India and the West. These developments helped prompt the new Chinese government to mount military actions in Tibet immediately after taking over power in Beijing.

The Restoration of Sovereignty Over Tibet

After the People's Republic of China was established, the new government decided to liberate Tibet and told the Tibetan authorities to dispatch a delegation to Beijing for negotiations. However,

separatist elements of the Tibetan ruling clique rejected this proposal. On November 11, 1950, the Tibetan authorities sent an appeal to the United Nations, claiming that China had committed aggression against independent Tibet. It became known later that this appeal was drafted by H. N. Richardson, the head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa. This appeal reflected thinking on the political status of Tibet in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.³⁷ The Tibetan authorities sent their troops to block the P.L.A.'s advance. After the P.L.A. defeated the main Tibetan force in Chamdo in October, 1950, the Lhasa authorities agreed to send a delegation to Beijing.

They traveled via India, but the British authorities in Hong Kong refused to issue visas to the Tibetan delegation. In late April 1951, the delegation, which had stayed in India for half a year, arrived in Beijing and entered into negotiations with the Beijing government. The Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet Between the Central People's Government and the Tibet Local Government was signed on May 23, 1951. What emerged from the agreement was not the Tibetan autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty that the Indian government had wanted, but full-fledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. The liberation of Tibet ended India's long-standing plans for Tibet's independence or semi-independence.

While entangled in the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, Nehru knew that India was not in the position to open a second front with China. He rejected the American ambassador's promise that America would support India's intervention in Tibet and adopted the policy of seeking a peaceful settlement on the basis of maintaining the status quo-- namely, the continuance of Tibetan autonomy within the suzerainty of China over Tibet.³⁸ However, the Chinese aim was to secure its territorial integrity and restore sovereignty over Tibet.

When the P.L.A. started its military operations to liberate Tibet, an Indian note to Beijing (dated October 26, 1950) expressed surprise and regret over the P. L. A. action in Tibet.³⁹ China's reply of October 30, was that "Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China." The note also warned that "no foreign interference shall be tolerated in the settlement of the Tibetan problem."⁴⁰

Another Indian note expressed the view that a settlement of the Tibetan problem could still be effected by peaceful negotiations, adjusting the Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of

China's suzerainty. Beijing's note of November 16 rebuked the Indian government for having attempted to obstruct the exercise of the sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese government.⁴¹ Premier Zhou Enlai reminded Nehru that India was interfering and encouraging certain reactionary groups that were resisting legal Chinese rights in Tibet.⁴² Under strong pressure from an uncompromising Chinese government, India gave up any consideration of military intervention in Tibet. Thereafter, India did not argue that the Tibet issue should be included in the U.N. General Assembly. Also, when the Dalai Lama wrote to the Indian government seeking political asylum, this request was denied. Both countries apparently sought to avert a possible conflict. However, after the Chinese entry into Tibet, Indian politicians began to talk about threats from the north. They justified the old British policy of making Tibet a buffer state in terms of their strategic defense on the northern frontier.⁴³ They were unwilling to accept the fact that Tibet had been part of China and that their policy of strategic security had been based on the sacrifice of Chinese territory and sovereignty. As Nehru asked in 1954, "What right does India have to keep a part of its Army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or part of China?"⁴⁴

The Panchsheel Agreement

By the early 1950s, the Soviet-American Cold War had spread into Asia. Chinese troops were drawn into the Korean war, while India was facing a hostile Pakistan after a war in Kashmir in 1948. The U.S. was negotiating with Pakistan to establish a military alliance. Under these conditions, neither China nor India wanted to open a second front. They hoped that any developments affecting their relations could be kept under control.

Though India, the Chinese believed, sided with the Western countries, it might also be a partner of China's united front against the West. Thus, it was important that Indian privileges in Tibet be ended through negotiations, and that Indian military forces be removed peacefully.

After securing its northern borders by signing treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, a hard line with respect to China was advocated by Sardar Patel, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister. On November 7, 1950, just before his death, Patel wrote a long letter to Nehru, warning that the attitude of the Chinese government was unfriendly

and its policy expansionist. He said that the disappearance of Tibet would bring the Chinese army to the gates of India.⁴⁵ Patel also warned Nehru that

We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they [the Chinese leaders] will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet....⁴⁶

He asserted that China's sovereignty over Tibet could not be treated as an isolated issue and that China should be asked to ratify the Simla convention in return for abandoning India's treaty rights in Tibet.⁴⁷ This unrealistic policy proposal was rejected by Nehru. Nehru preferred to take a friendly attitude towards China, which he believed to be the best guarantee of the Indian security.

While war clouds gathering on India's northern frontiers, other developments in both South Asia and the rest of the world affected its security environment adversely. In the face of the rapid expansion of Communist power in East Europe and Asia, the United States adopted a strategy of containment. NATO was formed chiefly for the defense of Western Europe. Two other organizations of U.S.-sponsored military alliance, SEATO and CENTO, were subsequently established, primarily for the containment of Communist expansion in Asia. Pakistan joined both SEATO and CENTO and allied with the United States. India refused the U.S. offer to join these alliances. With Chinese army on the northern frontier and with Pakistan's armed forces (equipped with advanced American weapons) on the western frontier, Indian policy-makers felt that the balance of military power in South Asia would become unfavorable to India. Therefore, friendly and stable relations with China would be the best way to redress the balance in regional power.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao's policy was to "set up a separate kitchen" and "clean house before inviting guests". This demanded disinheritng diplomatic relations established by the Kuomintang government, recognizing none of the unequal treaties previously signed, and abolishing step by step the various privileges of imperialists and their remnant forces in China.⁴⁸

During the British rule in India, the British-Indian government had wrested extra-territorial rights in Tibet through military conquest or by

diplomatic calculation. After India's independence, the Indian government kept these British privileges intact. It ran Tibet's postal and telegraph services, hospitals and schools. A detachment of escort troops in Yatung and Gyantse was maintained for safeguarding the trade routes and posts and telegraph services between Gyantse and Gangtok. It had military posts at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. There were also a number of rest-houses on the Kalimpong-Lhasa route.

Negotiations on Indian privileges in Lhasa lasted about four months. The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India was signed by India and China on April 29, 1954. As for India's privileges in Tibet, India's note of 1950 considered them as "natural" while they were condemned as "relics of British imperialism" in the 1954 agreement. The agreement also stated that "Now it is impossible and improper for us to continue any such arrangements as the British empire had established."⁴⁹ India thus gave up all the extra-territorial rights in Tibet, and China's sovereignty over Tibet was accepted by India in the form of a treaty.

A hardline group still existed among the Indian policy makers after Patel's death. This group was represented by G. S. Bajpai, the Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1950s. They asserted that the Indian government made no effort to settle the question of Chinese maps during the negotiations preceding the agreement, and that the Chinese could have been brought around to accepting existing treaties and borders in return for all that India surrendered to them. They believed that the Indian leaders missed this opportunity to bargain with the Chinese government. They argued that the British had recognized only China's suzerainty over Tibet, but Tibet was referred to as "region of China" in the 1954 agreement, actually accepting China's sovereignty over Tibet. G. S. Bajpai warned Nehru that to China the McMahon Line might be

one of the scars left by Britain in the course of her aggression against China; [China] may seek to heal or erase it on the basis of frontier rectifications that might not be to our liking or to our interests.

He then advised Nehru that India should formally inform the Chinese government that it regarded the McMahon Line as its boundary. He believed that this diplomatic act would force the Chinese government to "agree, disagree or by silence indicate their

acquiescence."⁵⁰

In a reply to Bajpai, K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, emphasized that India need not raise the issue of the McMahon Line to the Chinese because India had already declared it openly in Parliament.⁵¹ On March 28, 1951, B. V. Keskar, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha that such a frontier could not be well-protected if India had a border country which became hostile to her. A friendly China and a friendly Tibet were the best guarantee of the defense of India.⁵² In his speech in the Lok Sabha on May 18, 1954, Nehru admitted that if India had not given up those claims, it would have been forced to give them up.⁵³ Moreover, the preamble to the 1954 agreement contained the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) which became the basis of Sino-Indian relations. Peaceful co-existence was the common desire of the two countries at that time.

During the talks, neither side intended to raise the sensitive border issues, although both were aware of their differences. In November 1953, the Indian government decided not to raise the boundary issue in the forthcoming talks concerning Tibet since India publicly held the view that there was no dispute as to the border.⁵⁴ Later, the Indian government explained that they did not raise the border question because "the boundary was well-known and beyond dispute, and there could be no question regarding it."⁵⁵

At the first meeting of the Sino-Indian talks, Premier Zhou Enlai set the tone that, among the outstanding questions, the two countries should choose those that were ripe for settlement. He also indicated that two big countries like India and China with a long common frontier were bound to have some questions, but all questions could be settled smoothly.⁵⁶

When Zhou Enlai visited India in 1954, he told the diplomatic officials in the Chinese embassy that there was both a "bright side" and a "dark side" of Sino-Indian relations and that "We should do our best to promote the bright side and reduce the dark side."⁵⁷ The Chinese government later explained that they had decided not to discuss the border issue in order "to avoid affecting the settlement of the most urgent question." That was "the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet region of China on a new basis."⁵⁸ It was obvious that China sought to postpone the border issue until a suitable occasion arose.

India's approach to the border issue coincided with China's.

Nehru shared Panikkar's view that "you need not raise it; but declare it openly." Answering the question whether India should raise the border issue directly to the Chinese government in the early 1950's, Nehru stated on December 9, 1959, that

We felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of time and events will confirm it, and by the time perhaps, when they challenge to it, we would be in a much stronger position to face it.⁵⁹

Apparently, the Indian government was waiting for a favorable occasion when India would be able to bargain with China from a position of strength.

In spite of both sides' deliberate avoidance of the border issue, the boundary question arose during the talks. China's draft agreement stated that the Chinese government would agree to open a number of mountain passes and routes (Shipki La, Mane Pass, Niti Pass, Kungri Bingri Pass, Darma Pass and Lipu Lekh Pass) in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. The Indian side objected to this description of these border passes, implying that these passes belong to China.

Finally, it was decided that pilgrims and traders could travel through these passes, without indicating whether they belong to China or India.⁶⁰ It should be noted that there was no reference to border passes and routes either in the eastern sector or in the western sector.

For the Chinese government, the liberation of Tibet was the first decisive step in the exercise of China's sovereignty over Tibet. The next was the eradication of the Indian privileges in Lhasa. These two steps really established China's complete sovereignty over Tibet.

Uneasy Sino-Indian Friendship

The 1954 agreement was the starting point of the new Sino-Indian relationship. Both the countries attempted to establish relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. During this period, Pakistan, as an ally of the United States, became a member of the CENTO and the SEATO. China and the U.S. remained hostile to each other. Therefore, in light of American-Pakistani alliance and American-Chinese enmity, Sino-Indian friendship (for India) could redress the strategic balance of power in South Asia. This relationship was characterized by the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians and

Chinese are brothers). However, their policy toward each other showed a duality based on the images they held of each other.

After the liberation of Tibet, while the Chinese threat to India's security on the northern border was discussed within Indian political circles, a facade of brotherly friendship was outwardly maintained. Therefore, the starting point of India's China policy was to ensure India's security on the northern border with outward friendship for China. India would give up extra-territorial rights in Tibet in return for China's acceptance of the boundary India claimed. But from the Chinese perspective, their friendship was uneasy because of India's unilateral actions on the Sino-Indian border and its policy of "Two Friends" with both China and Tibet. Despite professions of goodwill and friendship, tensions were growing beneath the surface.

The Indian government was obviously aware that it had inherited from the British a disputed border with China which required a final settlement.⁶¹ As early as in 1947, the Tibetan authorities requested the Indian government to return territories occupied by India ranging from Assam to Ladakh, including Sikkim and Darjeeling. In the late 1940s, the Chinese Nationalist government repeatedly protested against India's forward pushes in the eastern sector. When India took over the Tawang Tract in 1951, the Tibetan authorities lodged a strong protest with the Indian government and protest rallies were held in Lhasa and Tawang.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, official Chinese maps showed the boundary line that previous Chinese governments had claimed. Although Zhou Enlai stated that the Chinese would not cross the McMahon Line, he indicated the illegality of that line and his hope that a proper way to settle the eastern sector of the boundary could be found at a later date.⁶²

In the early 1950's, the United States was the main enemy in the security strategy of the Chinese government. The Chinese leaders were facing military encirclement and economic embargo enforced by the United States and their allies in Asia. On its eastern front, China was fighting a war with the United States in the Korean theater. The United States prevented the Chinese Communists from taking over Taiwan by signing the American-Chinese Nationalist treaty of military alliance. On the western front, the Chinese Communists rapidly liberated Xinjiang and Tibet and placed the western frontier region under direct control for the purpose of preventing the United States from opening a second front.

Therefore, China's general strategy of security was to concentrate on the eastern front and maintain stability on the western front. In order to maintain stability on the western front, the primary target was to drive the foreign forces out of Tibet. In order to reach this target, it was crucial to seek cooperation from the Indian government.

After the outbreak of the Korean war, India played a mediating role in the United Nations. India took the lead in supporting the restoration of China's seat in the U.N. Security Council. This was regarded as a positive policy by the Chinese leaders. Thus, India became a strategic partner of China within the context of a broad anti-American united front.

As far as Sino-Indian relations were concerned, China's policy was to settle the urgent question of Tibet's status and postpone the border question until time was ripe. China's guiding policy toward India was well summarized in the Chinese Ambassador's note to the Indian Foreign Secretary. He clearly explained Chinese security concerns and strategic consideration at that time. He stated that China's enemy lay in the east where the United States had many military bases directed against China. He further elaborated that

[India] is not an opponent but a friend to our country. China will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States in the east and again to antagonize India in the west.... We cannot have two centers of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. This is our state policy. The quarrel between our two countries in the past few years, particularly in the last three months, is but an interlude in the course of thousands upon thousands of years of friendship between the two countries, and does not warrant a big fuss on the part of the broad masses and the Governments of our countries.... Our Indian friends! What is in your mind? Will you be agreeing to our thinking regarding the view that China can only concentrate its main attention eastward of China, but not south-westward of China, nor is it necessary for us to do so?... Friends! It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over?⁶³

Why did the Chinese separate these two interlocked issues? It was clear to the Chinese leaders that the border question was quite complicated, and that resolving this problem would involve two sovereign states, and would take patience and time. The Chinese leaders predicted that putting these two questions together on the

negotiating table would preclude agreement on the easier issue of the extra-territorial rights in Tibet because of their differences of the border alignment.⁶⁴

Although the Indian government gave up India's extra-territorial rights in Tibet as the relics of British imperialism, it insisted on the British-imposed boundary as a legal international boundary. In a memorandum to the ministries concerned in July 1954, Nehru reiterated his government's policy of the northern frontier that "both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our Agreement with China, this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody."⁶⁵

Soon after the signing of the 1954 agreement, India and China disputed a two-square-mile area (called Wuje by the Chinese and Bara Hoti by the Indians) in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border. On November 5, 1955, the Indian government complained that a party of Chinese soldiers had trespassed into Damzan in the area of the Niti Pass. On May 2, 1956, another complaint was lodged that a party of 12 Chinese soldiers was found east of Nilang near Tsang Chokla Pass. Two more complaints were lodged on September 8 and 24, 1956, charging that about 10 Chinese soldiers entered Shipki La Pass. The Chinese government rejected these complaints.⁶⁶

From July 1954 to July 1958, protest notes of the two governments were concentrated on scattered places of dispute, mainly in the middle sector. As early as 1950, Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament that the McMahon Line was India's northeastern boundary, map or no map, and they would not allow anybody to cross that boundary.⁶⁷ Until the signature of the 1954 agreement, official Indian maps showed the boundary with China in the eastern sector as "undemarcated" and in the western sector as "undefined boundary." Only in late 1954 did the Indian government unilaterally alter these maps, showing an internationally defined boundary with China in the eastern sector as well as in the western sector.

From 1951 on, there were intelligence reports about the construction of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway, crossing the Aksai Chin area.⁶⁸ In March 1957, China announced its completion, and in October of the same year, the highway was formally opened to traffic. From August 1958 on, protest notes were exchanged between the two governments because of the road construction. These notes referred to the boundary dispute in the western sector long before the Tibetan rebellion of March 1959. These charges and counter-charges began to

raise the curtain of the Sino-Indian border dispute, reversing the general trend of the Sino-Indian friendship.

These facts show that the Sino-Indian friendship of the 1950s was based on their respective calculations and considerations of strategic security--not on their publicly-claimed brotherhood or good neighborliness. They also demonstrate that it was not the Tibetan rebellion that led to the Sino-Indian border dispute, and that Chinese territorial claims were not a retaliation against India's support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebellion.

American Shadow over Sino-Indian Entente

After the Chinese Communists defeated the Chinese Nationalists, supported by the United States, in 1949, they adopted the foreign policy of "leaning to one side"--siding with the Soviet bloc. Soon thereafter, the Sino-American military showdown occurred in the Korean theater. In the U.S. strategy of containing China in Asia, it was of strategic importance to open a second battle front on the Chinese western frontier.

Just after the Tibetan authorities expelled the Chinese Nationalist Mission in Lhasa, the famous American radio commentator Lowell Thomas and his son were invited to visit Lhasa. Although they alleged that their visit was personal, subsequent events clearly demonstrated that their visit was the prelude to American involvement in the Tibetan affairs.

During their stay in Tibet, much of their time was devoted to meetings with officials of the Dalai Lama's government. They held conversations with the Dalai Lama, important officials of the Tibetan Kasha and the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army. According to Lowell Thomas, Jr., the chief topic of their conversations was the security of Tibet after the Communist victory in China. Their conversations centered around the following questions: How America might be made to realize Tibet's serious problem of defense against Asiatic Communism? What would be the best way to inform America of the Red threat to Tibet? And, what military aid might the United States be able to give Tibet? These concerns were the primary motive of the Tibetans who decided to invite Lowell Thomas and his son.⁶⁹ The father and the son came to the conclusion that "the most important requirement" in support of Tibetan independence was "skillful guerrilla forces." They elaborated this idea by stating that

To create this [the guerrilla forces], Tibet needs arms and advice principally from outside. Arms would include weapons especially adapted to guerrilla warfare, such as Garand rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades and mines. The kind of advice needed is technical instruction in the proper use and maintenance of this modern equipment, and in the most advanced methods of guerrilla strategy.⁷⁰

Back in Washington, they discussed the Tibetan problem with "our government heads". The conclusion was that

If the United States offers any kind of military assistance to Tibet, our country must assume the responsibility of maintaining Tibetan independence. But if the Chinese Reds called our bluff, how could we move an army over the Himalayas? How could we supply it? In the final analysis, the United States is not the nation to undertake that task.⁷¹

India, however, was the proper nation to undertake the task. Later India's Kalimpong became the command center for the Tibetan rebels and the base of Western spying activities. The air space over India's Assam became an air corridor for supplying American arms and military equipment to the Tibetans.

After the P.L.A. marched into Tibet, Takster Rimpoche, elder brother of the Dalai Lama, fled to Kalimpong. George Patterson⁷² contacted American officials to help him take refuge in the United States in June 1951. Takster and Patterson negotiated an agreement with American officials, which linked the U.S. with Lhasa's independence. Coded communications with the Dalai Lama were used to work out arrangements whereby the Dalai Lama would publicly announce Tibet's rejection of the 17-Point Agreement signed by the Tibetan delegation on May 23, 1951. The United States would then take up the matter of Tibet's independence and Chinese aggression in the United Nations. After making his announcement, the Dalai Lama was to leave Yatung for India within seven days.⁷³ The scheme was aborted later because of the Dalai Lama's sudden decision to return to Lhasa. Although the Chinese did not know the specific details about this scheme, Takster's escape to the United States and Patterson's suspicious activities in Kalimpong alerted the Chinese intelligence agency to possible American involvement in the Tibetans' rebellious activities.

According to a 1961 top secret memorandum from Brigadier General Edward Lansdale to General Maxwell Taylor, by 1961, Taiwan's Civil Air Transport (a CIA proprietary) had undertaken over 200 overflights of the Mainland of China and Tibet. Those overflights dropped men and supplies for espionage, sabotage, and insurgency. Since the distance between Taiwan and Tibet precluded direct flight, intermediary bases were arranged in Thailand. According to L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel who once acted as coordinator and expeditor between the CIA and the Air Force, the Dalai Lama's successful escape to India was one of the CIA's most masterful performances.⁷⁴

In order to start a guerrilla war in Tibet, American C-130s, with CIA crews, were modified for the Himalayan crossing. Hundreds of Tibetan rebels were flown to a secret base in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado and received special training for guerrilla warfare. By May 1960 some 42,000 Tibetan rebels had been armed and supplied by the CIA's airdrops.⁷⁵

Unbelievably, the Indian government regarded those planes as China's. On August 24 1960, Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon protested against Chinese planes' overflight of India's Assam.⁷⁶ Beijing's reply of September 16 to India's protest stated publicly that the planes took off from Bangkok, passed over Burma or China and crossed the Chinese-Indian border to penetrate deep into China's interior where they parachuted weapons, supplies, and radio sets to secret agents, and then flew back to Bangkok, again passing over the Chinese-Indian border.⁷⁷

When the two prime ministers held talks in April 1960, Zhou told Nehru that these aircraft were American. Apparently, the Indians did not believe Zhou's explanations.⁷⁸ The Chinese government told Burma that, should Burma discover any unidentified aircraft in its airspace, it was entitled to take any necessary counter-measure, either forcing them to land or shooting them down.⁷⁹

On the other hand, Chinese leaders saw the Indian government as a collaborator with American efforts to open the second front in China's western frontier. As early as 1958, the Chinese government protested to the Indian government concerning the hostile activities in India's Kalimpong. The Chinese note categorily stated that

Since the peaceful liberation of the Tibetan region of China, reactionaries who have fled from Tibet to Kalimpong have been

carrying on subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region under the instigation and direction of the U. S. and Chiang Kai-shek clique and in collusion with local reactionaries in Kalimpong.... They are actively inciting and organizing a handful of reactionaries hidden in Tibet for an armed revolt there in order to attain the traitors' aim and separate the Tibet region from the People's Republic of China.⁸⁰

The Indian government rejected the Chinese charge, and India's rejection only heightened the Chinese suspicion of India's involvement in the Tibetan affairs. The fact that the Americans used India's territory and airspace to support Tibetan rebels led the Chinese to believe that the Indian government was in collaboration with the U.S. in supporting Tibet's separatist activities. Thus, American efforts to support Tibetan rebels played a central role in eroding Sino-Indian entente and intensifying mutual misunderstanding and suspicion between China and India.

Notes:

1. H. E. Richardson was the British Trade Agent in Tibet before the British left India, and subsequently became head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

2. H. E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 173.

3. Karunakar Gupta, *Sino-Indian Relations, 1948-1952: Role of K. M. Panikkar* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1987) p. 72.

4. Frank Moraes, *Witness to an Era: India, 1920 to the Present Day* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 220-221.

5. B. N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (Bombay: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1971), p. 85.

6. K. P. S. Menon, *Delhi-Chungking: A Travel Diary* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 29.

7. *People's Daily*, September 3, 1959.

8. *Ibid.*, September 3, 1949.

9. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1949.

10. *Indian Council of World Affairs* (New Delhi: ICWA, 1947), pp. 78-79.

11. Zheng Yanfen, "My Perpetual Memories of Dai Jitao," in *Biographical Literature*, October 1971.

12. "The True Story of the Attendance of the Tibetan Delegation at the

Asian Relations Conference", in *A Collection of Tibetan Cultural and Historical Materials, Vol. II* (Lhasa: Research Association of Tibetan Cultural and Historical Materials under the Political Consultative Conference of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, 1981), pp. 12-14.

13. Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences, *Tibet Is an Inalienable Part of China* (Lhasa: Tibetan People's Press, 1986), p. 534. (Translated from Chinese). Also, see Zhuang Yan, "Pan-Asian Conference and Sino-Indian Representations," in Department of International Politics of Beijing University, *Study of International Politics*, No. 4, 1990.

14. Zheng, "My Perpetual Memories of Dai Jitao," p. 38.

15. Jawaharlal Nehru, "Asia Finds Herself," *Independence and After* (New York: Books for Libraries, 1950), p. 296.

16. Zhao Shixun, "Diplomatic Records Relating to the Sino-Indian Border and Tibet," in *Biographical Literature*, January 1963, p. 40.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

18. Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences, *Tibet Is an Inalienable Part of China*, p. 535.

19. Ya Hanzhang, *Biographies of the Dalai Lamas* (Beijing: The People's Press, 1984), pp. 335-336.

20. Zhao, "Diplomatic Records Relating to the Sino-Indian Border and Tibet," p. 41.

21. *Ibid.*

22. From the Archives of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in the Second Archives of Chinese History in Nanjing. The original telegraph is English.

23. The original document is kept in the Archives of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan affairs.

24. Wu Juncai, *India's Independence and Sino-Indian Relations* (Taipei: published by the author, 1950), p. 146.

25. At that time, the Chinese Nationalist government had moved to Guangzhou (or Canton) from Nanjing. The expelled Nationalist Chinese only could go back to China by ship from Calcutta.

26. Zhao, "Diplomatic Records Relating to Sino-Indian Border and Tibet," p. 42.

27. *The Statesman*, July 30, 1949.

28. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1949.

29. Zhao, "Diplomatic Records Relating to Sino-Indian Border and Tibet," p. 42.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

31. *Ibid.*

32. K. P. S. Menon, *Many Worlds: An Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 270.

34. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Before and After Independence* (New York: Books

for Libraries, 1950), p. 598.

35. Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

36. Zhao, "Diplomatic Records Relating to Sino-Indian Border and Tibet," p. 43.

37. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

38. R. C. Hingorani, *Nehru's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing CO. Pvt. Ltd., 1989), pp. 48-49.

39. Frederic A. Greenhut II, *The Tibetan Frontiers Question from Curzon to the Colombo Conference* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company LTD, 1982), pp. 61-62.

40. *A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue* (Beijing: Xinhua News Press, 1959), p. 392.

41. Prithwis C. Chakravarti, *India-China Relations* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadaya, 1961), p. 33.

42. George Ginburg, "Peking-Lhasa-New Delhi," in *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1960, p. 342.

43. J. P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-Indian War of 1962* (New Delhi: Thacker, 1969), pp. 6-8.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

45. K. C. Praval, *Indian Army After Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), pp. 143-144.

46. J. R. Saigal, *The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979), p. 162.

47. *The Hindustan Times*, December 2, 1963.

48. From my interview with Mr. Zhang Wenjin specializing in Sino-Indian affairs in Beijing in summer 1989. He was in charge of Asian affairs in Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Sino-Indian border crisis from 1959 to 1962.

49. Chakravarti, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

50. Amiya Rao & B. G. Rao, *Six Thousand Days, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), pp. 109-110.

51. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

52. Karunakar Gupta, "Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier," in *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 4, 1974, p. 724.

53. Chakravarti, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

54. Mullik, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

55. *White Paper No. III*, p. 91.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

57. From my interview with a Chinese expert on Indian affairs who wishes to remain anonymous in Beijing in summer 1991.

58. *White Paper No. III*, p. 74.

59. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

60. Mullik, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

61. See Vallabhbhai Patel's letter of 1950 to Prime Minister Nehru in Saigal, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-166. Patel explicitly and definitely mentioned "the undefined state of the frontier" as "potential trouble" between China and India.

62. *Peking Review*, January 5, 1960, p. 19.

63. "Statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary of India, May 16, 1959," in *White Paper No. I*, p. 76.

64. From my interview with Mr. Zhang Wenjin in Beijing in summer 1989. 65. D. R. Mankekar, *The Guilty Men of 1962* (Bombay: The Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968), p. 138.

66. *White Paper No. I*, pp. 10-18.

67. Chakravarti, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

68. Nilufar Choudhury, *Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, July 1989), p. 6.

69. Lowell Thomas, Jr., *Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet* (New York: The Greystone Press, 1950), pp. 29-30. and pp. 232-239.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

72. George Patterson was a Scottish missionary in eastern Tibet and had contacts with the Tibetan rebels there and the Dalai Lama's entourage in Lhasa. His book *Tragic Destiny* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959) describes his experience in Tibet.

73. George Patterson, *Tragic Destiny* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), pp. 84-85.

74. L. Fletcher Prouty, "Colorado to Koko Nor," in *The Denver Post*, February 6, 1972.

75. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 19.

76. *The New York Times*, April 7, 1960.

77. *Peking Review*, September 20, 1960, p. 19.

78. This information is based on my interviews with Chinese experts on the Sino-Indian border issue in Beijing in August 1991.

79. *Peking Review*, September 20, 1960, p. 19.

80. George Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p. 298.

Chapter 5

The Sino-Indian Cold War

The Sino-Indian border war ended after one month of fierce fighting. The countries were locked into enmity against each other. The smoking ruins of friendship in the distant haze might burst into flame at any time. Their relations remained in a frozen state until the mid-1970s. However, political hostility and military confrontation on the border did not lead to another Sino-Indian war. Therefore, I will define Sino-Indian relations of that period as the Sino-Indian cold war.

The Context of the Sino-Indian Cold War

The Sino-Indian cold war was associated with shifting in the strategic relations of the big powers in the world. Sino-American animosity continued through the 1960s. Sino-Soviet friendship became history, and ideological differences intensified hostilities and led to the growing deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union and the United States were also deeply trapped in the cold war and the nuclear arms race. After President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, Sino-American tensions began to ease. However, Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated with the border war in 1969. The Sino-Indian cold war was waged within the context of these American-Soviet-Chinese rival relationships.

China saw India, not as an adversary evenly matched in strength, but as an adversary associated with both the United States and the Soviet Union in encircling China. Prof. Huan Xiang, a senior adviser to the Chinese government in international affairs, once described China's diplomacy of this period as "beat with two fists", namely, one fist beat the United States and the other the Soviet Union.¹ In their

struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese regarded Indian leaders as "lackeys" or accomplices of the two superpowers. As P. L. Bhola pointed out, the American and Soviet motivation to help India was actuated by the Chinese factor and they were inclined to build up India as a counter-weight against China in Asia.²

The Sino-Indian border war, in a short period, brought India closer to the United States. The Nehru government even pleaded for military association with the United States and asked the U.S. Air Force to protect Indian cities.³ Though the border war ceased, the United States continued to bolster up India militarily. In December 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan decided to furnish India military assistance worth \$ 120 million on an emergency basis. During their meeting in June 1963, the two leaders further decided to help India by providing military aid to strengthen its defenses against the possible threat of renewed Chinese attack.⁴

Immediately after the end of the Sino-Indian border war, the United States and Britain sent high-powered delegations headed, respectively, by Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys to assess India's defense needs. They told Nehru that they were unhappy to see that a significant part of the Indian army was deployed not for defense against China, but for defense against Pakistan. They pressured India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in order to strengthen India's defense against China. Soon thereafter, Indo-Pakistani talks on the Kashmir issue started, but they ended on May 16, 1963, with no agreement reached.⁵

With the end of the Sino-Indian border war, and with the U.S. directly involved in the Vietnam war, the Johnson administration modified President Kennedy's pro-India policy and diverted attention from South Asia. Political and military confrontations in South Asia, American policy-makers then thought, would have little impact on the U.S. national security interests. Washington's interest in Pakistan cooled noticeably.⁶ As Hardgrave points out, the fact that the U.S. assumed a "low profile" in India reflected the judgment that the U.S. had no vital strategic interests in South Asia.⁷ The United States restored relatively balanced relations with India and Pakistan. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war furnished the United States a pretext to disentangle itself somewhat by suspending its military aid to both India and Pakistan. While the war in Kashmir was on, the Indian cabinet decided to attack Pakistan from Punjab. The American

ambassador immediately called on the Indian Foreign Office and threatened that the U. S. would take measures in support of Pakistan if India opened a second front.⁸ American pressure on India continued after the ceasefire in the Indo-Pakistani war.

When Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the United States in 1966, the Johnson administration sought to link its economic aid to India with India's attitude toward U.S. policy in Vietnam, but India was unwilling to support the U.S. Vietnam policy. The Indo-American relationship cooled thereafter.

From the early 1960s onward, with China as their common enemy and with the cooling of Indo-American relations, India's friendship with the Soviet Union developed rapidly. India became the strongest friend of the Soviet Union (outside the Eastern European bloc) in global and Asian affairs. The Soviet Union became the primary supplier of India's military equipment and India's most important trade partner.

In 1966, the Soviet Union successfully sponsored the Indo-Pakistani negotiations at Tashkent, which resulted in the Tashkent Declaration dealing with Indo-Pakistani relations after the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. In 1971, India and the Soviet Union formally signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Chinese observers viewed that treaty as essentially a political and military alliance against the United States and China.

China took steps to develop Sino-Pakistani friendship in order to redress the balance of power in South Asia. The United States recognized Soviet and Chinese geopolitical interests in South Asia.⁹ Nixon's policy objective on South Asia was to seek to maintain good relations with both India and Pakistan.¹⁰ Therefore, Indo-Soviet friendship *vis-a-vis* Sino-Pakistani cooperation displayed a clear picture within the context of the Sino-Soviet animosity. China's friendship with Pakistan and India's collaboration with the Soviet Union constrained diplomacy toward each other.

In the early 1970s, strategic relations of the big powers shifted dramatically. Sino-Soviet relations remained in a state of antagonism and the Soviet Union became the principal enemy in the Chinese security strategy. Meanwhile, the Sino-American rapprochement came into being and the normalization of Sino-American relations progressed steadily. China began to play an important role in world affairs as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Pakistan became a *de facto* non-aligned state by quitting CENTO and SEATO

and consolidated its links with the Muslim world. China developed good relations with all other South Asian countries, particularly with Pakistan, while India faced troubles in relations with its neighbors because of the coup d'état in Bangladesh and the annexation of Sikkim. India's non-aligned position in the Third World had also been shaken by the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty.

This strategic shift was eventually reflected in the consolidation of Indo-Soviet friendship and the strengthening of Sino-Pakistani cooperation. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, China was the strongest supporter of Pakistan, while the Soviet Union sided firmly with India. From the very beginning, the U.S. believed that Pakistan would inevitably lose its eastern wing. Because of bureaucratic infighting in the Nixon administration, no firm step was taken during the first phase of the war. When India attempted to further dismember West Pakistan, President Nixon warned Soviet Minister of Agriculture Matskevich on December 9, 1971, that if India moved forces against West Pakistan, the U.S. would not stand by. He said that "The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan. You must recognize the urgency of a ceasefire and political settlement of the crisis."¹¹ At the same time, a U.S. aircraft carrier task force was ordered to move toward the Bay of Bengal, which gave emphasis to Nixon's warning. Nixon's warning apparently frustrated the Soviet and Indian intention to destroy Pakistan.

An Asian collective security regime was proposed by Brezhnev in 1969 when he visited India. It was apparently designed to counter American influence in Asia and to establish a coalition of states hostile to China. For India, the threat to her national security loomed larger from every side after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The threat from China seemed to be supported by Washington in terms of Sino-American rapprochement.¹²

The dismemberment of Pakistan left India in a preeminent position in South Asia. The United States was disinclined to challenge the prevailing power balance there. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet rivalry came to play a major role in the Sino-Indian confrontation.

Sino-Pakistani Cooperation

Pakistan was one of those countries which established diplomatic relations with China in the early 1950s. Though it signed the Mutual Military Assistance Agreement with the United States in 1954 and

was aligned with the West as a member of CENTO and SEATO, China and Pakistan maintained normal relations. During the Bandung Conference held in 1955, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali stated that " We have the friendliest relations with China; China is not certainly imperialistic; she has not brought any other country under her heel."¹³ He also told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that Pakistan was not concerned about the threat from China and it would not be involved in a future war between the United States and China either.¹⁴ Pakistan's friendly gesture won Zhou's positive response. Zhou invited the Pakistani leader to visit China, resulting in an exchange of visits by Prime Minister Suhrawardy and Premier Zhou in 1956. After that, Sino-Pakistani relations continued to develop cautiously amidst the climate of Sino-Indian brotherly friendship and Sino-American hostility.

Considering the delicacy and complexion of the disputed Kashmir issue, Chinese leaders did not follow the Soviet line¹⁵ and refrained from pronouncing judgment on the merits of the Indo-Pakistani dispute. They kept more or less neutral by advocating a settlement through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. During a state visit to Pakistan in December 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai generalized the Kashmir issue as "the evil fruit left over by colonial rule" and did not take sides on it. He appealed to India and Pakistan to initiate negotiations among themselves and settle it peacefully. He discouraged any third party from intervening in such negotiations.¹⁶

Pakistan's foreign policy was based on feelings of national insecurity *vis-a-vis* India and on the dispute over Kashmir with India. The neighboring Soviet Union had developed friendly relations with India and openly supported India's claim to Kashmir. After the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war, the United States (Pakistan's ally) began to send military supplies to India, over which Pakistani leaders expressed grave concern.¹⁷ China was also annoyed over the Soviet attitude towards the Sino-Indian border dispute. From September 1959 to February 1961, while the Soviet Union provided \$ 500 million for India's Third Five-Year Plan projects, it recalled all Soviet experts from China and halted all Soviet-aided projects. At the same time, the Soviet Union began to send military supplies to India. It sold transport planes to India for use in the Sino-Indian border areas in 1961, and it even announced in 1962 that India would purchase ten squadron of MIG-21 fighters and manufacture the MIG aircraft in India.

Under the climate of Sino-Soviet tension and Sino-Indian hostility in the early 1960s, it was inevitable that China and Pakistan would come together and strengthen their cooperation against India. During Sino-Indian talks held in 1960, China refused to discuss the boundary of Kashmir west of the Karakoram Pass on the ground that it did not fall within the scope of the discussions.¹⁸ In 1961, Pakistan, for the first time, supported the Soviet draft resolution seeking to restore China's seat in the United Nations. During the Sino-Indian border war, Pakistan gave diplomatic support to China.

Sino-Pakistani friendship started with the signing of the Sino-Pakistani border agreement in 1963. Pakistan-held Kashmir is contiguous to China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Both countries accepted the fact that the borders between them had not been formally delimited and demarcated.¹⁹ On May 3, 1962, the two governments issued a joint communique, stating that they had agreed to conduct negotiations to attain an agreed understanding of the location and alignment of the Sino-Pakistani boundary and to sign an agreement of a provisional nature on that basis. They further agreed that, after the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir, the sovereign authorities concerned would reopen negotiations with China regarding the boundary of Kashmir in order to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the provisional one.²⁰ It was announced that complete agreement had been reached concerning the definition of the Sino-Pakistani border on December 27, 1962. The Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement was signed in Beijing on March 3, 1963.

The Indian government refused to recognize the validity of the agreement on the grounds that the whole of Kashmir belonged to India, arguing that "China and Pakistan have no common border."²¹ The Chinese government pointed out that it had never accepted the Indian stand on Kashmir without reservations, and further stated that

the Chinese Government cannot leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary...with the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan merely because there is a dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.²²

With these events--and in the light of closer Indo-Soviet ties and deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations--China came to regard India as a real threat.

During this period, Indo-Pakistani confrontation dominated South

Asian politics. India and Pakistan fought wars in both 1965 and 1971. The U.S. maintained relatively balanced relations with India and Pakistan, although Pakistan was the most allied of all the allies. After the Sino-Indian border war, the United States and the Soviet Union offered military and economic assistance to India. Pakistan, quite naturally felt unhappy with American military supplies to her enemy.

Under such circumstances, China and Pakistan became close friends in need. The first Sino-Pakistani trade agreement was signed in January, Pakistan and China signed a boundary agreement in March, and an air transportation agreement was reached in August. In October 1963, Pakistan first cast her vote for China's admission to the United Nations. In February 1964, Chinese Premier Zhou paid a state visit to Pakistan. The Chinese government, for the first time, formally supported Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue that the future of Kashmir should be determined by plebiscite in the light of the relevant U.N. resolutions.²³

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the U.S. and Britain, as Pakistan's allies, announced that they were cutting off military aid to both India and Pakistan in September 1965. China sided firmly with Pakistan and gave moral, political and material support. The Chinese intended to relieve the pressure on Pakistani troops in Kashmir by forcing India to divert some of its forces to the Sino-Indian border. In its note of August 27, 1965, the Chinese government accused Indian troops of intruding upon the China-Sikkim border, building military structures on the Tibetan side, kidnapping several Tibetans and seizing livestock from the Tibetan Shepherds. The Chinese government warned that if India did not immediately stop such actions, "it must bear full responsibility for the consequences that may arise therefrom."²⁴ On September 16, 1965, China sent an ultimatum to India, demanding the dismantling of all military structures on the Tibetan side of the China-Sikkim border within three days of the delivery of the note, return of the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized livestock. Otherwise, the Indian government would bear all the grave consequences arising therefrom.²⁵ The ultimatum was followed by Chinese troop deployment and mobilization on the Sino-Indian border. China also warned India that, if India attacked East Pakistan, China would intervene.²⁶ China's note of September 19 extended the time limit for India's dismantling military works by three days, namely, before midnight of September 22, 1965; reaffirmed its all-out support to Pakistan in its struggle

against Indian aggression; and fully supported the desire of India's neighbors to safeguard their independence and protect their internal affairs from interference.²⁷

Coincidentally, a ceasefire was declared between India and Pakistan on the same day the Chinese government had set in the note of September 19th. The Chinese government announced that, as the Indian troops had withdrawn from the Chinese territory, the purpose of the ultimatum had been fulfilled. China also started withdrawing its troops from the Sino-Sikkimese border.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war further consolidated and strengthened Sino-Pakistani friendship and cooperation by establishing a strategic partnership directed against India. After the war, the United States assumed a low profile by halting military aid to both India and Pakistan. China became a primary supplier of Pakistan's weaponry. Between 1970 and 1980, it provided some 500 tanks, 25 naval vessels and 300 combat aircraft. By 1980, China's military aid had reached 600 million dollars, and Chinese equipment constituted 75 per cent of Pakistan's tank force and 65 per cent of its air force.²⁸ During and after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the Chinese government gave strong support to Pakistan. Pakistan also acted as a channel of communication between China and the United States.²⁹

Indo-Soviet Friendship

After the Sino-Indian border war, Indo-Soviet friendship deepened and took on multiple dimensions. The Soviet Union tried to draw India to its side in the anti-China campaign, while India urgently needed the friendship of a superpower to deter its Chinese threat.

After Indira Gandhi became Indian Prime Minister in 1966, the first country she visited was the United States. The Johnson administration asked India to refrain from denouncing U.S. Vietnam policy in exchange for economic aid. Indira Gandhi rejected the condition and came back with empty hands.

Although the U.S. continued the supply of grain to India, Indira Gandhi turned to the Soviet Union and went to Moscow in July 1966. One month later, the Congress Party's President Kamaraj also visited Moscow. Both reiterated Indo-Soviet friendship and the need to strengthen it. In October 1966, a tripartite non-aligned summit was held in New Delhi and the leaders of India, Egypt and Yugoslavia jointly called for an unconditional halt to U.S. bombing of North

Vietnam.

After the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviet Union became the primary supplier of Indian weaponry. Between 1966 and 1971, Indira Gandhi paid six visits to the Soviet Union. On the eve of the third Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviet Union and India signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Article IX of the Treaty states that

in the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.³⁰

After signing this treaty in New Delhi, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the treaty was a most important landmark for the Soviet Union and India. He also stated that "in this noble work in defence of peace in Asia, India and the Soviet Union are acting hand in hand and we are convinced that this will continue in future."³¹

This treaty was undoubtedly the prelude to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. While Chinese and American leaders were making secret contacts through the Pakistan's channel for Sino-American rapprochement, Indira Gandhi discussed with the Soviet leaders the possible convergence of American and Chinese foreign policies and its impact on the situation in Asia during her Moscow tour in 1971.³² During the East Pakistan crisis, America's open tilt in favor of Pakistan and the danger of China's direct intervention pushed the Soviet Union and India to sign a treaty of this kind as a preventive leverage.

During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, President Nixon dispatched a task force of the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, while Soviet submarines tracked them. When the Chinese threatened a showdown on the Sino-Indian border, Soviet troops were building up on the Sino-Soviet border. As V. D. Chopra states, since the United States and China firmly backed Pakistan, "the treaty provided the kind of security and confidence that India sorely needed at that time."³³ India became the firmest Soviet supporter in Asian and international affairs.

Sino-Soviet confrontation was further intensified by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict. Chinese leaders increasingly felt the biggest threat to China's national security from the North. After the

1971 Indo-Pakistani War, in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, India became a loyal ally of the Soviet Union in its Asian and global diplomacy. In 1973, when Soviet leader Brezhnev visited India, he reiterated the importance of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and India in the world affairs. He again advocated the establishment of the Asian Collective Security Regime. Indian leaders neither supported nor opposed Brezhnev's proposal. With the restoration of American-Chinese relations, North Vietnam began to doubt China's intentions in Vietnamese affairs and tilted toward the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Chinese leaders believed that the Soviet-proposed Asian Collective Security Regime and the Indo-Soviet treaty were directed primarily against China. All these developments in Indo-Soviet relations contributed to shaping China's India policy.

Sino-Indian Confrontation

Immediately after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war, the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of the Indian Parliament, passed a resolution on November 14, 1962, asserting the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the Chinese "from the sacred soil of India". The Chinese government published an article titled "Again On Nehru's Philosophy," which became the manifesto for overthrowing Congress rule in India. The two Asian giants entered an era of cold war.

During the next decade, each side supported internal forces hostile to the other. While allowing the Tibetan separatists to carry out anti-Chinese activities on its soil, the Indian government opened official contact with the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. After the failure of the Tibetan rebellion, the Dalai Lama established his government-in-exile in North India and carried out separatist activities against China. Some Indian politicians actively supported the Dalai Lama's advocacy of Tibet's independence and even demanded that the Indian government reopen negotiations with China on the status of Tibet. The Chinese viewed all this as interfering in Chinese internal affairs and violating China's national sovereignty.

Indian Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai described Taiwan as an "independent country" in September 1967. In August 1968, a U.N.-sponsored conference was held in New Delhi. In his speech in the Indian parliament, Indian Minister of State for Education, Bhagwat

Jha Azad openly called the People's Republic of China "Communist China" and the Taiwan authorities "the Republic of China". In 1968, the Taiwan authorities sent a delegate to the centenary celebrations of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi organized by the Indian government. It was reported that the Taiwan delegate would also "exchange views with the Indian leaders" in a bid to promote "close understanding."³⁴

The Chinese government not only encouraged the Naga and Mizo rebellions in India's Northeast, but also openly supported the Naxalbari movement to overthrow the Congress rule in India. The Chinese media called India a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country and Naxalbari (in the north of West Bengal) was seen as an emergence of a "red area of revolutionary armed struggle," and the Naxalbari uprising "the spring thunder of Indian revolution." This overt and covert support continued until the late 1970s, when the thaw in Sino-Indian relations started.

Sino-Indian relations took a sharp turn for the worse in 1967, when both sides expelled each other's diplomats. On June 13, 1967, China announced the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on the charges of espionage activities. China also withdrew recognition of the diplomatic status of the second secretary in the Indian embassy in Beijing and kept him from leaving China until the Chinese judicial organs tried him for the crime. A public trial was arranged for the Indian diplomats. In retaliation for the Chinese actions, the Indian government deprived the Chinese first secretary of diplomatic status and deported him. The Chinese third secretary was also declared *persona non grata* and ordered to leave India within 72 hours. The Indian government even warned all its check posts and airports to see that the Chinese third secretary did not escape, and that if he went out of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, he would be arrested and action would be taken against him. On June 16th, some Chinese embassy personnel were assaulted and injured by Indian demonstrators in front of the Chinese embassy. Then, China put the Indian embassy under siege and the Red Guards blocked all the roads to the embassy. Indian police also encircled the Chinese embassy in New Delhi and the Indian government imposed restrictions on persons entering and coming out of the embassy. The diplomatic crisis ended with the lifting of the sieges of the two embassies by both sides respectively on June 20 and 21. This diplomatic crisis further poisoned Sino-Indian relations.

Although no major armed clashes occurred after the 1962 border

war, alleged incidents of violating the line of actual control took place frequently and tension simmered on the Sino-Indian border. According to the Chinese note to India (dated January 18, 1965), during the second half of 1964, Indian troops made 24 intrusions into Chinese territory across the line of actual control or across the China-Sikkim border.³⁵ On February 16, 1966, Chavan, Indian Defense Minister, informed the Lok Sabha that, from December 1965 to January 1966, the Chinese had committed 27 violations: 19 of them in the western sector; 4 in the eastern sector; 1 in the middle sector; and 3 on the China-Sikkim border.³⁶ On September 11, 1967, an armed clash occurred at Nathula and another clash took place on October 1 at Cho La, resulting in casualties on both sides. In the two armed clashes, 88 Indians were killed and 163 wounded; and Chinese casualties were estimated to be 300 at Nathula and 40 at Cho La.³⁷

Even while upgrading conventional weapons, both China and India made efforts to develop their own nuclear capabilities. In October 1964, China carried out its first successful atomic explosion. China's acquisition of nuclear strength caused much anxiety and concern among Indian leaders. On November 23, during a debate of foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha, some members advocated an agreement of mutual security with the United States while others advocated such an arrangement with the Soviet Union. Some even suggested that the two superpowers might have military bases in India as they had bases in Europe. Others urged the Indian government to change its nuclear policy and develop its own nuclear deterrent to China's nuclear threat.³⁸ Although the Indian government publicly maintained policy of not developing nuclear weapons, the explosion of India's first nuclear device in 1974 proved otherwise. As U. M. Trivedi, a parliamentary member from the Jan Sangh, stated, Indian nuclear power had been developed "for the purpose of terror meeting terror".³⁹

Following the diplomatic storm created by the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, political crises in Sikkim again put India and China into another round of diplomatic confrontation. Sikkim was a small Himalayan kingdom between China and India during the British rule in India. Under the Anglo-Chinese pact of 1890, Sikkim became a British protectorate. The British would not intervene into Sikkim's internal affairs but guided its external affairs. Under the Indo-Sikkimese treaty signed in 1950, Sikkim became India's protectorate and the Indian government was responsible for its external and defense affairs.

During the fifth general elections in January 1973, Sikkim's pro-Indian parties suffered a complete defeat and pro-Chogyal⁴⁰ parties won a victory. The Chogyal's advocacy for Sikkim's independence concerned the Indian government. After this general election (with the support of the Indian government), the opposition parties of Sikkim launched a country-wide agitation against the Chogyal of Sikkim, demanding the participation in Indian economic and political institutions. With the pretext of maintaining political stability, the Indian government sent its army to take over the responsibility of maintaining law and order in Sikkim, and Sikkim's administration was taken over by the Indian Political Officer in Gangtok. In September 1974, the Indian government made Sikkim an associate state of India by its Thirty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment. Finally, the Indian government formally announced Sikkim as its 22nd state on April 23, 1975 and completed the process of annexing Sikkim.

The Chinese government accused India of taking over the administration of Sikkim on April 12, 1973.⁴¹ On September 11, 1974, the Chinese government issued a statement condemning India for "annexing Sikkim in a colonial way," and declared that China absolutely would not recognize India's annexation of Sikkim.⁴² On April 29, 1975, the Chinese government stated that China would not recognize India's illegal annexation of Sikkim and would firmly support the Sikkimese people in their just struggle for national independence and their defense of state sovereignty against Indian expansionism.⁴³ India's annexation of Sikkim tied another knot in Sino-Indian relations and turned the Sino-Sikkimese border into a Sino-Indian border which the Chinese government has never recognized.

During the period of confrontation, China and India held and projected negative images of each other. The Chinese viewed the Indian leaders as "expansionists" and "regional hegemonists," while the Indians regarded the Chinese leaders as "aggressors" and China as the greatest threat to India's security. All these international and bilateral factors created an atmosphere of the Sino-Indian cold war which has proved difficult to defrost.

Notes

1. From my interview with Prof. Huan Xiang, Director of the Center for

International Studies of the State Council, in Beijing in 1985.

2. P. L. Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations* (Jaipur, India: R. B. S. A. Publishers, 1986), p. 51.

3. John K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 486.

4. Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day* (Agra, India: MG Publishers, 1991), p. 119.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

6. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 846.

7. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*, 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 414.

8. B. N. Kaul, *India and Superpowers* (New Delhi: Pulse Publishers, 1989), p. 40.

9. Hardgrave and Kochanek, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

10. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 848.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 904.

12. Kaul, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

13. George M. Kahin, *African-Asian Conference* (Bandung, Ithaca, 1956), p. 20.

14. Klaus H. Pringsheim, "China's Role in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict," in *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1965, p. 170.

15. During their visit to India in 1955, the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin, sided with India on the Kashmir issue and declared that the accession of Kashmir to India was final and complete. See B. N. Goswami, *Pakistan and China* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 45-46.

16. *Dawn*, December 22, 1956.

17. Bhola, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

18. *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961), Indian Report, p. 269.

19. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 164-65.

20. *Peking Review*, May 11, 1962, p. 10.

21. *White Paper No. XII*, p. 1.

22. Bhola, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

23. *People's Daily*, February 24, 1964. The Chinese carefully worded this part of the Sino-Pakistani Joint Communiqué by stating that "They expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."

24. *White Paper No. XII*, pp. 36-37.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

26. Goswami, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.
27. *White Paper No. XII*, p. 48.
28. Robert G. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South Asia", in *Asian Survey*, Washington, D. C., March 1985, p. 276; and also see Yaacov Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 90.
29. Goswami, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.
30. V. D. Chopra, *Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991), Appendix-I, p. 218.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
33. *Ibid.*, p.153.
34. *Peking Review*, August 30, 1968, p. 30, and October 18 1968, p. 30.
35. *White Paper No. XII*, p.6.
36. Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), p. 237.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 225-27.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
40. The Chogyal was the title of the king of Sikkim. It is a Tibetan word and its literal meaning is king of religion.
41. *People's Daily*, April 12, 1967.
42. *Ibid.*, September 11, 1975.
43. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1975.

Chapter 6

The Sino-Indian Detente

Following the bloody border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, Sino-Soviet hostility and confrontation intensified further. Soviet leaders began to peddle their Asian collective security regime, which Chinese leaders saw as directed against China. Feeling this Soviet threat to China's national security, China planned to reestablish Sino-American relations within the context of American-Soviet-Chinese power politics. As a countermeasure to the Soviet-Indian joint pressure on China's borders, Normalization of Sino-Indian relations was put on the agenda of China's diplomacy.

On January 1, 1969, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated, at a press conference, that India would try to find a way of solving the dispute with China without insisting on its acceptance of the Colombo proposals as a precondition.¹ Indian President Zakir Hussain, in his address in the Lok Sabha, expressed the desire to have friendly relations with China.² On May 1, 1970, in response to India's overtures, Chairman Mao Zedong shook hands with the Indian charge d'affaires ad interim on the Tiananmen rostrum and told him that "India is a great country. The Indian people are a great people.... We should be friendly."³ Mao's smile signaled China's intention to normalize Sino-Indian relations. Regrettably, the third Indo-Pakistani war and India's annexation of Sikkim interrupted this process of normalizing relations with India.

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan no longer constituted a serious threat to India's security. But Sino-American rapprochement led to India's fear of an emerging America-China-Pakistan axis directed against India. Therefore, Indian leaders took steps in 1973 to improve Indo-American relations and relax Sino-Indian tensions as a preemptive measure after signing the Simla

agreement with Pakistan. They were reluctant to support Brezhnev's proposal for the establishment of the Asian collective security regime.⁴ Chinese leaders also recognized India's preeminent status in South Asia. The two countries had the common desire to relax their tensions. However, India's annexation of Sikkim during 1973-75 delayed the process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

Sino-Indian detente actually started with the exchange of Chinese and Indian ambassadors in 1976. Political changes in both China and India during 1976-1977 accelerated the process of the Sino-Indian thaw. Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Pakistani cooperation also made a significant impact on the making of India's security policy.

China's India policy was designed to reduce pressure on its security from the western frontier and frustrate Soviet efforts to build an Asian security regime against China. India's China policy was designed to reduce the pressure on its northern frontier and preempt what it was seen as an emerging Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis by improving relations with China and the United States. Thus, Sino-Indian political dialogue began to replace Sino-Indian confrontation.

During this period, Soviet leaders were sensitive to tentative moves in the direction of Sino-Indian rapprochement. They saw those moves as a threat to the Soviet Asia security mechanism. Brezhnev and Kosygin openly voiced their dissatisfaction over the Indian Foreign Minister's Beijing visit in early 1979. Soviet leaders attempted to obstruct efforts toward Sino-Indian reconciliation and even attempted to unseat the Janata government, which had taken steps to improve relations with China.⁵

After the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1982, China began to adjust its foreign policy of tilting towards the West. It began to follow a more independent foreign policy, namely, rebalancing its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. India also began to distance itself from the Soviet diplomatic strategy and committed itself to improving relations with Washington. The coincidence of Chinese and Indian foreign policy reorientations were conducive to moving the Sino-Indian dialogue ahead. From 1981 to 1987, eight rounds of Sino-Indian border talks promoted the improvement of Sino-Indian relations in political, economic and cultural fields. However, there was no substantial progress in the negotiations of the solution to the border dispute.

From 1985 to 1989, Gorbachev's new Asia policy of maintaining

friendly relations with India and normalizing relations with China created a positive atmosphere in both Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations, which culminated in the 1988 Sino-Indian summit and the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit. These two summits marked the full normalization of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations.

Dynamism of Sino-Indian Thaw

Since the early 1960s, China had been self-isolated in both the Asian-Pacific region and the whole world as a result of Mao's ultra-leftist foreign policies. To the north of China, the Soviet Union was defined as an aggressive social-imperialist superpower; to the east and south of China, Chinese leaders continued to feel the nightmare of military threats from the United States and its allies; and to the west of China, India became an accomplice of American and Soviet anti-China campaigns. After the brief Sino-Soviet border war in 1969, diplomatically-isolated Chinese leaders and American leaders entangled in the Vietnamese war realized the possibility and common interests of reestablishing Sino-American relations. In the early 1970s, Sino-American secret dialogues led to President Nixon's successful visit to China and the restoration of Sino-American relations. This historic event marked the beginning of Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet Union within the context of their global triangular relationship. As far as the power structure of South Asia is concerned, the so-called America-China-Pakistan axis versus Soviet-India alliance came into being.

In the mid-1970s, great changes took place in both Chinese and Indian domestic politics. These political changes provided an opportunity for the new leaders of both countries to reassess and reorient their policies towards each other within the changed context of international relations.

In China, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai passed away and the ultra-leftist clique--the Gang of Four--was purged in 1976. Deng Xiaoping became the paramount Chinese leader. When Deng came back to power, he lost no time in bringing the Cultural Revolution to an end and started to push his reform program of modernization on a nationwide scale. In order to concentrate the government's attention upon domestic modernization, Deng was committed not only to strengthening relations with Western nations, particularly with the United States and Japan. He was also interested in maintaining and

improving relations with China's other neighbors in the face of tensions with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, in China's South Asian and Indian studies, Chinese scholars began to reassess India's foreign policy and its positive role in the Nonaligned Movement. Perhaps one of the most important factors was that the Indian government was reluctant to sign an Asian collective security treaty with the Soviet Union in spite of Brezhnev's strong pressure. The Chinese also recognized the fact that India had become the preeminent power in South Asia after the dismemberment of Pakistan, and that no combination of other South Asian countries could balance India. Thus, demand for the improvement of Indo-Chinese relations became stronger. Three reasons behind this can be identified.

The first reason was the judgment that Indo-Soviet friendship was, to a great extent, linked with Indo-Chinese enmity, and that the improvement of Sino-Indian relations would be conducive to distancing India from the Soviet Union. It was reasonable for Beijing to create the atmosphere of Sino-Indian rapprochement in the face of Sino-Soviet confrontation and Indo-Soviet friendship. It was proved by the fact that Soviet leaders repeatedly warned Indian leaders to be cautious in taking steps to improve Sino-Indian relations and promised to give generous economic and military assistance to India.⁶ They repeatedly reminded India of various Chinese anti-India activities and, at the same time, warned that the real Chinese intent was to weaken Soviet-Indian friendship.⁷

The second was related with China's security considerations on its western front, particularly in Tibet. Political unrest and ethnic strife surfaced in Tibet in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. The Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile used Indian territory as the base for carrying out various anti-China activities, and never ceased to make trouble inside Tibet after the failure of the 1959 revolt. Security on the western front apparently required India's cooperation. If the Indian government pledged not to allow the Tibetan rebels to use its territory as a base for carrying on anti-China activities, it would be difficult for other countries to effectively support the Dalai Lama's separatist movement inside Tibet.

Finally, the American defeat in the Vietnam war and its growing domestic crisis forced the United States to reduce its presence in East Asia. Chinese leaders were concerned about Soviet efforts to fill the power vacuum by advocating their Asian collective security regime.

Vietnamese leaders, who had remained neutral between Moscow and Beijing in their confrontation, began to lean towards Moscow and took steps to bring all Indochina under its own control, excluding Chinese influence there. Under such circumstances, it was imperative for Beijing to take steps diplomatically to stabilize Sino-Indian relations in order to frustrate Soviet efforts in the Asian-Pacific region.

As part of Beijing's diplomatic efforts against Soviet hegemonism, Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannien, Hua Guofeng and Huang Hua paid visits to Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey during 1978-1979. While staying in Kathmandu, Deng attributed instability in this region to the competition for hegemony by the superpowers. He urged South Asian countries to join together against hegemonism, as a substitute for Soviet expansionism.⁸ As Garver states, the opening to India was part of a broader effort to shore up what was called "the Northern tier".⁹

In India, facing a major political challenge to her power, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed the Emergency in 1975 in order to bring the deteriorating situation under control. Perversely, her measures led to a crisis of confidence and unification of political opposition against her government. In the general election of 1977, the Janata Party defeated the ruling Congress (Indira), and the first non-Congress central government came to power in 1977. This significant change presaged some modification or adjustment in the orientation of India's foreign policy making. Chinese leaders saw the fall of Indira Gandhi's government as a setback for Soviet hegemonism in South Asia, and immediately made positive responses to the political change in New Delhi.¹⁰ To comply with the rhetoric of "genuine nonalignment",¹¹ the Janata government took measures to alleviate Indian-Chinese tensions while balancing India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Vajpayee's China Visit

During the Janata rule, India emphasized "genuine non-alignment" and sought to improve relations with neighboring countries. In its relations with the two superpowers, India moved a bit closer to the United States and a little farther from the Soviet Union. This policy made a good impression on the Chinese, who were making efforts to establish a strategic relationship with the United States against the Soviet Union. The Chinese and Indian governments therefore

continued the process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

Following the exchange of ambassadors in 1976, the first serious attempt at Sino-Indian rapprochement came in 1978. A high-level Chinese delegation of friendship headed by Wang Bingnan, a senior Chinese diplomat and head of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, visited India in March 1978. Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai received the Chinese delegation. Mr. Wang invited Indian Foreign Minister Atal Vajpayee to visit China to explore the political basis on which Sino-Indian relations could be improved. Wang's invitation was accepted by India and Vajpayee's visit was first scheduled for that August, but Vajpayee's illness postponed his China tour until the next February.

From then on, China stopped its hostile propaganda against India. Beijing made its overtures to New Delhi through Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescue. Chinese leaders indicated that China was prepared to open border talks and improve relations with India if India so desired. They thought that "prospects for improvement of relations between India and China are good now."¹² President Ceausescue made a three-hour stop in New Delhi on his way home after visiting China on May 30, 1978, and conveyed the Chinese intent.

In June 1978, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited the United States. According to David Binder's report, Mr. Desai indicated that India was ready, sometime in the future, to recognize the present frontier as the Indo-Chinese boundary, and that India would not demand the return of territory seized by China between 1957 and 1962. The condition for this would be restoration of friendly relations between the two countries. When questioned about the Sino-Indian border dispute on the NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" program, Mr. Desai stated that

We don't want to take back the area which we say they have taken from us by force. We don't take by war. We have sufficient patience to see what friendship, if they mean it, is restored so that this question is favorably solved.

When questioned further whether this could be interpreted to mean formal recognition of the present boundary if friendly relations were restored, he replied: "I think that when the question is solved then that will happen and I think they are also willing to discuss the question now."¹³ It seemed that the Janata government was ready to

accept the 1960 Chinese proposal for mutually recognizing the existing line of actual control. Desai's statement was an encouraging message for the Chinese who had been seeking Zhou's package deal for a final settlement.

Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited Beijing in February 1979, where he exchanged views with Chinese leaders on normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Vajpayee's discussions with his Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua, also referred to what Indian leaders considered to have a direct bearing on India's national security--China's support to Naga and Mizo insurgents in India's northeastern region. Vajpayee received satisfactory assurances for stopping such support from the Chinese government.¹⁴ The five principles of peaceful co-existence were reaffirmed as the basis of normalization of bilateral relations and settlement of the border dispute. As a friendly gesture, the Chinese government agreed to reopen the two Hindu holy places, Kailash and Manasarovar (inside Tibet), to Indian pilgrims. Vajpayee's Beijing visit concluded with the signing of a new trade agreement between the two countries.

Vajpayee's visit would have been considered a significant step toward normalization of Sino-Indian relations, but an awkward situation was created by the Chinese attack on Vietnam while the Indian foreign minister was still in China. Vajpayee cut short his visit and hurried back home. "Teach Vietnam a lesson" naturally reminded the Indians of their humiliating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

The outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese war was not a deliberate Chinese arrangement, but a coincidence. However, at this juncture, Vajpayee's presence in China was a real embarrassment to the Indian government. China's attack on Vietnam also heightened India's vigilance against China's threat to its own national security. On the other hand, it reflected the limited weight of the Indian factor in Beijing's foreign policy making at a time when Moscow and Hanoi joined together to expand their influence in Indochina by controlling Laos and invading Cambodia. In spite of this untimely interlude, normalization of Sino-Indian relations suffered only a temporary setback.

Chinese leaders took advantage of Vajpayee's stay in China to start the war not for the purpose of embarrassing Indian leaders, but for making a surprise attack on Vietnam. It was rational that Chinese attack would be launched after the Indian delegation left China. But the fact is that the Vietnamese had already fully prepared for such an

attack from China because Deng openly stated in the United States that China would teach Vietnam a lesson.¹⁵ Foreign news media reported China's military deployments on a large scale along the Sino-Vietnamese borders and in South China.¹⁶ It was certain that Chinese leaders would not disclose the date of starting the attack on Vietnam to India (Moscow's friend). However, it was certainly possible for the Chinese leaders to start this war one or two days later.

Perhaps Vajpayee's China tour was scheduled at an improper time. From 1977 onward, events were moving rapidly in Indochina. Sino-Vietnamese relations were deteriorating surprisingly fast, while Soviet-Vietnamese friendship grew closer with the signing of the treaty of Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in November 1978. This treaty was obviously designed to deter an attack on Vietnam from China.

Concurrently with this development, China moved toward normalizing relations with the United States, in December 1978, to deter Soviet expansion in Indochina as well as around the world. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese were busy preparing for the forthcoming Sino-Vietnamese war, and the international community was watching these developments closely. Under such circumstances, the Indian government was still arranging Vajpayee's China tour. With hindsight, it is possible that the Indian leaders could have found a convenient excuse for postponing his visit again.

After the Janata Party came to power, Moscow was apparently unhappy with New Delhi's conciliatory policy toward China because Sino-Indian tensions were conducive to diverting China's attention from Indochina. Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin went to New Delhi in March 1979. During his talks with Mr. Desai, he expressed concern that India was trying to get nearer to China.¹⁷ Mr. Desai was reluctant to see China's attack on Vietnam as aggression and refused to recognize the Vietnamese-installed regime in Cambodia. He insisted that the Vietnamese troops should first be withdrawn from Cambodia.¹⁸ Kosygin bluntly told Indian reporters that he was less than satisfied with the results of his talks with Mr. Desai regarding Indian-Chinese relations.¹⁹ Later, Soviet President Brezhnev clearly told Mr. Desai that "Your foreign minister's visit to China was not well received by our public. I do not know how your people reacted to it, but our people took it very ill."²⁰

According to American intelligence reports, Moscow was working to see that Morarji Desai's regime would not last long.²¹ Considerable evidence shows that this analysis should not be

considered groundless. Therefore, the collapse of the Janata regime in July 1979 was attributed not only to internal strife of the party and personal ambitions of some Janata leaders, but also to the Soviet role. In this way, Desai's efforts to improve Indo-Chinese relations were brought to an end. Although the leaders of the two countries showed their courage to put Indo-Chinese rapprochement on the track, their game could only be played within the limits of those domestic, regional and international factors.

Presumed Confronting Axes

In the late 1970s, the Iranian and Afghan revolutions, followed by the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, disturbed the existing strategic balance in West Asia and South Asia. The Soviet Union succeeded in bringing Indochina within its sphere of influence with reunified Vietnam as its ally. China saw Moscow's moves in both Indochina and Afghanistan as part of the strategy of "southward advance" designed to secure warm water ports on South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. This strategy could establish effective Soviet control over the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, which carried oil and raw materials vital to the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Soviet control of those vital sea lanes could strategically outflank West Europe from South. On the other hand, the Soviet southward drive would pose a real threat to China's national security by encircling China from West Asia to Southeast Asia with Afghanistan, India and Vietnam as its collaborators.²²

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistan, an ally of the United States and a strategic partner of China. As the commentator of *People's Daily* pointed out, with Soviet troops at the threshold of Pakistan, the Soviet threat to that country was very real.²³ The U.S. again recognized the importance of South Asia and Pakistan, and it began to re-establish close relations with Pakistan. Washington, Beijing and Islamabad strengthened their cooperation in resisting Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia. Frequent diplomatic contacts between America, China and Pakistan produced a coordinated policy of defending Pakistan and supporting the Afghan Mujahideen. American Defense Secretary Harold Brown visited Beijing, and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua went to Islamabad in January 1980. In April of that year, a high-level military delegation led by

Xiao Ke, vice-minister of defense, was sent to Pakistan. Pakistani and Chinese leaders shared the view that improved Sino-Indian and Indian-Pakistani relations would weaken Indian perception of a potential threat from the America-China-Pakistan axis. The Chinese media lauded Pakistani efforts to reduce Indian-Pakistani tensions. The commentator of *People's Daily* regarded the Indian foreign secretary's three-day visit to Pakistan as "an understanding of major significance".²⁴ In May 1980, Pakistani President Zia Haq paid an official visit to Beijing, and the leaders of the two countries reaffirmed Chinese-Pakistani friendship. At the banquet in honor of President Zia Haq, Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng declared that

The Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support you in your just struggle in defence of national independence and state sovereignty and will stand firmly together with you against foreign aggression and interference.²⁵

Considering the complicated Indo-Pakistani relations, the Chinese government declined to conclude a formal Sino-Pakistani defense treaty to counter the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty. China apparently hoped to retain some flexibility in dealing with India. The efforts to ameliorate Sino-Indian tensions would not only help frustrate Soviet efforts to establish the Moscow-New Delhi-Kabul axis in South Asia, but also reduce the possibility of forging the Soviet-Indian-Vietnamese security relationship. Such a development would certainly complicate Chinese national security policymaking.

Following Indira Gandhi's return to power in January 1980, Moscow-New Delhi-Hanoi cooperation was strengthened. As a countermeasure, Chinese leaders decided to take practical steps to improve Sino-Indian relations. While talking to newsmen, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua said in New Delhi that a certain international compulsion had governed the current Chinese overtures for seeking to improve relations with India.²⁶ He attended India's Republic Day celebration at the Indian embassy in Beijing. This was the first time in 20 years that the Chinese foreign minister had graced the annual event.

China also began to adjust its position on the Kashmir issue. Until 1980, China had strongly supported Pakistan's position, calling for respect of the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination, and insisting that the Kashmir dispute be settled on the basis of a

plebiscite based on the relevant UN resolutions. While talking with the editor of *Vikrant*, an Indian defense journal, on June 21, 1980, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the Kashmir dispute was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, and that it should be settled through peaceful negotiations on the basis of the line of actual control.²⁷ Deng's statement suggested a departure from China's previous position on the Kashmir issue. When Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shani visited China in December 1980, Huang Hua set the tune on this issue by stating that the Chinese government appreciated Pakistan's efforts to seek a just settlement of the Kashmir issue "in the spirit of the Simla agreement and in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions."²⁸ The Chinese leaders tried to keep their position more or less neutral by combining the Simla agreement and the UN resolutions together.

After Indira Gandhi returned to power in January 1980, she defended Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. India took the lead in recognizing the Soviet-installed Kabul regime and the Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh regime. Indira Gandhi visited Moscow in May 1980, and Soviet President Brezhnev visited New Delhi in that December. The Indian government attempted to divert Pakistan's attention from its western front by exerting some pressure on Pakistan's eastern front.

During Mrs. Gandhi's last four years in office (1980 to 1984), Indo-Soviet political, military and economic cooperation expanded substantially. In 1980, the Soviet Union agreed to loan up to 7.8 billion rubles to the Indian government, and pledged a substantial increase in oil supplies over the ensuing five years. Both sides decided to boost their bilateral trade up to U.S.\$ 13.3 billion within the next five years.²⁹ In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union also agreed to provide India with advanced T-72 tanks and MIG-27 fighters.³⁰ India became the first country outside the Soviet Union to get the license to assemble and produce this model of plane.

However, Mrs. Gandhi soon realized that her policy of leaning toward the Soviet Union would not serve India's long-term security interests. The large-scale flow of American and Chinese arms into Pakistan would pose a potential threat to India. In addition, political instability in Punjab and in the Northeast constituted a grave security threat on the northern and western frontiers. Informed Indian strategists recognized that a unified and compliant Pakistan as a buffer state between India and the Soviet Union could only serve Indian

long-term interests; while a broken Pakistan could not, because it would bring the Soviet Union closer to Indian territory. They also agreed that continued efforts to normalize Sino-Indian relations would help maintain the strategic balance of the big powers in South Asia and help ensure tranquillity and stability along the northern border.

All those concerns led Mrs. Gandhi to diversify and balance India's diplomatic investments by adjusting her Soviet policy of leaning toward one side, by expanding India's ties with the United States, and by seeking improved relations with China.³¹ On the Afghanistan issue, for example, Indian leaders began privately to urge the Soviets to withdraw their troops.

In order to dissuade India from improving Sino-Indian relations and to tie New Delhi more closely to the Soviet Asian strategy, the Soviet leaders attempted, as the Chinese correctly charged, to sow discord and create differences between India and China.³² After the first round of Sino-Indian border talks held on December 14, 1981, *New Times* published Alexander Usvatov's long article which enumerated many of China's activities against India and warned Indian leaders that any improvement in Sino-Indian relations might be at the expense of Soviet-Indian friendship.³³ During Indira Gandhi's visit to Moscow in 1982, she explained that India's efforts to improve Indo-Chinese relations would not be at the cost of its friendship with the Soviet Union.³⁴

From 1982 onward, the general trend of China's foreign policy was to alleviate Sino-Soviet tension and hostility and cultivate balanced relations with both the superpowers. Since then, Chinese leaders have defined their approach as an "independent foreign policy". This term marked the beginning of China's balanced relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. This adjustment was motivated by external and internal factors.

Externally, President Reagan came to power and decided to rebuild American military power and adopt a new containment policy of preventing global Soviet expansion. Soviet-American confrontations were intensified. The policy of leaning toward the United States against the Soviet Union increased the risk of provoking Moscow and intensifying the tensions along the Sino-Soviet border. In March 1982, Brezhnev's conciliatory speech in Tashkent led Chinese leaders to believe Moscow's willingness to make rapprochement with China. On the other hand, the U.S. Congress's Taiwan Relations Bill and U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan led Chinese leaders to question American

intent. Sino-American talks resulted in a Sino-American declaration in August 1982, which further regularized American relations with China and reflected greater American sensitivity to Chinese concerns on U.S. Taiwan policy. This adjustment in China's relations with the two superpowers was apparently conducive to weakening Soviet opposition to the Sino-Indian thaw and alleviating Indian fear of the America-China-Pakistan axis against India.

Internally, Chinese leaders were carrying out their economic reforms. China needed to borrow experiences from the Soviet Union and East European countries in their economic development and reforms. China also hoped to learn from India about dealing with foreign investments and establishing a system of mixed economy. China required a peaceful international environment, with emphasis on good relations with its neighboring countries. Thus, improvement in Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations was high on China's diplomatic agenda.

The assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, temporarily delayed the process of improving Sino-Indian relations. At the time of her assassination, one of her senior advisers was in Beijing, talking with Chinese officials on the issues of facilitating the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. The two parties suspended the talks and he hurried back to New Delhi.³⁵

Chinese leaders were highly concerned that this unexpected tragedy might impede the process of the Sino-Indian thaw. They decided to despatch senior Vice-Premier Yao Yiling to attend Indira Gandhi's funeral. On this occasion, he invited Rajiv Gandhi, new Indian prime minister, to visit China. Rajiv Gandhi accepted this invitation. President Zail Singh told China's new ambassador that India was willing to make efforts to settle unresolved questions with China and maintain stable normal relations with China.³⁶ In his inaugural address on December 31, 1984, Rajiv Gandhi stressed the continuation of a non-alignment policy and expressed his desire to improve relations with neighboring countries.³⁷

As a response to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's friendly gesture, in his congratulatory message to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Indian diplomatic relationship, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang attached great importance to Sino-Indian relations, and expressed hope of restoring relations to a level comparable to that of the 1950s.³⁸ In June 1985, China proposed that both sides should reciprocally reopen consulates

in Lhasa, Shanghai, Bombay and Calcutta, which had been closed since 1961, and resume the long-suspended Sino-Indian border trade.³⁹

Due to efforts on both sides, the process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations was not halted by a change of India's political leadership. In October 1985, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met in New York. Mr. Gandhi reaffirmed acceptance of Zhao's invitation to visit China. In December 1985, a senior delegation of the Chinese Communist Party was invited to attend the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Indian National Congress. During this visit, the ruling parties of the two countries officially established friendly ties.

After Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in May 1985, the pace of the Sino-Soviet thaw speeded up. The Soviet media seldom mentioned directly China's alleged anti-Indian schemes. However, when there seemed to be a possible breakthrough in the Sino-Indian border talks in late 1985, *Pravda* published an article on October 22, stating that the United States and China were helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, and that a Pakistani nuclear device was about to be exploded in China's Xinjiang.⁴⁰ This report was designed to arouse the Indian public and indirectly place pressure on the Indian government by indicating that China and the United States were arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons. China promptly denied such a report as a "sheer fabrication," and denounced Soviet attempts to thwart improvements in Sino-Indian relations.

Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy focused on balanced relations with the two superpowers and on improvements in the relations with India's neighbors. Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to Moscow, reaffirming Indian-Soviet friendship in May 1985. He then went to Washington the next month, emphasizing his willingness to develop cordial relations with the United States. During his stay in Moscow, Mr. Gandhi did not respond to the Soviet proposal that a pan-Asian peace and security conference be held.⁴¹

There existed a similarity in Indian and Chinese policy orientations toward the United States and the Soviet Union. India tried to develop better relations with the United States while maintaining friendship with the Soviet Union; and China made efforts to normalize relations with Moscow while maintaining friendly ties with Washington. New Delhi and Beijing had a meeting point in their policies toward the two superpowers. Both countries hoped to balance

their respective relations with the United States and the Soviet Union by avoiding excessive leaning toward one side or the other. However, the improvement in the Sino-Soviet relations was limited since the Soviet Union did not, at that time, meet China's three conditions for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, while Sino-American cooperation was growing steadily. On the other hand, Indo-Soviet friendship remained close, and the improvement in the Indian-American relations was strained by America's close cooperation with Pakistan.

The Soviet Factor in Sino-Indian Detente

The Sino-Soviet thaw began with Brezhnev's Tashkent speech in 1982. The Chinese response was to formulate the "independent foreign policy" at the twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist party held in 1982. This policy was designed to distance China from the United States and undertake to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union. Following Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in May 1985, his New Thinking reoriented Soviet foreign policy by seeking Soviet-American detente globally while alleviating Soviet-Chinese tensions. Substantial Sino-Soviet rapprochement was invigorated by Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986. In that speech, Gorbachev emphasized Soviet-Indian friendship by stating that "The friendly relations between the USSR and India have become a stabilizing principle on an international scale."⁴² Gorbachev's approach was primarily to move toward rapprochement with China while maintaining close relations with India. Gorbachev's triangular Eurasian strategy was designed to draw China, India and the Soviet Union together with Soviet-Indian friendship and Soviet-Chinese rapprochement to thwart Washington's efforts to return to the Asian-Pacific region.

Beijing maintained that three obstacles prevented full normalization of Sino-Soviet relations: Soviet military deployments along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders; Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; and Soviet-supported Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Moscow responded positively and made efforts to address China's security concerns through its actions of troop withdrawal from Mongolia and initiatives for negotiation of the Afghan and Cambodian issues. In his Krasnoyarsk speech in 1988, Gorbachev made a connection between Asia-Pacific regional security and foreign military

bases. He offered a Soviet evacuation of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for a U.S. promise to give up its naval and air bases in the Philippines.⁴³ Gorbachev's proposal was helpful in the elimination of these potential threats to China's security.

Gorbachev's approach was tested first from summer 1986 to spring 1987, when Chinese and Indian patrols were confronting with each other in the Sumdurong Chu valley of the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. Rumors of border conflicts went around the world, and here was great concern about another Sino-Indian border war.⁴⁴ Under such tense circumstances, Moscow kept silent with no statement on the Sumdurong Chu incident. One month later, during celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the August 1971 Soviet-Indian treaty, S. B. Tatilaev, the leader of the Soviet delegation, refused to declare the recent Sumdurong incident a Chinese intrusion. The Soviet ambassador to New Delhi stressed that the Soviet-Indian treaty had not been directed against any third country.⁴⁵ This interpretation was obviously not in tune with the original intent of the treaty.

It was reported that, when American Defense Secretary Weinberger visited India in October 1986, he conveyed a Chinese message to Indian leaders that India should stop nibbling at Chinese territory, otherwise China would again teach India a lesson. Then Weinberger went to Pakistan, where he announced that the United States would supply Pakistan with AWACS aircraft and F-16 fighters.⁴⁶ The Chinese warning and America's arms supplies to Pakistan exerted immense pressure on India and exacerbated India's worries about the Washington-Beijing-Islamabad combine. The next month, Gorbachev paid an official visit to New Delhi. Throughout his visit in India, he reiterated the importance of Soviet-Indian friendship, and emphasized that improvement of Sino-Soviet relations would not be at the expense of Soviet-Indian friendship. At his news conference, he was reluctant to side with India in the Sino-Indian border dispute.⁴⁷ He called instead for better Sino-Soviet-Indian relations so that no one would have to choose sides.⁴⁸ Gorbachev apparently took a neutral position in the Sino-Indian conflict, including the Sino-Indian border dispute.

While the Sino-Indian confrontation in the Sumdurong Chu valley was escalating, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced the withdrawal of a mechanized infantry division from the Sino-Mongolian border in January 1987, and the first round of Sino-Soviet border talks was held the next month. The Soviet Union pursued force reductions along the

Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian frontiers and accepted the main channel of the Amur (or Heilongjiang) and Ussuri rivers as the demarcation line for the Sino-Soviet boundary. In April 1988, the signing of Geneva accords provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. With the thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, Indian China policy based on the Sino-Soviet confrontation had to be adjusted to the changing triangular relations of Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi. From the Sumdurong Chu crisis, Indian leaders realized that they could no longer expect Soviet support for India in the event of a future Sino-Indian crisis--if Sino-Soviet relations became cordial. Therefore, New Delhi did not want to lag behind Moscow in improving relations with Beijing.

Rajiv Gandhi realized that a diplomatic breakthrough in the Sino-Indian relations required political discussions at a higher level. Indian Defense Minister K. C. Pant and Minister of External Affairs N. D. Tiwari, respectively, visited China in April and June, 1987. Rajiv Gandhi decided to visit Beijing and drop the Indian condition that full normalization of Sino-Indian relations could only follow the settlement of the border dispute. Thus, the full normalization of Sino-Indian relations would be symbolized by the Sino-Indian summit, not by the settlement of the border dispute.

Just one month before Gandhi's Beijing's visit, Gorbachev, although planning his own visit to Beijing, rushed to New Delhi and reassured Indian leaders that Moscow would continue to put Soviet-Indian friendship first in its priorities for Asian diplomacy. During his stay in New Delhi, four agreements were signed to further Indo-Soviet cooperation. The Soviet Union decided to supply the largest credit of U.S.\$ 234 million to India for 20 years at an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent.⁴⁹ Gorbachev's visit reaffirmed the special Indo-Soviet friendship. Gorbachev also emphasized China's role in Asian and world affairs and encouraged India's efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations. He said that he was glad to see signs of improved Indian-Chinese relations.⁵⁰

Sino-Soviet-Indian relations would no longer be a zero-sum game. If the Soviet Union had earlier attempted to prevent improvements in Sino-Indian relations, Gorbachev now decided to encourage India's improved relations with China. If China had attempted to draw India into its anti-hegemony united front to frustrate the Soviet scheme to encircle China, Deng Xiaoping now hoped that Sino-Soviet rapprochement could accelerate improvements in Sino-Indian relations.

If India had made efforts to deter China's potential threat to its national security by allying with the Soviet Union, Rajiv Gandhi now discovered that good relations with China could better guarantee India's security. Therefore, Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet summits occurred respectively in December 1988 and May 1989.

Eight Rounds of Border Talks

Beijing's leaders noted that, although India had supported the Soviet Union in the Afghan and Cambodian issues, India was unwilling to become subject to Soviet control diplomatically and be drawn away from the non-aligned movement.⁵¹ Indian leaders were also interested in improving Sino-Indian relations. Their judgment of India's foreign policy renewed China's efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations. When Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng met Mrs. Indira Gandhi at Marshal Tito's funeral in Belgrade in 1980, he stressed China's desire to have good relations with India, and Indira Gandhi gave a positive response.

From the very beginning, China's strategy on Sino-Indian border negotiations was composed of two main aspects. One was to insist on a package deal, and the other was to develop relations in other fields with the border dispute shelved. To give their intention a concrete form, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping gave an interview with Krishna Kumar, the editor of *Vikrant*, on June 21, 1980. The Chinese leader renewed the "package" approach on the border issue. China would be willing to accept the demarcation as following the watershed in the eastern sector in exchange for India's renunciation of claims to Aksai Chin. In other words, both sides should agree to accept the present line of actual control as their boundary. Deng also mentioned the Kashmir dispute as an Indo-Pakistani bilateral issue. During his meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Atal Vajpayee in February 1979, Deng Xiaoping said that

We should seek common ground while reserving our differences. As for the boundary question between our two countries, we can solve it through peaceful consultation. This question should not prevent us from improving our relations in other fields.⁵²

While answering questions by Indian correspondents, Deng Xiaoping reiterated that China and India should "shelve these issues

on which there actually are differences" and "take their time in negotiating." He stressed that they should "do some practical things to develop their relations."⁵³

In his statement to the Lok Sabha, Indian Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao welcomed Deng's offer as a starting point for the normalization of relations and accepted it as the proposition to open negotiations on the border dispute, though he did not agree to the package deal.⁵⁴

When Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal in June 1981, he again mentioned the package solution to the Sino-Indian border dispute, and stressed that peaceful coexistence between India and China would be in the interests of peace in Asia. He also expressed enthusiasm for South Asian regional cooperation. Zhao disclosed that Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua would pay his long-delayed visit to New Delhi in June 1981.⁵⁵

Huang Hua's visit was marked by the agreement to open negotiations on settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute and the development of Sino-Indian relations. There followed, over the course of the decade, eight rounds of Sino-Indian talks as an official channel of Sino-Indian dialogue. The first round of talks was held in Beijing on December 10-14, 1981. The second was held in New Delhi on May 16-20, 1982. The third was held in Beijing from January 29 to February 2, 1983. These first three rounds may be regarded as the first stage. At this stage, both sides stated their own positions but failed to evolve a mutually agreed approach to the border talks, since they continued to view the border problem from diametrically opposed positions. The Chinese maintained that the package offer was an integrated proposition for a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the existing realities in both the western and eastern sectors, which had to be accepted in toto or rejected altogether. The Indians suggested that the three sectors should be reviewed separately--the sector-by-sector approach--with the Colombo proposals as the basis for negotiating a peaceful settlement acceptable to both sides.

China also came forward with five points to reinforce the six points raised by Zhou Enlai in 1960.⁵⁶ China's five points were (1) equality; (2) friendly consultation; (3) mutual understanding and mutual accommodation; (4) fair and reasonable settlement; and (5) comprehensive settlement. Comprehensive settlement and mutual understanding and mutual accommodation became the two fundamental principles the Chinese government advocated for settling

the border problem.

At the same time, India presented six working principles. They were: (1) an early settlement; (2) just solution taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides; (3) a commonly agreed approach and basis for discussion; (4) consideration of each other's proposals; (5) steps to create a propitious atmosphere; (6) efforts made to settle the border issue in each sector. The sector-by-sector settlement was the core of India's working principles.

During the first three rounds of talks, China's approach was that the border problem, as a legacy of the past, could be solved on the basis of the present realities by recognizing the line of actual control with necessary adjustments as the international boundary. India insisted on sector-by-sector negotiations and refused China's package deal. Both sides failed to narrow the existing differences.

However, during this period, trade relations between the two countries improved steadily. In 1981 the trade turnover amounted to \$111.3 million, and it increased to \$139 million in 1982. This development kept up the optimism that the negotiations on the border issue could go on.⁵⁷

The following five rounds of talks constituted the second stage. All the principles and points advanced by both sides contained some mutually acceptable principles for substantive discussions on the border question. At this stage, both sides cautiously inched forward without getting bogged down in differing interpretations.

The fourth round of talks, held in New Delhi on October 26-30, 1983, was not a leap but a slight move forward. Both sides got down to discussing the rival approaches for resolving the border dispute. India agreed to consider China's package proposal and China agreed to consider India's sector-by-sector approach. India also accepted China's proposition that discussions should be broadened to include trade, technical cooperation, cultural exchange and international affairs. On August 15, 1984, the two countries signed a trade agreement which accorded each other most-favored-nation status. As a concrete measure to promote and develop economic and trade relations between the two countries, an agreement was signed between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and the China Council for Promotion of International Trade on March 2, 1985. The two countries also agreed to promote closer cooperation in the field of radio and television in a memorandum of understanding signed in February 1985.

The fifth round of talks was held in Beijing on September 17-22, 1984. No substantive progress was made, but the negotiating climate was friendly. Vice Premier Wan Li met the Indian delegation on September 22. He hoped that India and China should continue to maintain tranquillity and peace on the border and that the border question would be solved through friendly consultations. He stressed that "We both want peace and stand for disarmament and have common points on many international issues."⁵⁸ On March 30, 1985, the leaders of the two countries exchanged greetings on the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang hoped that the two countries would work together to restore Sino-Indian relations to the level of their 1950s friendship. He expressed the conviction that Sino-Indian friendship would be in the interests of the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated in his message to Zhao Ziyang that

It is our earnest hope that through our joint efforts all outstanding problems between us can be solved, consistent with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, thereby enabling our two peoples to resume and consolidate their long standing historical ties.⁵⁹

On the eve of the sixth round of border talks, Zhao Ziyang and Rajiv Gandhi met in New York on October 22, 1985. During their meeting, they expressed their resolve to settle the border problem. They also agreed that the border issue should be discussed at the political level.

During the sixth round of bilateral talks held in New Delhi, on November 7-11, 1985, China accepted the Indian sector-by-sector proposal and at the same time insisted that the entire border should be reviewed within the comprehensive settlement. Both sides discussed the issues concerning the eastern sector and agreed to review those relating to the middle and western sectors during the next round. It was also agreed that the status quo should be maintained on the border pending a final settlement of the border dispute. Additionally, as a concrete achievement, they settled the issue of compensation for the Indian embassy's property in Beijing, removing an irritant in Sino-Indian relations.

With the three sectors reviewed separately, it appeared that India would have the upper hand in bargaining. However, the agreement on the sector-by-sector review did not lead to any progress in settlement

of the border dispute since every sector could be made as controversial as both sides wanted. After the sixth round, the Chinese stressed that the eastern sector was the most serious problem and key to the overall solution. They reiterated their earlier claims in the eastern sector and stressed that only mutual readjustment and concession could lead to a settlement, either in the eastern sector or in the western sector.⁶⁰ The Indians thought that according to the package approach the Chinese had already accepted the McMahon Line, and there were only small adjustments to be made. So India began to blame China for "turning back on its position." In reality, the Chinese position just frustrated India's intention to take advantage of the sector-by-sector agreement. As *Patriot*, a Soviet-oriented newspaper, pointed out, the Chinese concession was actually meant to jolt the Indians to prepare themselves psychologically to make concessions.⁶¹

China's emphasis on the eastern sector might have been part of her bargaining tactic. The dispute on the McMahon Line focuses on the Tawang Tract. Regarding the McMahon Line itself, it was shown quite differently on the three maps produced by the Simla conference. The Tawang Tract had been administered by the Tibetans until 1951, when Indian troops occupied it. The Indian government repeatedly charged the Chinese with occupying India's territory in Aksai Chin after 1959, but it never mentioned India's occupation of the Tawang Tract in 1951. As Surjit Mansingh points out, China's emphasis on the eastern sector dashed Indian expectations of a deal in which India would recognize China's control of Aksai Chin in return for China's recognition of the McMahon Line and withdrawal from those areas in the western sector occupied by the Chinese from 1959 to 1962.⁶²

After the seventh round of talks held in Beijing on July 19-23, 1986, both sides hardened their attitudes. There were two important developments which almost led to a border crisis. One was the upgrading of Arunachal Pradesh to statehood in December 1986; another was the Sumdorong Chu valley dispute. These two issues poisoned the atmosphere of Sino-Indian relations.

The Sumdorong Chu valley lies in the Thagla ridge area from which the 1962 war had started. When the Chinese unilaterally withdrew in 1962, they declared that the areas they had evacuated could not be re-entered by the Indians. In 1984, following the Chinese acceptance of the sector-by-sector review within the framework of comprehensive settlement, India took an initiative to open a post in

the Sumdurong Chu valley ignoring Chinese warnings. In the summer of 1986, the Chinese personnel began to move in. It was the Indian initiative that gave rise to a chain of reactions that culminated in the heightened border tension in the late 1986. Although Rajiv Gandhi rejected the Chinese plea for mutual concessions, he admitted that the McMahon Line was in fact a "thick red line," which, on the ground, would become six or seven kilometers wide. He agreed that the border dispute in the eastern sector could be settled by "systematic and scientific mapping."⁶³ This statement helped ease tensions on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border.

With tensions growing on the eastern sector, the two governments realized that some measures should be taken to alleviate them, and that a new Sino-Indian border war would be harmful to both sides. Before the eighth round of the talks, the tension greatly eased.

At the eighth round held in New Delhi, November 14-17, India gave up its stand of "boundary settlement or nothing" and agreed that, pending a settlement of the border issue, the two governments should develop friendly relations and strengthen cooperation in other fields. The Indian side also stated that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted to visit China. The Chinese side reiterated that China would welcome his visit to China. During this round of talks, the boundary issue was not discussed and it was stressed that peace and tranquillity should be maintained all along the border. Apparently, the stage was set for raising the border dialogue to the political level.

The eight rounds of Sino-Indian border talks in the 1980s showed that India's border policy changed first from non-negotiation to negotiation, and then from "boundary settlement or nothing" to overall developments in all fields. Sino-Indian dialogue of the 1980s substituted Sino-Indian detente for Sino-Indian enmity. The two countries made substantive progress in reducing the level of tension, but they seemed to feel no particular urgency to settle the border problem. If both sides failed to develop sufficient momentum to press forward at the first stage, at least, after the 1986-87 events, harsh realities prompted both sides to achieve some mutual understanding for maintaining peace and stability in the border area. The most encouraging result of the Sino-Indian border negotiations was the Sino-Indian summit held in December 1988.

Rajiv's China tour was part of the general trend of transition in world politics from hostility and confrontation to detente and dialogue. The 1988 Sino-Indian summit also marked a departure from the

previous approach, namely, political settlement of the border dispute was substituted for the previous legalistic approach. In this political approach, both sides reduced their stress on historical treaties and documents and focused instead on their respective security interests by attaching importance to mutual bargaining and understanding.

Notes

1. *The Times of India*, January 2, 1969.
2. Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), p. 259.
3. Geng Nien, "Sino-Indian Relations: Retrospect and Prospect," in *South Asian Studies*, No. 3-4, 1981, p. 3.
4. Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day* (Agra, India: MG Publishers, 1991), p. 157. Also see Zhao Weiwen, "Changes in Indian Foreign Policy," in *Contemporary International Relations*, No. I, 1982, p. 45.
5. Arun Gandhi, *The Morarji Papers: Fall of the Janata Government* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1983), pp. 28-30 and pp. 36-40.
6. Zhao, "Changes in Indian Foreign Policy," pp. 44-45.
7. Robert Horn, "The Soviet Union and Sino-Indian Relations," in *Orbis*, Winter 1983, pp. 900-901; and also see John Garver, "The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations," in *The China Quarterly*, March 1991, pp. 69-70.
8. *People's Daily*, February, 5, 1978.
9. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
10. "Indian General Election and Soviet Setback in South Asia," in *Peking Review*, April 8, 1977, pp. 23-24.
11. Gandhi, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
12. *Indian Express*, May 31, 1978.
13. *The New York Times*, June 12, 1978.
14. G. D. Deshingkar, "India-China: The Security Dimension," in *China Report*, March-April, 1979, pp. 69-75.
15. During Deng's visit to the U.S., at a luncheon with reporters on January 31, 1979, Deng warned that China might take military action against Vietnam to give Hanoi what he called a "necessary lesson". He stated that "if you don't teach them some necessary lessons, it just won't do." He stressed that "I can say two things: one, we Chinese mean what we say; and two, we Chinese do not act rashly." See *The New York Times*, February 1, 1979; and also see *Peking Review*, February 9, 1979, pp. 13-14.
16. It was reported that China assembled a force of 100,000 troops and

150 planes near the Vietnamese border over the last four weeks according to intelligence aides. See *The New York Times*, February 1, 1979.

17. Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

18. Nihal Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear: the Story of Indo-Soviet Relations* (London: Mansell, 1986), p. 146.

19. *The New York Times*, March 14, 1979.

20. Gandhi, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

22. "Moscow's Dumb-bell Strategy", in *Beijing Review*, February 25, 1980, pp. 8-9. Also, "Afghanistan, what's Moscow after?" in *Beijing Review*, January 25, 1980, pp. 9-10.

23. "Indian-Pakistan Talks, Mutual Understanding of Great Significance," in *Beijing Review*, February 18, 1980, p. 13.

24. "An Understanding of Major Significance," in *Beijing Review*, February 18, 1980, p. 13.

25. *People's Daily*, May 4, 1980.

26. *Foreign Affairs China*, Beijing, Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs, September 1981, p. 21. During his interview with Indian correspondents on February 14, 1979, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing its policy of southward advance and the Chinese were very much concerned over that, and that the developments in Indochina were causing great anxiety. He further stressed that to solve those problems required the joint efforts of all the Asian peoples. All these could be interpreted as China's international compulsion for improving Sino-Indian relations. See *Peking Review*, February 23, 1979, pp. 4-5.

27. "A Thaw in the Himalayas," in *Far East Economic Review*, July 4, 1980, p. 26.

28. Naveed Ahmad, "Sino-Pakistani Relations (1971-1981)," in *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1981, p. 73.

29. Robert Horn, "The Soviet Union and Sino-Indian Relations," in *Orbis*, Winter 1983, p. 906.

30. *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1986, p. 116.

31. Thomas Robinson, "The Soviet Union and Asia in 1981," *Asian Survey*, January 1982, p. 25.

32. *Beijing Review*, May 31, 1982, p. 11.

33. Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 901.

34. *The Hindustan Times*, September 30, 1982.

35. From my interviews with Chinese experts on Indian affairs in Beijing in summer 1991.

36. *People's Daily*, December 3, 1984.

37. *Ibid.*, January 1, 1985.

38. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

39. Nancy Jetly, "Sino-Indian Relations: a Quest for Normalization," in

India Quarterly, January-March, 1986, P. 59.

40. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

41. *People's Daily*, August 2, 1985.

42. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

43. Rajan Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1989, p. 28.

44. "Another Round of Talks or War?" in *Blitz*, July 26, 1986, p. 9. and "Chinese Intentions in the East," in *The Statesman*, July 24, 1986.

45. V. N. Rykov, "Fifteen Years of Indo-Soviet Treaty," in *New Age*, August 10, 1986, p. 9.

46. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

47. *Outlook*, December 15, 1986.

48. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

49. *The New York Times*, November 19, 1988.

50. *Beijing Review*, December 5-11, 1988, p. 16. And *Far East Economic Review*, December 1, 1988, p. 38.

51. "India and Pakistan Face Common Problems," in *Beijing Review*, January 26, 1980, pp. 13-14.

52. *People's Daily*, February 15, 1979.

53. *Peking Review*, February 23, 1979, p. 4.

54. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 4, 1980, pp. 26-27; and *The Times of India*, July 3, 1980.

55. *Beijing Review*, June 15, 1981, p. 9.

56. Zhou Enlai's six points were: (1) There is the existence of boundary dispute; (2) there is the existence of a line of actual control exercising administrative jurisdiction on either side; (3) in settling the boundary dispute certain geographical principles like watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes should be considered; (4) the national feelings of the two peoples should be taken into account; (5) pending such a settlement, the two sides should observe the existing line of actual control; and (6) both sides should refrain from patrolling to ensure tranquillity along the border.

57. *Regional Studies*, Autumn 1987, p. 57.

58. *People's Daily*, September 23, 1984.

59. Chaturvedi, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

60. *The Hindu*, November 11, 1985.

61. *Patriot*, June 10, 1986.

62. Surjit Mansingh and Steven Levine, "China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation," in *Problems of Communism*, March-June 1989, p. 37.

63. *Indian Express*, December 19, 1986.

Chapter 7


Conclusion: Opportunities and Challenges

The Beijing visits of Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev ushered in the new phases of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations. The Soviet (or Russian) policy of friendship toward both China and India and China's policy of friendship toward both India and Pakistan produced a dramatic change in the strategic relationships of the major world powers in South Asia.

During the first 45 years of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian divergent security interests of the Cold War era bedeviled their bilateral relations with mutual suspicion, distrust and hostility. Pakistan looked at its national security only in terms of India; India looked at its national security in terms of Pakistan and China; and China looked at its security interests in terms of the United States and the Soviet Union. In China's security strategy, the threat from India was considered in terms of the Indo-Soviet alliance, and the threat from the United States was calculated in terms of the American-Japanese security treaty, the American-South Korean security treaty, the American-Taiwan agreement of joint defense and the SEATO. Only after the restoration of Sino-American relations in the early 1970s was China no longer concerned about the American threat.

Therefore, the ebb and flow of the Sino-Indian relationship was intricately interwoven with Indo-Pakistani enmity and American-Soviet-Chinese triangular rivalry. I summarize this dynamic interplay as follows:

1. Indo-Pakistani hostility has been, and will remain, the crux of South Asian politics;
2. The Sino-Indian border dispute has not been, and will not



4. Power Structure Related to Sino-Indian Relationship

Note: N=Normalcy, F=Friendship, H=Hostility,

D=Detente, LF=Low Friendship

become, a top-priority in Sino-Indian relations;

3. India and Pakistan have been inclined to internationalize the Indo-Pakistani-Chinese relationship, while the United States, the Soviet Union and China have been inclined to regionalize their power politics in South Asia;

4. American-Soviet-Chinese dynamic relationships have constrained diplomatic options of India and Pakistan; and the Indo-Pakistani-Chinese relationship has made little effect upon the triangular relationship of the three major world powers.

The figure(p. 148) shows the interactions of power structures at three dimensional levels--Sino-Indian, Sino-Indian-Pakistani and American-Soviet(or Russian)-Chinese relationships since the end of World War II. It is composed of four parts, each of which represents the two big and small triangular relationships in every period. As far as each part is concerned, the smaller and thick-line triangle represents the American-Soviet-Chinese relationships. The thin-line triangles represent the Indo-Pakistani relationship and the relationships of India and Pakistan with the three powers--the United States, the Soviet Union (or Russia) and China. This figure demonstrates that there is almost no change in the Indo-Pakistani, Soviet-Pakistani and American-Indian relationships during the four periods, and that the dramatic changes in the Sino-Indian relationship are closely linked with changes in American-Soviet-Chinese relationships.

In the 1950s, the American-Pakistani military alliance and Sino-American confrontation pushed India and China closer to each other. Considerations of strategic security interests outweighed their bilateral differences. When the Cold War extended into Asia, non-aligned India and China, allied with the Soviet Union, became brothers who shared the same bed but dreamed different dreams.

After the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the United States, the Soviet Union and India became China's arch enemies. Pakistan became China's close friend and strategic partner against India. Pakistan's relationship with the U.S. provided a reliable communication channel for opening the dialogue between China and the United States. During this period, the United States was trapped in the Vietnam war and assumed a low profile in South Asia by suspending military aid to both India and Pakistan following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Concern with the perceived threat of a China-Pakistan axis led to India's growing dependence on the Soviet Union, which culminated in the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in 1971. The

pattern of Sino-Pakistani cooperation versus Indo-Soviet friendship came into being.

In the early 1970s, with the normalization of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations and the American retreat from Southeast Asia, China was no longer concerned about the American threat to its national security. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, became China's arch enemy. Chinese leaders focused their attention on the Soviet threat in terms of the Soviet-Vietnamese-Indian alliance. Deterring the Soviet expansion in Asia brought the United States and China together.

From the early 1980s onwards, a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations set in, and it was bolstered by Gorbachev's new Asia policy. Sino-Soviet detente was accompanied by substantial progress in the Sino-Soviet border talks that culminated in Gorbachev's Beijing tour in May 1989. His visit marked the normalization of the party-to-party and state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the improvement of Sino-Indian relations was accompanied by a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations. Sino-Indian detente also led to the Sino-Indian summit held in December 1988, which symbolized a normalization of the relations between China and India. The Indian National Congress and the Chinese Communist Party established formal relations, regarding each other as friendly parties, as early as in 1985. By 1989, China had restored or established normal relations with the major powers of the Cold War era. China, like India, tried to balance its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union by adhering to an independent or non-aligned foreign policy.

With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the cooling of Sino-American relations following the 1989 Tiananmen event, both India and China no longer attached importance to past Indian-Soviet friendship and Sino-American cooperation in their respective security strategies. The United States and China are now at odds in the fields of human rights, bilateral trade and arms sales. Indo-Russian relations have substantially weakened and neither look to the other in terms of the "special" friendship that characterized earlier Indo-Soviet relations. Both China and India seek broader support from the international community than from any individual power on a bilateral basis. They now share the view that only Sino-Indian friendship can be a reliable guarantee for their national security within the context of the post-Cold War era in which the American-Russian-Chinese relationships are uncertain and unstable. I define such

uncertain and unstable relationships as "low friendship" in the figure of power structures related to Sino-Indian relationship.

The ebb and flow of Sino-Indian relations must be examined within the framework of the complicated international and regional relationships of the larger global environment. Looking forward to the future development of Sino-Indian relations, and exploring the options of the settlement of the border dispute, I will attempt to analyze the three dimensions of the Sino-Indian relationship--international circumstances, regional politics and domestic compulsions. In conclusion, I will concentrate on three possible options for resolving the Sino-Indian border dispute in terms of the long-term national security interests of the two countries.

International Circumstances

Since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in December 1988, the world has experienced earth-shaking changes. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 45-year Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union came to an end, and the bipolar structure of world power suddenly vanished. Reunified Germany is rising as the backbone of the European Union and a major world power. Russia was reborn on the ruins of the Soviet Union and remains a nuclear superpower. Japan and China in East Asia, and India in South Asia, are playing a more important role in the issues of Asian security and economic development. Although the United States became the only superpower of the post-Cold War era, its capability for dominating the Asia-Pacific region and Europe is in the irreversible decline. According to Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance draft leaked by *The New York Times* in March 1992, in order to maintain its status of leadership in the global and regional affairs, the United States is attempting to establish a unipolar international order with the U.S.-led Group of Seven as its fulcrum and deny the emergence of any major power domination over any region.¹

Without the existence of the Soviet threat, however, Germany and Japan will no longer readily follow U.S. global policies. China, India and Russia will not easily yield to pressures from the United States when it comes to their own security and economic interests. The world is moving toward a multipolar power structure. The fact that Germany, Japan and India formally sought permanent membership in

the UN Security Council during the 1992 conference of the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrates such a change in the world power structure.² According to Frank Wisner, the U.S. ambassador to India, the Clinton administration does not actively consider India's inclusion in the UN Security Council.³ If the United States backs Japan and Germany as future member states of the UN Security Council, Russia and China will possibly support India's inclusion in order to break the G-7 domination in the Security Council of the United Nations.

If wars and nuclear threats have dominated the 20th century, then economic competition and trade wars will probably rule over the 21st century. All nations, developed or developing, share the view that a country's national strength, especially in the economic sense, will decide its status in the international community in the coming century. The European Union and Japan, which have been the two largest trade partners and the Cold War allies of the United States, will become its fierce competitors, if not rivals, on the global scene. Thus, the American-Soviet Cold War will probably be replaced by trade wars between the United States and her strategic partners in the years to come. Within this changed world power structure, trade and economic competitions on global scale have accelerated a formation of regional groupings. The challenge the United States will face is not from a particular power, but from a number of powers dominating their respective regions. In the foreseeable future, major powers will continue to focus on their domestic issues, and all nations will increasingly become interdependent and complementary with the growing integration of the world economy. They will be both potential partners and potential rivals. Thus, Definite enemies and friends can not be clearly identified among the major world powers.

Although Russia is experiencing political turmoil and economic crisis, her military and nuclear might, enormous industrial potential, and rich natural resources will enable the Arctic Bear to stand up again as a giant within a decade or so. In 1991, Russia and the United States signed the START treaty, which will cut about one third of their arsenals of long-range missiles and bombers over the next seven years. In December 1992, at a summit meeting in Moscow, Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II, which will further reduce their nuclear arsenals by one-third to one-half. However, it is unlikely that these agreements bring their nuclear rivalry to an end. When addressing a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on May 14, 1992, ex-Soviet

President Gorbachev stated that Russia could not be permanently kept offside in world politics.⁴ Russian President Yeltsin told his senior military commanders that Russia must have armed forces comparable with the best in the world.⁵ In January 1992, weeks after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Yeltsin announced in a speech to the United Nations that Soviet missiles were no longer targeted on the United States. However, according to Shaposhnikov, the CIS's military chief, Russia was still aiming its nuclear missiles at the United States and awaiting the U.S. response to Yeltsin's initiative to point the missiles elsewhere. He asked the U.S. and West for a similar and reciprocal step.⁶ Stemming from an agreement signed in January 1994, the U.S. and Russia announced, in late May 1994, that they had stopped aiming their missiles at each other. The action is almost purely symbolic, since high-tech computers can, within minutes, retarget missiles once again. Just before President Bush left the White House, his order to bomb Iraq provoked Russian President Yeltsin's criticism of Washington's tendency of dictating terms in areas such as Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.⁷ Russia has consistently opposed full membership of Eastern European nations and former Soviet republics in the NATO, and seen it as a threat to its own security. Although Russia prepares to sign the Partnership for Peace initiated by the NATO following 18 Eastern European nations and former Soviet republics, it intends to bargain for a special status with some power to veto NATO decisions. In spite of American opposition, Russia decided to sell rocket engines to India,⁸ advanced TU-27 and MIG-29 planes to China, and submarines to Iran. The Russians argue that their arms sales will not affect the regional power balance--the same argument made by the Americans to justify their arms sales. They are unwilling to follow the U.S. logic of "Don't do as I do, do as I say."⁹ All these facts indicate that Russian nationalism will become the keynote of Russian foreign policy, whether or not Boris Yeltsin is in power.

The Russian-Japanese dispute over the Northern Territories (or the Kurils), which were seized by the Soviet Red Army in 1945, led to the postponement of Yeltsin's planned visit to Japan. When Yeltsin left Moscow on a twice-postponed mission to make amends with Japan on October 11, 1993, he ruffled Japanese leaders by declaring that the two-day summit should avoid the central issue of the Russian-Japanese relationship--ownership of four small Pacific islands. He stressed that "I am strongly hoping that Japan does not touch on the

territorial issue....I hope that Japan doesn't spoil the trip by bringing up the Northern Territories issue."¹⁰ In 1956 Moscow agreed that once a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty was signed, two islands--Shikotan and the Habomais group--would be returned to Japan and that future talks would decide the fate of the other two--Kunashir and Etorofu. But the Soviets claimed in 1960 that Japan nullified the 1956 accord by signing the Japanese-American security treaty. While the dispute was not resolved during the two-day summit, Yeltsin stated at the summit's conclusion that Russia would be responsible for the 1956 accord. Later, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev further explained that Russia recognized the 1956 accord as a starting point for negotiations and would not recognize the 1960 repudiation.¹¹ After crushing political opposition with military force, the first thing to be decided will not be the fate of the Northern Territories, but the fate of the Yeltsin administration. The Russian-Japanese territorial dispute and the American-Japanese alliance will continue to constitute an important dimension of the Asian-Pacific security structure.

On the eve of his visit to Beijing, President Yeltsin told the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that Russia considers China to be a great power, and Russia's relations with China are a priority of the Russian foreign policy, not only in the Asian area, but also on the international scene.¹² Under the 24 Sino-Russian agreements signed during Yeltsin's visit to Beijing, Russia will sell the most sophisticated armaments and weapons to China. The two countries will regard each other as "friendly states" and avoid entering into alliances and signing treaties that will hurt the other's interests. The Sino-Russian Joint Statement reaffirms that both sides will not seek, and also oppose any form of, hegemony in Asia-Pacific or any other region of the world.¹³ Yeltsin told reporters that "We agree that the long period of artificial cold is now over, and we are now entering a new stage of de-ideologized relations."¹⁴

During the Cold War, Soviet interests in India were driven principally by its security concerns directed toward the denial of American or Chinese influence in South Asia.¹⁵ With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, newly-born Russia has no common boundary with South Asian countries. Struggling for survival from political turmoil and economic crisis, the Russian government shares a fundamental interest with the U.S. and China in the stability of South Asia, and refrains from involving in competition for influence in the region. In January 1993, President Yeltsin paid an

official visit to India. India and Russia signed a new Indo-Russian treaty of friendship and cooperation to replace the old Indo-Soviet treaty signed in 1971. The Indo-Soviet treaty was regarded as evidence of the Indo-Soviet alliance against China and the United States. The new Indo-Russian treaty omitted the strategic security clause, suggesting that it was not directed against any third country. President Yeltsin described Russia's relations with India as a "priority avenue of the Russian foreign policy". He stressed that "cooperation with India threatens no one,"¹⁶ and that Moscow would not "play the India card" against China and the United States.¹⁷

These visits, and the agreements that came out of them, indicate that Russia hopes to develop good relations with both China and India, striking a balance between East and West. Addressing the Indian Parliament, President Yeltsin emphasized that Asia is a priority area in Russian foreign policy, and Russia's national interests and geopolitical situation would require it to maintain a steady presence in the region on the basis of partnerships.¹⁸ He mentioned recent Sino-Russian contacts as "a new quality" and hailed improved Sino-Indian relations. Moreover, he emphasized that all these "fit into our overall Asian policy". He recognized the growing importance of the peaceful interaction between the three large Asian countries--Russia, India and China--which could become a powerful factor in the world.¹⁹

Since 1989, China has experienced a difficult period in her relations with the United States and the Western countries. However, by the end of 1992, China had restored her political and economic relations with the U.S., Japan and Germany, and established balanced relations with all major world powers.

With the Clinton Administration in Washington, forecasts for American-Chinese relations in the years to come are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. The two countries will continue their quibbling over human rights, bilateral trade and military sales. The Chinese interpret massive military sales by the U.S. and major Western countries to Taiwan and the escalation of their official contacts with Taiwan and the Dalai Lama as attempts to keep China divided. Chinese leaders regard U.S. support for Chinese political dissidents as an outside subversion of the Chinese government. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian stated that China will stand firm on the important issues involving China's sovereignty and fundamental national interests, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet; and that China will never barter away its principles and will strongly react to any interference into China's

internal affairs.²⁰ The Chinese government is taking diplomatic measures to face the harsh reality of the possible deterioration of American-Chinese relations.

As the most important measure, China has been making efforts to diversify its political and economic relations with major world powers. China's attempts to consolidate Sino-Japanese and Sino-Germany trade and economic relations are targeted against the possible reversal of Sino-American relations. For the past few years, China has succeeded in its efforts to strengthen Sino-Japanese and Sino-German relations, stabilize its relations with Russia, reestablish Sino-Indian friendship, establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, and normalize Sino-Vietnamese relations. Recent Chinese diplomatic actions have served to diversify China's diplomatic posture and improve its security environment for China's modernization drive.

The keynotes of China's foreign policy are to develop friendship with every surrounding country, balance strategic relations with major world powers, and make efforts to stabilize the volatile Sino-American relationship. It should be noted that Chinese leaders recognize that U.S. leadership will be indispensable in coordinating and stabilizing global and Asia-Pacific regional situations in the post-Cold War era and that no other world power can assume such a role. In bilateral relations, the United States is the largest market for Chinese consumer goods, while China is a huge market for U.S. agricultural products and high-tech products. In dealing with international and regional affairs, the U.S. and China, two permanent standing members of the UN Security Council, will have more important responsibilities and interests than their bilateral political differences and disagreements.

Therefore, Chinese leaders will seek to improve Sino-American relations and place emphasis on the development of cooperative and constructive relations between China and the United States on the basis of equality and mutual benefits by advocating the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences.²¹ China's general policy toward the United States has been formulated as "Increase trust, reduce trouble; and develop cooperation, avoid confrontation."²² China is unwilling to see the deterioration of Sino-American relations and the renewal of the Sino-American confrontation.

Although President Clinton spoke harsh words of China during the 1992 presidential campaign, he softened his tone during the national economic conference held in Little Rock in December 1992. He stated

that he did not want to isolate China for political and economic reasons, and that he did not think he would have to revoke China's MFN trade status if progress continues on human rights and other issues.²³ American China hands know that the Chinese believe that courtesy demands reciprocity; and that mutual respect and equal dialogue will win China's cooperation while pressure and confrontation will bring just the opposite to what one wished.²⁴ According to *U.S. News & World Report*, the general tendency of Clinton's foreign policy is to strike a balance between moral rhetoric and geopolitical reality. It emphasizes "diplomacy over force, small steps over grand gestures, prudence over boldness and domestic policy over geopolitics."²⁵ He stated, in a press statement, that "I reaffirm the essential continuity of American foreign policy."²⁶ His emphasis on diplomacy, prudence and domestic economy could be compatible with China's reconciliatory policy toward the United States. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton extended China's favored trade status for another year and declined to link the issues of nuclear proliferation and arms sales with renewal of China's trade privileges.²⁷ Clinton's move represents an obvious retreat from his pledges during the 1992 presidential campaign when he vowed to tie renewal of China's MFN trade status to its behavior on human rights, trade practices and arms sales. In May 1994, President Clinton decided to renew China's MFN status, delink it with human rights records, and finally end the ritual of the annual renewal of China's MFN status. His move put abnormal Sino-American relations on the track and paved the way toward Sino-American cooperation in global and regional affairs. However, Sino-American differences remain on the issues of human rights, nuclear proliferation and military sales. Therefore, it is impossible for India to play the U.S. card in dealing with China, and it is also unnecessary for India to worry about Sino-American cooperation against her.

With the differences on issues of human rights, nuclear proliferation, missile technology, Indo-American relations are not expected to be better than in recent years. After Clinton assumed office in the White House, the ties between Washington and New Delhi took a turn even for the worse because of Clinton's replies to letters from proponents of Khalistan and independent Kashmir and his remarks on human rights violations in Kashmir, and also of Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel's views on Kashmir, which seem to question Kashmir's accession to India. During his meeting with visiting Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the White House,

President Clinton viewed that "I have been disturbed by the apparent strain or limitation on the relationships between the United States and India." They agreed to make joint efforts toward "a very close working relationship".²⁸ The 1994 American-Indian summit was apparently intended to relieve a stressful year full of what India perceived as slights and neglect by Washington. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and India negotiated to establish some degree of military cooperation, including joint naval exercises and military training. The first joint naval exercise was carried out in May 1992, but it was followed soon thereafter by an American-Pakistani naval exercise. There is nothing to suggest that Indo-American military cooperation is designed to deter some perceived threat from China.

No change has been identified in the U.S. policy toward South Asia. For India, the U.S. is surely a high priority; but for the U.S., India commands a comparatively low priority, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. As R. L. Hardgrave points out, South Asia historically had relatively low priority as a focus of American foreign policy interest. With the end of the Cold War, South Asia has declined once again as an area of concern for the United States.²⁹ However, the United States is now India's largest trading partner and the single largest investor, although, in absolute terms, American investment in India is minimal compared with U.S. investments in Southeast Asia and China. Therefore, in view of economic and trade ties between the U.S. and India, the two countries will be committed to cooperative relations. For the Americans, American-Pakistani relations will be considered in terms, not only of South Asian politics, but also of Muslim world politics. Although the U.S. has withheld military assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. will continue to regard Pakistan as a partner in the power politics of the Muslim world.

It is likely that U.S. policy toward South Asia will continue to balance relations with India and Pakistan and maintain stability and promote security by decreasing Indo-Pakistani tensions and discouraging a nuclear arms race in the region.³⁰ During his visit to New Delhi in April, 1994, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott convinced Indian officials that the days of the U.S. favoring Pakistan over India had ended, by stating that "There is no American tilt toward any country in the region."³¹ He also proposed to cap the nuclear weapons programs of both India and Pakistan. The U.S. new initiative reflects its policy of balanced relations with India and

Pakistan.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indo-Russian friendship no longer contains anti-China implications. In turn, Sino-American cooperation does not constitute a threat to India's security. The key international factor preventing better relations between China and India has been removed. Essential changes in the strategic relationships between China, Russia and the United States have definitely made the old power patterns of the big powers irrelevant in South Asia. These changes will be conducive to removing mutual mistrust between China and India, creating favorable climate for developing their bilateral relations and eventually settling their long-standing border dispute.

Regional Politics

Within the framework of regional politics in South Asia, the tragedy of the Sino-Indian relationship is that one's image of the other is conflicting, and their diplomatic perceptions of South Asia have been incompatible. I share Mehta's view that misperceptions and misjudgments have been one of causes for the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations and the delay of the Sino-Indian thaw.³²

Security interests of India are fundamentally regional in its scope of concern. It denies any big power presence in South Asia, both as a threat to regional security and as a challenge to its own preeminent position.³³ India sees China as an interloper in South Asia. China believes that, since South Asian nations are China's neighbors, she certainly has an interest in active diplomacy in that region. China sees India as a regional hegemonist power, while India sees South Asia as the realm of its national security and "as its natural and rightful sphere of influence."³⁴ Other South Asian nations, particularly Pakistan, see China as a countervailing force against New Delhi in South Asia.³⁵ While China's friendly relations with India's neighboring countries developed, India's relations with them were generally strained and volatile. During the Cold War era, these stereotypical perspectives of security interests played a major role in shaping the policy of each to the other. Undoubtedly, the play of regional politics has been, and will continue to be, affected by the influence of outside powers.

The Kashmir Issue

Since the India-Pakistan partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have been hostile to each other. South Asian politics has been dominated by Indo-Pakistani hostility, and the Kashmir dispute has been the crux of this antagonism.

Kashmir was a princely state before 1947. At the time of India-Pakistan partition, India pressured the Hindu Maharaja to accede to the Indian Union. An Instrument of Accession was signed by the Hindu Maharaja in order to obtain India's military assistance against a popular insurgency. This accession was conditioned on a reference to a popular vote under impartial auspices. Pakistan disputed India's claim to Kashmir. The first Indo-Pakistani war broke out in 1947-48. With the intervention of the United Nations, the line of ceasefire was established and the future status of Kashmir would be determined by the Kashmiri people through a free and fair plebiscite. Pakistan has insisted that the Kashmir issue should be settled on the basis of the U.N. resolutions, while India has rejected the U.N. intervention and has insisted that the whole Kashmir be part of India's territory.

Both India-held Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir have common boundaries with China. The disputed Aksai Chin area lies between China's Xinjiang and Tibet, India-held Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir. Thus, Indo-Pakistani disputes over Kashmir have been interwoven with Sino-Indian disputes over Aksai Chin. If India and Pakistan can resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful negotiations, it will be greatly conducive to the settlement of the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

On the Kashmir issue, China and the U.S. supported Pakistan, while the former Soviet Union supported India. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, America and China have adjusted their Kashmir policy and adopted a neutral stance. They hope that the Kashmir issue can be resolved by peaceful negotiations at the bilateral level. When Prime Minister Rao visited Washington in May 1994, President Clinton reaffirmed this U.S. policy toward the Kashmir issue. If Indo-Pakistani hostility had suited China in the 1960s and the 1970s, China has, since the early 1980s, disengaged from the conflictual dimension of Indo-Pakistani relations following the thaw in Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations. China is no longer interested in taking sides in disputes within South Asia.

Russia continues the Soviet stance on the Kashmir issue, not

congruous with China's and America's. During his visit to New Delhi, Russian President Yeltsin voiced unequivocal support for the position that Kashmir is an integral part of India. He alleged that the truth was on the side of India and Russia intended to support and defend it.³⁶ Russia's continuous engagement in the Kashmir issue has frustrated international efforts to ease Indo-Pakistani tensions. However, as British Prime Minister John Major points out, whatever anyone else does, the Kashmir issue must eventually be solved by the governments of India and Pakistan.³⁷ Undoubtedly, outside engagement in the Kashmir issue can only worsen Indo-Pakistani relations and complicate the negotiating process of the Kashmir issue. If Russia departs from the previous Soviet stance and disengages from the Kashmir issue, that would help stabilize Indo-Pakistani relations and eventually resolve this thorny issue.

The Nuclear Proliferation Issue

Since the 1970s, nuclear proliferation in South Asia has become another major issue of Indo-Pakistani relations. India and Pakistan have been making efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and are today on the threshold of nuclear weaponization. Security concerns and threat perceptions of India and Pakistan are the key factors in the process of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Pakistan insists that she will sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty if India also agrees to do so; and India argues that India faces a potential nuclear threat not only from Pakistan, but also from China. The China factor has clearly played a crucial role in India's drive toward nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear programs and nuclear capabilities, however, were designed to deter the Soviet (now Russian) and American nuclear threats.

Pakistan has proposed that South Asia be a nuclear-free zone guaranteed by the United States, Russia and China. And, for this purpose, Pakistan has also proposed that two plus three should hold a conference concerning nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. This proposal has been supported by the United States, China and Russia. But India rejected it by advocating a comprehensive regime for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. In view of India's vigorous opposition to this proposal, the U.S. and Russia are no longer enthusiastic about pursuing it.

India's attitude demonstrates that India is not willing to give up

its plan to develop nuclear weapons. If India does not abandon its plan for nuclear weaponization, it has no reason to oppose weaker Pakistan's nuclear efforts. One day after Benazir Bhutto returned to power as prime minister on October 19, 1993, she stated, in a televised address, that "We will protect Pakistan's nuclear program and will not allow our national interest to be sacrificed."³⁸ Pakistan's openly-declared nuclear policy has been that it did not possess a nuclear weapon and had no intention of developing one. Benazir Bhutto's statement suggests a change in Pakistan's nuclear policy and its substantial progress in its program of nuclear weaponization. The U.S. NBC News reported that Pakistan had built seven Hiroshima-type nuclear bombs.³⁹ The Pressler Amendment banned U.S. military aid to Pakistan on the ground that Pakistan has not halted its program of nuclear weaponization. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 14, 1993, that he was strongly in favor of anti-proliferation legislation that would impose substantial sanctions if there was a violation.⁴⁰

After Russia's withdrawal from its contractual obligation to transfer rocket engine and technology to India, India's full commitment to self-reliance in ballistic missile technology combined with widely-reported Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation will cast shadow on the prospect of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. Therefore, any regional nonproliferation regime for South Asia will unavoidably involve definite guarantees of no nuclear threat from China, Russia and the United States. This could be in the form of an international treaty signed by the nuclear powers that prohibits the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons against a nuclear-free country or zone.

Against this background, the Clinton administration evolves a new South Asia initiative for nuclear non-proliferation in this region. This initiative centers on first capping, then rolling back, and eventually eliminating nuclear weaponization programs of India and Pakistan. Talbott's South Asia tour in April, 1994, the London talks that followed, and the American-Indian summit in May, 1994 focused on this initiative. For Pakistan, the capping proposal allows one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment and delivers 38 of 71 F-16s to Pakistan in return for a verifiable capping of its nuclear weapons program. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto rejected this proposal. Pakistan insists on the logic that both India and Pakistan should cap their nuclear programs together. For India, the U.S. agrees not to rake

up the Kashmir issue and emphasizes that it should be resolved in accordance with the Simla agreement. During the Clinton-Rao summit meeting, President Clinton even hinted that the U.S. could provide India with nuclear protection against China's nuclear threat. Clinton stated that the American-Indian dialogue is pivotal for India's security. He told Rao that "I believe you can increase your security and avoid becoming a nuclear power. Japan did it; Germany did it; a lot of other countries have done it. We can do it together."⁴¹ India has refused to play ball unless measures on a nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia are universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable. India, as a non-aligned country, is difficult to accept America's nuclear umbrella of protection.

This capping proposal also involves a nine-nation conference, or a "Five Plus Two Plus Two" formula. The participants include the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council, Japan and Germany besides India and Pakistan. This conference is intended to provide an international guarantee or pressure for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia.

After the U.S. capping proposal was made public, responses were negative rather than positive. There would be a lot of work to be done to see it gain speed.

South Asian Regional Cooperation

Although Indo-Pakistani tensions have not decreased, regional cooperation in South Asia has progressed in the economic and social fields for the past decade. The annual South Asian summit has contributed to keeping these explosive issues under control.

Regional cooperation in South Asia had been inhibited by the unequal distribution of power in the region, and by the hostility and conflicts between India and its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Initially, India viewed regional cooperation as a design to enable its smaller neighbors to be united against India. Therefore, India sought to deal with each country on the bilateral basis. India's neighbors were also reluctant to enter into regional cooperation, for they feared that India would dominate and control such an arrangement. It would institutionalize and legitimize Indian hegemony in South Asia. The mutual fear and distrust resulted in delay of the formation of any regional cooperation in South Asia.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the late Bangladesh

President Zia Rahman initiated a plan to establish an organization of regional cooperation. His proposal was eventually supported by the other South Asian nations. The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formally created in 1985.

According to its declaration, its purpose is to promote collective self-reliance in the nine socio-economic fields, as a part of South-South cooperation. The declaration stressed the equality of association, with each nation in charge of at least one field of cooperation. All decisions are to be made unanimously, and bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations. Although SAARC keeps its distance from political and security issues, it has been a major step forward for regional cooperation that can enhance regional stability by excluding foreign intervention. Annual summit meetings also provide an opportunity to bring the leaders of South Asian nations together to exchange views, discuss bilateral issues and promote mutual understanding.

However, it should be noted that, so many years after the launching of the SAARC, anti-Indian sentiment among India's neighbors and anti-neighbor sentiment in India remain real obstacles to forging effective regional cooperation. The SAARC countries hope that future summits will concentrate on cooperation in more substantive fields such as trade, investment, finance and industry, and lay the ground for transforming what was once known as region of mistrust into one of trust and mutual cooperation in the 1990s.⁴² The Seventh Summit of the SAARC was expected to launch South Asian preferential trade arrangements and the South Asian Development Fund. But this summit has been postponed twice because of the Ayodhya dispute. Economic necessity is obviously handicapped by Indo-Pakistani enmity. Mutual trust and peaceful coexistence are the basis of effective regional cooperation and of prevention of outside interference. Although there is a long way to go for the South Asian countries to reach this goal, they are making efforts to move toward this direction. Their efforts have been supported by the United States, China and Russia.

Policy Adjustments of the Major Powers

Although Pakistan and the U.S. became allies in the early 1950s, their strategic interests have been incongruent. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. treated Pakistan simply as a military ally against

Communist expansion. There was no recognition that most Pakistanis considered their real security threat to be India, the country that the U.S. had enshrined in the pantheon of abstract morality which, in turn, viewed the U.S. arming of Pakistan as a challenge to India's security.⁴³ This dilemma of U.S. South Asia policy remained unresolved throughout the Cold War.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States found Pakistan once again a frontline state in its efforts to resist the Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf area. The United States renewed its military assistance to Pakistan in 1980. The supply of F-16s and other advanced weapons greatly improved the fighting capabilities of Pakistan's armed forces. During the 1980s, American experts on South Asia defined the importance of the U.S.-Pakistani cooperation, but they also clearly realized that they had to strike a balance between Pakistan's regional priorities and America's global interests, and between U.S.-Pakistani and U.S.-Indian relations. On the one hand, the Reagan administration provided Pakistan with military and economic assistance; and on the other, in the face of India's repeated protests, it tried to convince India that Pakistan's military build-up was not directed against India. The U.S. government justified its military aid in terms of the Soviet threat on the western front of Pakistan. However, Pakistan was really concerned about its eastern front.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan's intimate security ties with the United States could not help but create a new scenario for India. During this period, India purchased a great number of advanced war planes, submarines, tanks and other advanced weapons from the Soviet Union, France, Britain and Germany. India's military purchases partly reflected its concern over Pakistan's military build-up. Although the U.S. government tried to balance its relations with Pakistan and India, U.S. relations with India remained neither warm nor cool. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the dilemma of U.S. South Asia policy remained unsolved. Since then, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet threat lost its relevance, and Washington began to take a fresh look at its Pakistan policy. U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan was suspended in October 1990 due to the Pressler amendment on the suspicion that Pakistan's nuclear program was weapon-oriented. But Islamabad has consistently denied the charge. Nicholas Platt, American ambassador to Pakistan, stated that the F-16 planes would not be delivered until

the nuclear tangle was resolved. He also recognized that the sanctions would continue to bite and corrode American-Pakistani relationship.⁴⁴

In a broader sense, the U.S. suspension of military aid to Pakistan constitutes a part of a South Asian policy adjustment under new global and regional circumstances. The Pressler amendment would be a diplomatic move to balance U.S. relations with India and Pakistan without the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan rather than a legal penalty imposed upon Pakistan for its disobedience. The U.S. has also threatened sanctions against India, such as in the case of a rocket engine deal with Russia. Although American-Pakistani relations have cooled, American-Indian relations have not yet made progress. U.S. sanctions against both India and Pakistan, and its joint naval exercises with the two countries, demonstrate U.S. interest in developing balanced relations with India and Pakistan.

With these adjustments of U.S. South Asia policy, Pakistan has been developing and strengthening its ties with the Islamic world. On November 28, 1992, five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan signed the charter of the Economic Cooperation Organization initiated by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, which created a huge Muslim economic bloc in Central Asia.⁴⁵ Iran and Afghanistan have expressed support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. In terms of its security considerations, Pakistan tends to rely on the sympathy and support of the Muslim nations instead of the world powers. The special relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan could become history.

The Russian parliament chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, on the eve of his official visit to India on August 2, 1992, called for developing and deepening relations between Russia and India in all fields. He said that, as the successor of the Soviet Union, it was only natural for Russia to continue good relations with India. He emphasized that "We don't have any ground to revise those positive and serious achievements of Soviet-Indian relations in the preceding decades."⁴⁶ In January 1993, during his New Delhi visit, Russian President Boris Yeltsin took sides with India in the Kashmir dispute, and he ruled out military and technical aid to Pakistan. That shows that "tilt toward India" is the core of Russia's South Asia policy.

Since the mid-1980s, Sino-Soviet or Sino-Russian border talks have made substantial progress and only a few small differences remain to be solved.⁴⁷ A Russian-Chinese border treaty is expected to be signed during the next Sino-Russian summit in Moscow. China is negotiating with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over

cutting military forces and confidence-building measures in the border areas. Good and stable Sino-Russian relations could well have a salutary effect on Sino-Indian relations. On the one hand, the pattern and nature of Sino-Pakistani cooperation versus Indo-Russian friendship would substantially change. This would be helpful to alleviate Indo-Pakistani tensions. On the other, China would be less worried about the Russian factor in relations with India. With the Sino-Russian boundary problem on the way to a solution, China will be left with only one real border dispute--with India. To this day, neither Russia nor the United States has officially endorsed India's territorial claims. After 1978, Soviet maps began to show Arunachal Pradesh as part of India, but continued to show Aksai Chin as Chinese territory, which is in conformity with the Chinese package deal.

China will no longer be on alert against an Indo-Russian alliance; and India will not be concerned about the "threat" from the Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis either. China's South Asia policy is that, while developing existing friendly relations with the other South Asian nations, China is sincerely making efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations. China, without taking sides in South Asian affairs, has encouraged South Asian nations to settle their bilateral differences by peaceful means and consultations. Jagat Mehta, in my view, correctly summarizes the lesson of the Sino-Indian confrontation during the Cold War. He points out that, if India-Soviet relations were based on hostility to China, China would not like India; and if China-Pakistan relations were based on hostility to India, the relations with India would not improve. He further reasons that China could have relations with Pakistan on the pattern China chooses; and India could have relations as it likes with the Soviet Union. This could be the basis. He stresses that "Our cooperation cannot be based on hostility to somebody else; it has to be based on positive economic interdependence."⁴⁸ Apparently, both Chinese and Indian leaders have reoriented their policy toward each other in this direction.

If the Sino-Soviet (or Russian) thaw has accelerated the Sino-Indian detente, the Sino-Indian LAC agreement should produce a positive effect upon the Kashmir crisis between Pakistan and India. During the Rao-Li talks in Beijing, China promised not to play the Pakistan card in its dealings with India and, at the same time, assured Pakistan that no moves would be made at its cost.⁴⁹ For the Indian side, instead of redeploying the troops withdrawn from the Sino-Indian border on the Kashmir front, it should negotiate a similar agreement

with Pakistan for defining a line of actual control in the currently disputed border areas, reducing troop deployments and establishing confidence-building measures. As Walter Anderson, senior South Asia policy analyst in the State Department's intelligence and research bureau, hopes, the Sino-Indian accord would alleviate India's security concerns and be catalyst for easing tension in the subcontinent and a nuclear detente with Pakistan.⁵⁰

The Chinese have begun to redefine the basis of renewed Sino-Indian friendship by stressing economic and commercial links. During Rao's Beijing visit, Chinese leaders called for raising Sino-Indian trade to a higher level, and both sides also signed an agreement on opening more border trade points to promote Sino-Indian border trade. The Lipu Lekh Pass on the Himachal-Tibet border is the existing trade point and Shipki La Pass on the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border is going to be opened under the new agreement.

While addressing the students of Beijing University on September 9, 1993, Prime Minister Rao even talked about the vision of Asian resurgence and stressed that "there would be no place for hegemony or expansion, whether inside or outside the continent." He asserted that "Asia could come into its full stature and attain its full destiny in the coming century if India and China work together to make it so."⁵¹ Rao's vision of future India-China cooperation not only refers to bilateral relations but to the entire Asian region. Therefore, in my view, the political and strategic significance of the Sino-Indian LAC agreement would go far beyond their bilateral relations in a long run. Although many analyses have cautioned against euphoria, the pace of the Sino-Indian cooperation could be surprisingly fast.

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has continued Gorbachev's Asia policy--develop good relations with both India and China. The United States and China have made efforts to balance their relations with Pakistan and India, and have hoped that Indo-Pakistani detente can take place with settlement of their bilateral differences. China has succeeded in stabilizing Sino-Russian relations by Yeltsin's visit while making efforts to improve Sino-American relations. The United States, Russia and China hope for peace and stability in South Asia, and the end of Indo-Pakistani enmity. Thus, China and India deal with their bilateral relations in an atmosphere comparatively free from the influence of the superpowers that characterized the old pattern of South Asian politics. Sino-Indian rapprochement would give India much greater diplomatic

maneuverability. India has already developed stable relations with the United States and Russia. With a third major power as a friend, India would be endowed with unprecedented flexibility in its diplomacy, especially in the relations with its South Asian neighbors.

Domestic Compulsions

Since the collapse of the East European bloc and the Soviet Union, the climate of Sino-Indian relations has improved. The leaders of the two countries share the view that Sino-Indian friendship should be reestablished on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Both India and China hope to maintain stable and friendly relations within the changed world power structure and the changing pattern of power politics in South Asia. Under these volatile international circumstances, political stability and economic development become the domestic compulsions for developing relations between the two Asian giants.

Chinese leaders hope for a peaceful international environment and internal stability so that China can focus its attention upon an ambitious program of modernization. After the disastrous Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders realized that political and social stability is the precondition for economic development. For the past decade, Chinese leaders have focused on reform of the rigid economic system and the promotion of fast economic growth. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders also realized that creation of an economic miracle and upgrading of people's living standard had become the fundamental guarantee for the Communist leadership and China's socialism. In 1992, the growth of China's economy reached 12.8 percent, the highest rate in the world.⁵² In the 1990s, China's economy is expected to grow at an annual rate of 8-10 percent. In order to sustain the fast pace of economic development, Chinese leaders have made every effort to remove the factors that would lead to political turmoil and social unrest. This strategy of modernization is defined by some scholars as market authoritarianism, which has proved effective in East Asian modernization. India is the second largest country in Asia and has border disputes with China. Thus, maintenance of friendly Sino-Indian relations becomes an important aspect of China's diplomatic strategy for creating favorable international circumstances for China's modernization.

In view of the bloody ethnic and religious conflicts in Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet republics, Chinese leaders have been greatly concerned about Tibetan separatism represented by the Dalai Lama and his followers, particularly after the top leaders of the United States, Britain and France officially met the Dalai Lama. Tens of thousands of Tibetans have been living in India, and their government-in-exile has also been functioning there since the failure of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion. Since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, the Indian government has repeatedly reiterated that Tibet is an autonomous region of China, and that the Tibetans would not be allowed to engage in anti-China political activities in India. Considering that Western powers might support the Dalai Lama's separatist movement by using the issue of human rights as an pretext, Chinese leaders believe that a friendly India will contribute to frustrating Western attempts to separate Tibet from China.

Based on these considerations, China's India policy contains: recognition of India's preeminent position in the region; encouragement of peaceful coexistence among the South Asian countries; efforts to balance relationships with India and other South Asian countries, particularly Pakistan; and a fair and reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute through peaceful negotiations. The Chinese long ago ended support for the Naga and Mizo tribal rebellions and have provided no aid or encouragement to the Sikh separatist agitation in Punjab and the separatist movement of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in Kashmir. Beijing refrained from making comments on the bloody Hindu-Muslim conflict that followed the demolition of the Ayodhya mosque. In view of the instability of the Indian government since 1989, China has tried to establish parallel relations with India's major political parties. The Chinese Communist Party has established party-to-party relations with the Indian National Congress(I), and the two parties have exchange frequent visits. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party has established party-to-party relations with the Indian communist parties and the Janata Dal. When Premier Li Peng visited India in December 1991, he met the leaders of all major Indian parties, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In early 1993, China invited A. B. Vajpayee, the senior BJP leader, to visit China. Chinese leaders think it possible that the BJP would become a ruling party in India. Therefore, since friendship with India is a strategic measure of China's general foreign policy, keeping contacts with all major Indian political parties helps ensure stability of Sino-Indian relations under

India's political uncertainty and volatility.

The Indian government is today facing some thorny problems in its efforts to bolster its economy and keep domestic unrest under control. Separatist movements in Kashmir, Punjab and the Northeast, and the intensifying Hindu-Muslim conflict, have resulted in political instability and outside interference. Friendship with China can keep China from intervening into India's internal affairs, particularly the separatist movements in the states bordering China.

Domestic compulsions in both countries have led their leaders to believe that Sino-Indian friendship will be indispensable in their efforts to bolster their economies and maintain political stability in their countries.

Approaches to the Border Settlement

It has been nearly half a century since India and China, as two sovereign and independent countries, began to assert their respective claims for the Sino-Indian boundary. Their conflicting border versions, based on historical-legalistic arguments, led to a fierce border war in 1962 and the subsequent Sino-Indian confrontation. There was no substantial progress in exploring a mutually acceptable solution to the border dispute itself during the eight-round border talks of the 1980s. In view of the Sumdurong Chu incident, both sides realized the potential danger of unexpected border crises if there is no definite boundary line to be observed.

After the two Sino-Indian summits held in 1988 and 1991, the focus has shifted from the border dispute to a line of actual control between the two countries. However, if efforts to explore a reasonable and realistic solution do not continue, the powder keg of Sino-Indian relations will likely explode again sooner or later.

In September 1993, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's Beijing visit led to signing of a Sino-Indian agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control and reducing military forces in the border areas, pending a final solution through friendly negotiations. This peace pact, under which both sides agree to respect and observe the LAC, is a big step forward in exploring a lasting border solution, eliminating worry about events such as the Sumdurong Chu incident which nearly sparked another border war in 1987.

With the signing of the LAC agreement in September 1993, two

possibilities exist: stepping forward to the final settlement, or returning to a legalistic framework of claims. Under the favorable external and internal situation, leaders of the two countries are looking forward to a final solution along the line of the LAC agreement. However, since both sides still uphold their respective legal claims, there is a possibility that some unexpected events might bedevil the LAC agreement. Therefore, I am still cautious about euphoria prevailing in the two countries. The lesson of the line of control between India and Pakistan in Kashmir proves that there is a crucial step between the LAC and the formal boundary. Namely, the two countries should see their territorial claims as the disputed territories between them and abandon the phrase "no prejudice to their respective legal claims." We should seize the opportunity--strike while iron is hot--to preserve the momentum of the LAC agreement in order to see a final settlement of the border dispute in the foreseeable future. We must not see the LAC as simply an indefinite postponement of a final solution.

Three alternative approaches have evolved in the past three decades: (1) No concessions, with an attempt to impose one's will upon the other; (2) Mutual concessions, with demands that the other surrender more; and (3) Accept the line of actual control as the first step towards the final settlement. Because these three approaches are still competing with each other, I will examine and assess them at some length.

(1) Each side insists on its own territorial claims and waits for an opportunity for imposing one's will upon the other by force.⁵³ This approach is actually the continuation of the confrontation policy of the late 1950s and the early 1960s.

On the Chinese side, those who advocate this approach base their arguments on the hypothesis that India will be Balkanized because of uncontrolled ethnic and religious conflicts. According to this view, it is most likely that India's Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir will become small independent nations. Then, the present Sino-Indian border would become the borders with the would-be nations, similar to the case of the former Sino-Soviet border. These small nations would not be able to confront China. On the contrary, those small nations would possibly seek goodwill and friendship from China to deter the pressure and threat from India. From this perspective, China should play a catalytic role in the process of India's disintegration.

On the Indian side, those who advocate this approach argue that Tibet was an independent country before the Chinese Communists

took power in China. According to this view, the Nehru government made a mistake in accepting China's occupation of Tibet in the Sino-Indian agreement signed in 1954. They intend to correct this mistake by encouraging and supporting Tibet's separatist agitation. They seem to believe that Tibet will be able to separate itself from China with the help of international support. India could then easily deal with Tibet without China standing behind it. Tibet's independence would provide a buffer zone between China and India and fundamentally ensure India's security interests.

This approach represents wishful thinking on either side. It is designed to seek territorial gains by cruelly violating the other state's sovereignty and territorial integration. This approach cannot reduce, but intensify, tensions between the two countries. These people do not understand the deeply-rooted political culture and strong centripetal tradition of the two great nations with ancient civilizations. The modern histories of the two countries reveal that political turmoil and civil wars have occurred again and again, but the two great peoples always stood firm on their territorial integrity and state sovereignty.

Also, they underestimate each other's national strength and military might. They lack adequate knowledge of geographical features in the border areas. China and India are the two largest Asian countries, with the two strongest armed forces in Asia. If a war occurs between China and India, there may be no winner. We may say that the Chinese troops won a victory in the one-month war in 1962. However, if the war had lasted one more month, the bitter winter would have cut all logistic supplies to the Chinese troops, and they could well have been defeated.

This approach will unavoidably interfere in each other's internal affairs, and tensions between the two countries will be escalated. The two countries will naturally make considerable military build-ups on both the sides of the border. Long-term war preparedness will definitely cost a sizable amount of the financial resources needed for promoting their economic growth.

(2) Mutual concessions, with demands that the other surrender more territory. This approach was reflected in the efforts to work out the general principles for resolving the border dispute during the negotiations of the 1980s. When Deng Xiaoping offered a package deal, the Indian side hesitated to accept it. The motivation of India's position was to obtain more concessions from China. India's option was to ensure the McMahon Line as the boundary line in the eastern

sector while making China unilaterally surrender a sizable piece of territory in the western sector. When India was ready to discuss Deng's proposal, China took a step back. The motivation of China's position was to ensure the line of actual control as the boundary line in the western sector while demanding that India surrender part of the Tawang Tract north of the Se La range. This is actually a face-saving approach for each side. If this approach is achieved in either version, the side having acquired more territory can claim victory.

The Chinese side put forward the principle of "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation", taking into account both the history and the reality. The Indian side preferred the principle of "mutual adjustment", with China's unilateral surrender of considerable area in Aksai Chin. The common point is that the border is negotiable and adjustable, but the fundamental difference is that one side demands the other to surrender what it is not prepared to relinquish.

This approach insists on peaceful settlement by negotiation. However, the negotiability and adjustability of the border invited new troubles along the current line of actual control. Because of the geographical complexity and the ambiguity of the current line of actual control, each side attempted to push forward, as far as possible, before actually discussing adjustments along the entire border. The Sumdorong Chu incident(1986-1987) erupted against this background. This approach will tend to touch off border conflicts, and it is unlikely to be conducive to the maintenance of peace on the Sino-Indian border. In a final analysis, the essence of this approach is for one side to attempt to gain what it does not yet possess, but is controlled by the other.

This approach suggests that neither government was politically prepared to settle the border dispute. Both sides were interested in relaxing tensions between them, but there was no urgency to resolve the border problem. The primary factor was that each already controlled what it wanted from the other. Both China and India seemed to be satisfied with the *status quo* on the border, and neither side could expect to gain more through border negotiations.

(3) Define the line of actual control as the first step toward a final settlement; and as the second step, a political settlement based on the mutually-accepted line of actual control at a proper time in the future.

Looking back at the Sino-Indian border dispute and border negotiations of the last four decades, several factors impeding the complete settlement still remain. I will try to identify them at some

length.

First, as mentioned above, the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is interwoven with the Sino-Indian dispute over the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. The Indian government has consistently claimed sovereignty over all Kashmir. India has refused to accept the Sino-Pakistani boundary, and China has refused to negotiate with India concerning this boundary. Thus, if we expect substantial progress in negotiating the Sino-Indian boundary east of the Karakoram Pass, there must be a radical shift in India's stance on the Kashmir issue. Moreover, since 1984, Indian troops have been wedged between the Indira Col pass and the Karakoram Pass near the Siachen Glacier. India's occupation of the Siachen Glacier has made this section of the Sino-Pakistani boundary questionable and further complicated the border negotiations between China and India.

Second, the close relationship between China and Pakistan is a sensitive subject which continues to raise concern in New Delhi. The frequent exchange of visits by Chinese and Pakistani leaders demonstrates their close friendship and cooperation. Indian leaders are seriously concerned about their security interests related to nuclear and military cooperations between China and Pakistan. India continues to protest any action taken by China and Pakistan in the Pakistan-held area of Kashmir. However, Sino-Pakistani friendship and cooperation will not be weakened with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. In light of the emerging bloc of Muslim nations in Central Asia and ethnic unrest in China's Xinjiang, Sino-Pakistani friendship should be examined within the broader framework--the Muslim world, except for South Asia.

Third, for the Indians, the cession of Aksai Chin would constitute a sellout of India's national integrity because of the November 7, 1962, parliamentary resolution which banned concession of India-claimed territory. So far no government in New Delhi has been strong enough to face the possible public uproar. Indira Gandhi was reported to be on the verge of accepting the Chinese package deal in 1983. She was assassinated soon thereafter. As John Lall states, it was an opportunity lost.⁵⁴ Although Rajiv Gandhi enjoyed a three fourth majority in the Lok Sabha after the 1984 national election, he was not well-advised and missed a good opportunity for a *de jure* settlement.⁵⁵ His political charisma was eroded soon by other issues before he started his Beijing tour in 1988. The Rao government is very cautious on this sensitive issue. For the Chinese, however, Aksai

Chin is a vital and indispensable communication link between Xinjiang and Tibet.⁵⁶ It is unlikely that the Chinese would make any concessions that could harm China's security interests in its northwestern frontier areas. It appears beyond the capability of the present Indian government to make public acceptance, as an international boundary, of the existing situation along the entire Sino-Indian border. However, an encouraging trend in India's public opinion is that the 1962 parliamentary resolution should be disregarded. General K. Sundarji, the former Indian Army Chief, states that "The 1962 Parliamentary pledge was based on momentary fervor rather than rational thinking. Today any opposition to the accord [the Sino-Indian LAC agreement] would be anti-national, silly and stupid."⁵⁷

Finally, the knot of the Sikkim issue between India and China remains to be untied. The Chinese will not easily accept the Sino-Sikkimese boundary as part of the Sino-Indian boundary, nor will they separate the status of Sikkim from the Sino-Indian boundary. The Sikkim issue could only be settled within the framework of a package deal. During the Rao-Li talks held in September 1993, China did not formally accept the incorporation of Sikkim into India. However, their acceptance of the LAC implied Chinese acquiescence or "flexibility" on the Sikkim issue in exchange for Indian toleration of the exclusion of the Sino-Pakistani boundary from the current line of actual control between China and India. Since the former China-Sikkim boundary is actually part of the LAC, it should be included in the LAC agreement. Since the Sino-Pakistani boundary is not part of the LAC, it should be excluded from the LAC agreement. Of course, such a practical and realistic arrangement does not prejudice the legal claims of either side. Cheng Ruisheng, the Chinese ambassador to India, was reported to disclose on April 20, 1994 that China was positively considering to accept the annexation of Sikkim by India. The Chinese announcement would help formally define the current line of actual control between the two countries, excluding the Sino-Pakistani boundary.

In view of these factors, a comprehensive settlement can only be achieved step by step, taking into account the sentiments of the two peoples and the national interests of the two countries. In order to maintain peace and stability on the entire border, the first step is to define an acceptable line of actual control between the two countries.

From the historical point of view, four lines of actual control have been proposed. The first line is the state of actual control when the

British left in 1947. The second line is the November 1959 line suggested by the Chinese government and confirmed by the Colombo conference. The third line is the September 1962 line advocated by the Indian government. The last line is the current line of actual control between the two countries. Since India does not recognize China's November 1959 line, and China does not accept India's September 1962 line, these two lines may be excluded. The 1947 line and the current line are relatively easy to identify.

The current line of actual control has been observed by both sides since the end of the 1962 war. Any mutually accepted agreement will inevitably be based on recognition of what actually exists on the ground.

This mutually accepted line would serve as a provisional boundary by the two countries. Both sides could agree not to violate the line without prejudice to the legal claims of either side pending a final settlement. Bypassing the boundary dispute by defining a mutually-accepted line of actual control, the two countries could then seek stable and peaceful conditions along the border by demilitarization and confidence-building measures. This step may temporarily exclude the disputes over the issues such as Sikkim, the Sino-Bhutanese border and the Sino-Pakistani boundary. More importantly, a mutually-accepted LAC may preclude any charge of selling out territory from either side because there is no prejudice to legal claims of either side.

The new Sino-Indian LAC agreement signed in September 1993 may be seen as the first step based on "rational politics and objective realities"⁵⁸ in the course of the comprehensive border settlement. Although it is politically impossible for the current Indian government to concede any India-claimed territory to China, this pragmatic accord, like the Simla agreement with Pakistan in 1972, does make the LAC the *de facto* or a semi *de jure* border.⁵⁹ It could have been done in the mid-1950s, or during the eight rounds of border talks in the 1980s. But those opportunities were lost for various reasons. Although they still need some time to delineate the LAC, establish confidence-building measures (CBMs), and reduce military forces in the border area, the two Asian giants have found an agreed line to respect and observe. Stability and tranquillity along the LAC can, to a greater extent, be maintained. In terms of the current atmosphere of India and China, I share Deshingkar's view that, with the signing of the LAC agreement, the legalistic and historical framework of the border claims has been thrown on the remotest back-burner, or even behind the

burner shelf.⁶⁰ There is widespread support to the LAC agreement in both India and China, which will further strengthen the determination of Indian and Chinese leaders to boost the momentum for exploring a final solution.

As the second step, a comprehensive settlement might be based on the *status quo* and the 1947 state of the Sino-Indian border. The *status quo* means the current limits of actual administration of either side, and the 1947 state of the border means the border state when the British left in 1947. For the Chinese, "mutual accommodation" contains two implications. One is the Chinese package deal, namely, China would accept the McMahon Line as the basis of defining the Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern sector in return for India's recognition of China's control of Aksai Chin as the basis of defining the Sino-Indian boundary in the western sector. The other is mutual adjustments in each sector, namely, India would make concessions in the eastern sector in return for which China would make concessions in the western sector.

China has defined Aksai Chin in the western sector as strategically vital to her security interests, although she claims that the eastern sector is crucial to the solution of the border issue. India has defined the eastern sector as strategically vital to her security interests, although she claims that Aksai Chin is crucial to the solution of the border issue. It seems unlikely that either side will simply agree to give up the disputed areas that it now holds. In view of the experiences of the 1962 war and the 1986-87 border crisis, it appears equally unlikely that either side will try to gain what it does not yet hold by resorting to war.

Since 1914, all Chinese central governments have refused to accept the validity of the McMahon Line and the legality of the Simla conference, primarily because of their refusal to accept the sovereign status of Tibet. This issue has been, and still remains, politically sensitive to the Chinese government. Their consistent refusal has resulted in insistence on the pre-1914 Outer Line as the international boundary. Based on the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty signed in 1960, it appears that the Chinese have not insisted that the entire disputed area be Chinese. In fact, China accepted part of the McMahon Line as the international boundary when the border alignment was renegotiated between China and Burma.

The Chinese claim was designed to challenge two thorny issues they have been facing since the early 1950s. One is the political status

of Tibet, and the other is the Indian claim to the whole Aksai Chin area. The first issue was resolved politically through the 1954 Sino-Indian negotiations, but the territorial dispute related to the political status of Tibet remained unsolved. After 1954, the Indian government formally claimed the whole Aksai Chin area through the publication of new Survey of India maps. The Indian government protested against the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway running through Aksai Chin in 1958. Only then did the Chinese government formally make their claim to the whole disputed area south of the McMahon Line. At the same time China offered a package deal in which China would, in principle, accept the McMahon Line in return for India's disclaim to the Aksai Chin area.

Even in the western sector, the Chinese attitude is not rigid. For instance, the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement was signed in 1963. The boundary line is based on the 1899 line with the 1905 revision. According to the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, of a disputed area of 3,400 square miles between the Chinese and Pakistani versions of the Sino-Pakistani boundary, Pakistan gained about 1,350 square miles, including 750 square miles of Shimshal valley. This valley was rich in natural resources, including salt mining areas and grazing grounds, and had been under administrative jurisdiction of the Chinese government.⁶¹ In the Muztang region, the Raskam valley and the Tagdumbash Pamir, which had been under Chinese control but claimed by Pakistan, went to China. Therefore, the boundary alignment agreed upon by China and Pakistan in 1963 largely conformed to the factual boundary that existed between the two countries.⁶²

In future bargaining with India, the Chinese government might be willing to accept the current line of actual control without implying acceptance of the Simla convention and other imperially-imposed and now disputed lines.

As the bargaining principle of a give-and-take deal, both sides will have to recognize the current line of actual control as the basis of a comprehensive settlement, while, at the same time, taking into account the state of the Sino-Indian border in 1947. Within the framework of this approach, major or minor adjustments would be possible, through friendly consultations, in considering the convenience of economic life and religious feelings of frontier population on both the sides of the boundary. The Chinese government might propose major territorial adjustments in the eastern sector. In the Tawang Tract, the Se La

range might be a proposed alignment; on the upper reaches of the Tsari-Subansiri river, the Tibetan sacred places might be included in Chinese territory; and on the Lohit valley the traditional boundary between Walong and Menilkrai might be restored. In return for these major adjustments, it is likely that the Chinese could make substantial concessions in the Aksai Chin area. Between the Karakoram Pass and the Panggong Lake the claim lines of both sides differ widely. Considering major adjustments in the eastern sector, a compromise line in the western sector might be accepted by the Chinese on the basis of the 1899 British proposal, giving the Lingzitan Plain to India, or along the Chip Chap-Changchenmo valleys where Lanak Pass and Kongka Pass would be border passes. The Chip Chap-Changchenmo line could meet two Indian claims. One claim is that Lanak Pass is a Sino-Indian border pass and the other is that China would actually accede what India thinks is China-occupied territory during the 1962 war. South of the Panggong Lake, the compromise line might be based on the Kashmir Atlas of 1868, which puts Demchok within Tibet and the western half of the Spanggur Lake within India.

It is definite that, if the Indian side is willing to make more concessions in the eastern sector, the Chinese side would do the same in the western sector. Otherwise, if one side is not willing to make any substantial concessions, neither is the other. In that case, a final solution of the border dispute can only be shelved. When China and Japan signed their peace treaty ending the state of war, both sides put into cold storage the dispute over the Senkaku(or Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea. Deng Xiaoping once said: "Perhaps our generation is not wise enough to solve this problem, let us leave this to a generation with greater wisdom."⁶³

During the Sino-Indian border talks of the 1980s, the Chinese side proposed major adjustments in both the sectors, while the Indian side preferred small modifications along the line of actual control. It seems to me that both proposals contain some mutually acceptable positive elements. Both sides regard the current line of actual control as the basis for a final solution of the border dispute. Their basic difference centers on how they could trade each other's currently-controlled border land on the principle of the take-and-give deal, while taking into account the interests of the two nations and the feelings of the two peoples toward the Himalayas and the Karakoram. Whether it might be China's major adjustment or India's minor modification, it

is certain that the final solution will be a political solution in the light of the principle of mutual and equal adjustment. It means that this solution will be one of face-saving for both sides, one of looking forward instead of looking back, and one of respecting the feelings of the two peoples toward the Himalayas and the Karakoram, while also considering the strategic security interests of the two nations.

Within the framework of this general principle, if one side hopes to get a piece of land from the other, it should offer a proper piece of land to the other--whether this trade might be a major adjustment or a minor modification. Certain controversial phrases such as the McMahon Line and the package approach should be avoided in evolving a compromise approach, so that both sides can accept it without loss of face.

From the historical point of view, this approach might be a bitter pill for both sides. It might be thought that each side will lose a large piece of land which it has claimed. However, in looking to the future, a peaceful and settled boundary between the two largest neighboring nations in Asia will bring inestimable benefits to their national security, political stability and economic development. Both sides will benefit much more in the future than they suppose to lose in the present. In fact, each side will get essentially what it possesses at present, without gain or loss. The dilemma of the on-going border talks lies in the fact that each side seeks to gain more than she possesses at present. For a breakthrough, each side must give up this attempt and reach out to resolve a dispute that has impeded friendship and cooperation between the two Asian giants.

Turning the LAC into a formal boundary, a *de jure* settlement based on the realities and possibilities, will unavoidably be a historical conclusion after one century of the border dispute between India and China. Talking about winner or loser is irrelevant to this historical conclusion.

Notes

1. C. Raja Mohan, "Pentagon's New World Order," in *The Hindu*, March 19, 1992.
2. *The New York Times*, September 24, 1992.
3. *The Hindustan Times*, May 19, 1994.
4. *The Washington Post*, May 15, 1992.

5. *The Times of India*, November 26, 1992.

6. *The New York Times*, September 26, 1992.

7. *Ibid.*, January 26, 1993.

8. Under the pressure from the United States, Russia agreed to halt the Russian-Indian contract for its sale of the rocket engine and technology to India on July 16, 1993. The deal was worth between \$200 million and \$300 million. Russia will be allowed to renegotiate terms for selling some engines but not the related technology. The U.S. promised to promote the space cooperation between the NASA and the Russian space organization, including potential contracts for launching American satellites on Russian rockets that could mean \$700 million in commercial trade for Russia in the next seven or eight years. See *The New York Times*, July 17, 1993.

9. *Austin American-Statesman*, November 26, 1992.

10. *The Los Angeles Times*, October 12, 1993.

11. *The New York Times*, October 14, 1993.

12. *China Daily*, November 26, 1992.

13. *People's Daily*, December 19, 1992.

14. *The Washington Post*, December 19, 1992.

15. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "Projected Roles of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in South Asia," presented at the Second U.S.-India Bilateral Conference, Berkeley, California, February 19-22, 1991. Quoted from the revised draft for publication, P. 9.

16. *The Hindustan times*, January 29, 1993.

17. *The New York times*, January 30, 1993.

18. *The Hindustan Times*, January 30, 1993.

19. *The Hindu*, January 30, 1993.

20. *People's Daily*, December 31, 1992.

21. Chinese Premier Li Peng's talk with visiting Dr. Henry Kissinger and C.P.C. General Secretary Jiang Zemin's meeting with Dr. Kissinger. *People's Daily*, December 11 and 12, 1992.

22. *People's Daily*, January 26, 1993.

23. *China Daily*, December 16, 1992.

24. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "A Conversation with Party Leader Jiang Zeming", in *U.S. News & World Report*, March 15, 1993, p. 60. During his interview with Zuckerman and others, Jiang states that when foreign countries do not understand us, we believe in dialogue. We are opposed to applying pressure; and that applying pressure against China is undesirable and ineffective.

25. *U.S. News & World Report*, February 22, 1993, p. 33.

26. *The Statesman*, January 15, 1993.

27. *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1994.

28. *Ibid.*, May 28 and 29, 1993.

29. *Ibid.*, May 20, 1994.

30. Hardgrave, "Projected Roles of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in South Asia," p. 2.
31. Testimony of Teresita C. Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 7, 1991. *South Asian Issues*, p. 2.
32. *The New York Times*, April 9, 1994.
33. From my interview with Prof. Jagat S. Mehta at the University of Texas at Austin in May 1991.
34. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, 5th Ed.* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 339.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 394.
36. Nilufar Choudhury, *Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 1989), P. 15.
37. *The Hindu*, January 30, 1993.
38. *The Hindustan Times*, January 23, 1993.
39. *The New York Times*, October 21, 1993.
40. *The Statesman*, December 3, 1992.
41. *Ibid.*, January 15, 1993.
42. *The Hindu*, December 6, 1992.
43. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 845-846.
44. *The Statesman*, October 23, 1992.
45. *China Daily*, Beijing, November 29, 1992.
46. *The Hindustan Times*, August 3, 1992.
47. *People's Daily*, December 18, 1992.
48. From my interview with Prof. Jagat S. Mehta at the University of Texas at Austin in May 1991.
49. *India Today*, September 30, 1993, p. 23 and p. 26.
50. *India Abroad*, September 17, 1993.
51. *Mainstream*, September 18, 1993, pp. 3-4.
52. *People's Daily*, February 19, 1992.
53. From my interview with Prof. Hongwei Wang, a Chinese scholar in South Asian politics, in summer 1991 and also from Prof. Jagat Mehta's unpublished paper titled "India-China Relations--Review and Prognosis".
54. John Lall, "Approaching India-China Boundary Dispute," in *Mainstream*, December 10, 1988, p. 7.
55. Information from my discussion with Prof. Jagat Mehta concerning the prospect of the border settlement at Austin in fall 1991.
56. Hardgrave and Kochanek, *op. cit.*, p. 411.
57. *India Today*, September 30, 1993, p. 23.

58. *Ibid.*, September 30, 1993, p. 23.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
61. *The New York Times*, March 4, 1963.
62. B. N. Goswami, *Pakistan and China* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 91.
63. *India Today*, December 31, 1988, p. 34.

Appendixes

Appendix 1

Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India

April 29, 1954

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India.

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual non-aggression,
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of India, H. E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H. E. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

1. The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.
2. The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

1. The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

2. The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-Khargo, (4) Gyanima-Chakra, (5) Rampura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may

visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.

2. Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

3. Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

Article IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

Article V

For the travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Article.

1. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorized agents and examined by the border checkpoints of the other Party.

2. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

3. Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own countries, but shall only hold certificates

good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorized agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoints of the other Party.

4. Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoints of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

6. Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

Article VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty-ninth day of April 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

(Sd.)

Nedyam Raghavan,
Plenipotentiary of
the Government of
the Republic of India

(Sd.)

Chang Han-fu,
Plenipotentiary of the Central
People's Government of
the People's Republic of China

Note to Chang Han-fu from Nedyam Raghavan

Peking, April 29, 1954

Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister,

In the course of our discussions regarding the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of Notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:

1. The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from the date of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

2. The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

3. The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest houses.

4. The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands

from the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade Agency at New Delhi.

5. The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if India traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto.

6. The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

7. The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

8. The hospitals of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian Trade Agencies.

9. Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

10. The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulanchung (Taklakot) to Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

11. Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

12. The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year.

13. Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations at places under the jurisdiction of the other Party.

14. Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in accordance with local regulations at places provided in Article II of the Agreement.

15. Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sd.)

Nedyam Raghavan

Note from Chang Hang-fu to Nedyam Raghavan

Peking, April 29, 1954

Your Excellency Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to receive your note dated April 29, 1954, which reads:

"....."
....."

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I hereby agree to your Excellency's note, and your note along with the present note in reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments, which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present notes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.)

Chang Han-fu

(White Paper, 1954-1959 pp. 98-105)

Appendix 2**Proposals of the Colombo Conference
of Six Non-Aligned Nations for Border
Settlement Between China and India**

January 19, 1963

1. The conference considers the present *De Facto* cease fire period as a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict.

2. a) With regard to the Western sector, the conference appeals to the Chinese Government to carry out the withdrawal of their military posts by 20 kilometers as has been proposed in the letters of Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Nehru dated November 21 and 28, 1962.

b) The conference appeals to the Government of India to keep their existing military positions.

c) Pending final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon without prejudice to the rights of the presence of both India and China in that area.

3. With regard to the Eastern sector, the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a cease fire line to their respective positions. The remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions.

4. With regard to the problems of the middle sector, the conference suggests that they be solved by peaceful means without resort to force.

5. The conference believes that these proposals which could help in consolidating the cease fire once implemented, should pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving the problems entailed in the cease fire positions.

6. The conference would like to make it clear that a positive response to the appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two governments as regards its conception of final alignment of boundaries.

Clarifications Given by the Delegates of Ceylon, United Arab Republic and Ghana

January 13, 1963

Upon request by the Government of India, the following clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo conference proposals were given by the delegates of Ceylon, UAR and Ghana:

Western Sector

1. The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo conference will be 20 kilometers as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21 November and in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter of 28th November 1962, i.e., from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and IV circulated by the Government of China.

2. The existing military posts which the forces of Government of India will keep to will be on and upto the line indicated in (1) above.

3. The demilitarized zone of 20 kilometers created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

Eastern Sector

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo conference proposals, move right upon the south of the line of actual control, i.e., the McMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo conference proposals are Che Dong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the

line of actual control between the two Governments.

Middle Sector

The Colombo conference desired that the *status quo* in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*.

(*White Paper IX*, January 1963-July 1963, pp. 185-186)

Appendix 3

Sino-Indian Joint Communiqué

December 23, 1988

At the invitation of Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made an official goodwill visit to the People's Republic of China from 19th to 23rd December, 1988.

Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in an atmosphere of friendship, candidness and mutual understanding. President Yang Shangkun of the People's Republic of China, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee had separate meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During his visit, the two Governments signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Science and Technology, the Agreement relating to Civil Air Transport, and the Executive Programme for the Years 1988, 1989 and 1990 under the Agreement for Cultural Co-operation. Both the Premier and the Prime Minister were present at the signing ceremony. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi and their party also toured historical sites and scenic spots in Beijing, Xi'an and Shanghai.

During their talks and meetings, the leaders of the two countries had a wide exchange of views and ideas on bilateral relations and international issues of mutual interest. Both sides found such talks and meetings useful as they enhanced mutual understanding in the interest of further improvement and development of bilateral relations. The two sides made a positive appraisal of the co-operation and exchanges in recent years in trade, culture, science and technology, civil aviation and other fields, and expressed satisfaction with the relevant agreements reached between the two countries. They emphasized the vast scope that existed for learning from each other.

They emphasized that the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which were jointly initiated by India and China, which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between States. These principles also constitute the basic guidelines

for the establishment of a new international economic order. Both sides agreed that their common desire was to restore, improve and develop India-China good-neighbourly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles. This not only conforms to the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but will actively contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. The two sides re-affirmed that they would make efforts to further their friendly relations.

The leaders of the two countries held earnest, indepth discussions on the India-China boundary question and agreed to settle this question through peaceful and friendly consultations. They also agreed to develop their relations actively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this question. In this context, concrete steps will be taken, such as establishing a joint working group on the boundary question and a joint group on economic relations and trade and science and technology.

The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side re-iterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.

With regard to the international situation, the two sides held that in the present-day world, confrontation was giving way to dialogue and tension to relaxation. This is a trend resulting from long years of unswerving struggle by the peace-loving countries and people of the world against power politics. It is conducive to world peace and to the settlement of regional problems. It also facilitates the efforts of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to develop their national economies. India and China will make their own contributions to the maintenance of world peace, promotion of complete disarmament and attainment of common progress.

His Excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and their party expressed heartfelt thanks to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China for the warm and friendly hospitality accorded them.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited Premier Li Peng to visit the Republic of India at his convenience. Premier Li Peng has accepted the invitation with pleasure. The date of the visit will be decided upon through diplomatic channels. (*The Hindu*, Dec.24, 1988)

Appendix 4

Sino-Indian Joint Communiqué

December 16, 1991

At the invitation of Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Mr. Li Peng, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, paid an official goodwill visit to the Republic of India from 11 to 16 December 1991. Premier Li Peng held talks with Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. President Ramaswami Venkataraman and Vice-President Shankar Dayal Sharma held separate meetings with Premier Li Peng. The talks and meetings proceeded in an atmosphere of sincerity, candour and mutual understanding.

During the visit, the two Governments signed the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on the re-establishment of Consulates-General in Shanghai and Bombay, the Consular Convention between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, the Memorandum between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on the resumption of border trade, the Trade Protocol for 1992 between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the People's Republic of China and the Department of Space of the Republic of India on co-operation in peaceful applications of outer space sciences and technology.

The leaders of the two countries held a wide-range exchange of views on bilateral relations and major international and regional issues of mutual interest. The two sides expressed satisfaction that Sino-Indian relations had improved in recent years, especially since the 1988 visit to China by the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, as a result of the concerted efforts by the two Governments and peoples. The two sides re-affirmed their readiness to continue to develop friendly, good-neighbourly, and mutually beneficial relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence jointly initiated by China and India, for they believed that co-operation between China and India is in the fundamental and long-term interests of the peoples of the two countries and is conducive to peace and

stability in Asia and the world.

The two sides positively appraised their co-operation in the fields of trade, culture, science and technology. They particularly stressed the need for joint efforts for ensuring a dynamic increase and diversification of exchanges in the economic field, including trade. The two sides also agreed that border trade between the two countries could gradually be extended to new areas as mutually agreed upon. Both countries would actively engage in co-operation in the fields of health, education, energy and agriculture. It was also agreed to hold a Cultural Festival of India in China and a Cultural Festival of China in India.

The leaders of the two countries re-iterated that efforts would be made to arrive at an early and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question through friendly consultations. Both sides believed that the talks held so far by the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the boundary question had enhanced mutual understanding and agreed that the group should step up its work in search of an earliest possible solution to the boundary question. It was decided that the next meeting of the Joint Working Group would be held in New Delhi in early 1992 on a mutually convenient date. The two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area along the Line of Actual Control pending a final settlement of the boundary question. They also agreed that the periodic meetings between the military personnel in the border areas should be held on a regular basis.

The Chinese side expressed concern about the continued activities in India by some Tibetans against their Motherland and re-iterated that Tibet was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that it was firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about independence of Tibet. The Indian side re-iterated its long-standing and consistent position that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.

The two sides stated that the improvement and development of Sino-Indian relations was not directed against any third country, nor would it affect their existing friendly relations and co-operation with other countries. The two sides expressed their support for the peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues between countries in the region through friendly consultations. The Chinese side expressed their support for efforts by the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation for closer co-operation among its member-states. Both sides

believed that peace and stability in South Asia is in the interests of the peoples of the region and conducive to the preservation of world peace and stability.

The two sides extended welcome and support to the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict signed at the Paris Conference on Cambodia on 23 October, 1991, and expressed the hope that the Agreement would be fully implemented so as to create conditions for free and fair elections conducted and supervised by the United Nations, and to enable Cambodia to become an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned country.

The two sides stressed the importance of an early political settlement of the Afghan issue and expressed the support for consultations and dialogue among the parties concerned for the establishment in Afghanistan of a broad-based coalition government acceptable to all parties, thereby restoring peace within the country and ensuring the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. Both sides are supportive of the United Nations Secretary-General's statement on May 21 announcing a five-point programme for a political settlement of the Afghan issue, and hope that the United Nations will play an important role in this process.

The leaders of the two countries held that major changes had taken place in the international situation in recent years. While welcoming the trends toward relaxation of the international situation, they recognized that peace, security and development in the world are still faced with challenges. International economic relations are plagued by ever intensifying North-South contradictions and widening economic gaps. The two sides pointed out that in the absence of the economic development of particularly the developing countries, there will be no genuine peace and stability in the world. The two sides re-iterated their commitment to the cause of peace and development and held that the international community should continue to work for the maintenance of world peace and promotion of common progress of mankind.

The two sides believed that the international community should join efforts for the establishment of a new international political and economic order. The two sides stressed that the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, together with the purposes principles of the United Nations Charter, should comprise the

essential norms for the conduct of international relations and form the basis upon which the new international order should be established.

The two sides believed that the following principles should govern the new international order:

(1) Every country, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, is an equal member of the international community entitled to participate in the decision-making and settlement of international affairs. Each country shall have the sovereign right to formulate and implement its own strategies and policies for socio-economic development best suited to its national conditions. The principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs should be scrupulously observed in international relations. Differences and disputes among countries should be settled peacefully without resorting to force or threat of force.

(2) Efforts should be made to check the arms race and realize effective disarmament. The current process of disarmament should lead to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Further progress should be made towards conventional disarmament.

(3) Efforts should be made to address the growing economic gap between the North and the South, and achieve the settlement of global economic, social, demographic and environmental problems in a manner which would benefit all members of the world community. Regional co-operation should be furthered in order to expand channels for dialogue and promote common development. The developed countries are urged to address the questions of the mounting debt burdens of the developing countries, worsening terms of trade, inadequacy of financial flows and obstacles to technology transfers.

(4) The principles of the UN Charter and the relevant international human rights instruments on the protection of human rights should be respected, the whole of mankind should be safeguarded and promoted. Human rights are indivisible. For the vast number of developing countries, the right to subsistence and development is a basic human right.

(5) The two sides believed that dialogue and exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries were of major importance to greater mutual understanding and further development of bilateral friendship and co-operation in all fields. Premier Li Peng and his party thanked the Government and the people of the Republic of India

for the warm and friendly hospitality accorded them. Premier Li Peng invited Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to visit China at his convenience and conveyed an invitation from Chinese President Yang Shangkun to President Venkataraman to visit China. Both the Prime Minister and the President accepted the invitations with pleasure. Dates for both visits will be decided through diplomatic channels. Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao invited General Secretary Jiang Zeming of the Chinese Communist Party to visit India at his convenience. Premier Li Peng agreed to convey this invitation with pleasure and thanked the Prime Minister for his invitation.

(Beijing Review, Dec. 30, 1991-Jan. 5, 1992, pp. 10-12.)

Appendix 5**Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity
in the Border Areas along the Line of Actual Control**

September 7, 1993

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China, (hereinafter referred to as the two sides), have entered into the present agreement in accordance with the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence and with a view to maintaining peace and tranquillity in areas along the Line of Actual Control(LAC) in the India-China border areas.

Article 1

The two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC. In case personnel of one side cross the LAC, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the LAC. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the LAC where they have different views as to its alignments.

Article 2

Each side will keep its military forces in the areas along the LAC to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries. The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The extent, depth, timing and nature of reduction of military forces along the LAC shall be determined through mutual consultations between the two countries. The reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages in mutually agreed geographical locations sectorwise within the areas along the LAC.

Article 3

Both sides shall work out through consultations effective confidence building measures in the areas along the LAC. Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the LAC permitted under this agreement.

Article 4

In case of contingencies or other problems arising in the areas along the LAC, the two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel of the two countries. The form of such meetings and channels of communications between the border personnel shall be mutually agreed upon by the two sides.

Article 5

The two sides agree to take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the LAC do not take place and shall undertake mutual consultations should intrusions occur. Both sides shall also consult on possible restrictions on air exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the LAC.

Article 6

The two sides are agreed that references to the LAC in this agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question.

Article 7

The two sides shall agree through consultations on the form, method, scale and content of effective verification measures and supervision required for the reduction of military forces and the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the areas along the LAC under this agreement.

Article 8

Each side of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question shall appoint diplomatic and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present agreement. The experts shall advise the Joint Working Group on the

resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the LAC and address issues relating to redeployment with a view to reduction of military forces in the areas along the LAC. The experts shall also assist the Joint Working Group in supervision of the implementation of the agreement, and settlement of differences.

Article 9

The present agreement shall come into effect as of the date of signature and is subject to amendment and addition by agreement of the two sides.

(The Hindu, Sept. 9, 1993)

Bibliography

Official Documents:

Aitchison, Sir Charles, *Aitchison's Treaties, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring countries*. Calcutta: The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, 1929 and 1938.

A Collection of Tibetan Cultural and Historical Materials, Vol. II. Lhasa: Research Association of Tibetan Cultural and Historical Materials under the Political Consultative Conference of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, 1985.

Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961.

The Sino-Indian Boundary Question. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962.

A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue. Beijing: Xinhua News Press, 1959.

Tibet Is an Inalienable Part of China. Lhasa: The Tibetan People's Press, 1986.

White Papers (in fourteen parts covering 1954 to April 1968), or *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China*. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, the Government of India.

Books:

- Ayub Khan, Mohammad, *Friends Not Masters*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Banerjee, D. K., *Sino-India Border Dispute*. New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1985.
- Bell, Sir Charles, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*. London: Collins Clear-type Press, 1946.
- Bhola, P. L., *Pakistan-China Relations*. Jaipur, India: R. B. S. A. Publishers, 1986.
- Chakravarti, Prithwis C., *India-China Relations*. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadaya, 1961.
- , *India's China Policy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962.
- Chaturvedi, Gyaneshwar, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day*. Agra, India: MG Publishers, 1991.
- Chopra, V. D., *Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems*. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991.
- Choudhury, Nilufar, *Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 1989.
- Dalvi, J. P., *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-Indian War of 1962*. New Delhi: Thacker, 1969.
- Eekelen, W. F. Van, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
- Fisher, Margaret W., Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1963.
- Galbraith, John K., *Ambassador's Journal*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.
- Gandhi, Arun, *The Morarji Papers: Fall of the Janata Government*. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1983.
- Goswami, B. N., *Pakistan and China*. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971.
- Greenhut II, Frederic A., *The Tibetan Frontier Question from Curzon to the Colombo Conference*. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1982.
- Gupta, Karunakar, *The Hidden History of Sino-Indian Frontier*. Calcutta: Minerva Associates Pvt. Ltd., 1971.

- , *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*. Calcutta: New Book Center, 1982.
- , *Sino-Indian Relations, 1949-1952: Role of K. M. Panikkar*. Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1987.
- Hardgrave, Robert L. Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993.
- Hingorani, R. C., *Nehru's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing CO. Pvt. Ltd., 1989.
- Hoffmann, Steven A., *India and the China Crisis*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Indian Council of World Affairs*. New Delhi: ICWA, 1947.
- Jetly, Nancy, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.
- Kahin, George M., *African-Asian Conference*. Bandung: Ithaca, 1956.
- Kaul, B. M., *The Untold Story*. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967.
- Kaul, B. N., *India and Superpowers*. New Delhi: Pulse Publishers, 1989.
- Kaul, T. N., *Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems*. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Vol. II*. Harmond Sworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
- Kissinger, Henry, *White House Years*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.
- Lall, John, *Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict*. New Delhi: Allied publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1989.
- Lamb, Alastair, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- , *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations Between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.
- , *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975.
- , *Tibet, China & India, 1914-1950: A History of Imperial Diplomacy*. Hertfordshire, Britain: Roxford Books, 1989.
- Li, Tieh-tseng, *Tibet: Today and Yesterday*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960.
- Mankekar, D. R., *The Guilty Men of 1962*. Bombay: The Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968.

- Maxwell, Neville, *India's China War*. London: Jonathan Cape Limited., 1970.
- Mehra, Parshotam, *The McMahon Line and After: A Study of the Triangular Contest on India's North-Eastern Frontier between Britain, China and Tibet*. Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1974.
- , *The North-Eastern Frontier: A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, Vol. 1, 1979 and Vol. 2, 1980.
- , *Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987: Problems and Perspectives*. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1989.
- Menon, K. P. S., *Delhi-Chungking: A Travel Diary*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- , *Many Worlds: An Autobiography*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Misra, A. N., *The Diplomatic Triangle: China India America*. Patna, India: Janaki Prakashan, 1980.
- Moraes, Frank, *Witness to an Era: India, 1920 to the Present Day*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973.
- Mullik, B. N., *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal*. Bombay: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1971.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Independence and After*. New York: Books for Libraries, 1950.
- , *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*. New Delhi: Government of India, 1961.
- Palit, D. K., *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*. London: Hurst & Company, 1991.
- Patterson, George, *Tragic Destiny*. London: Faber and Faber, 1959.
- , *Peking Versus Delhi*. London: Faber and Faber, 1963.
- Prasad, Niranjana, *The Fall of Towang*. New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1981.
- Praval, K. C., *Indian Army After Independence*. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990.
- Rao, Amiya, & B. G. Rao, *Six Thousand Days, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974.
- Richardson, H. E., *Tibet and Its History*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Reid, Sir Robert, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam*. Shilong: Government of Assam Press, 1942.

- Richardson, H. E., *Tibet and Its History*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Saigal, J. R., *The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979.
- Shahid Hamid, S., *Karakoram Hunza: The Land of Just Enough*. Karachi: Ma'aref Limited, 1979.
- She, Bin, *Xi Zang Jiao She Luo Shi* (Brief History of Dealing with the Tibet Issue). Shanghai: China Books House, 1926.
- Singh, Nihal, *The Yogi and the Bear: The Story of Indo-Soviet Relations*. London: Mansell, 1986.
- Snow, Edgar, *Red China Today: The Other Side of the River*. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1970.
- Talbott, Strobe, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.
- Taylor, Jay, *The Dragon and the Wild Goose: China and India*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Thomas, Lowell, Jr., *Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet*. New York: The Greystone Press, 1950.
- Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I., *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- , *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980*. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- Whiting, Allen S., *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975.
- Woodman, Dorothy, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries*. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Wu, Juncai, *India's Independence and Sino-Indian Relations*. Taipei: published by the author, 1950.
- Ya, Hanzhang, *Biographies of the Dalai Lamas*. Beijing: The People's Press, 1984.

Periodicals and Newspapers:

Asian Survey, Berkeley, U.S.A.

Austin American-Statesman, Austin, U.S.A.

Biographical Literature, Taipei, Taiwan.

Blitz, Bombay, India.
China Daily, Beijing, China.
The China Quarterly, London, Britain.
China Report, New Delhi, India.
China Tibetology, Beijing, China.
Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, China.
Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan.
The Denver Post, Denver, U.S.A.
Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, China.
Far East Economic Review, Hong Kong.
Foreign Affairs China, Beijing, China.
The Hindu, Madras, India.
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India.
India Abroad, Washington, D.C..
Indian Express, New Delhi, India.
India Quarterly, New Delhi, India.
India Today, New Delhi, India.
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, London, Britain.
Mainstream, New Delhi, India.
New Age, New Delhi, India.
The New York Times, New York, U.S.A..
Orbis, Philadelphia, U.S.A..
Outlook, Beijing, China.
Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, Pakistan.
Patriot, Bombay, India.
Peking Review (Beijing Review), Beijing, China.
People's Daily, Beijing, China.
Political Science Quarterly, New York, U.S.A..
Pravda, Moscow, USSR.
Problems of Communism, Washington, D.C., U.S.A..
Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.
South Asian Studies, Beijing, China.
Study of International Politics, Beijing, China.
The Times, London, Britain.
The Times of India, Bombay, India.
U.S. News & World Report, Washington, D.C., U.S.A..
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., U.S.A..
Washington Quarterly, Washington, D.C..

Index

A

- Abor 53
Abors 51
Afghan Mujahideen 129
Afghanistan 2, 48, 81, 84,
129, 137, 163, 166
Agreement on Measures for
the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet
89
Agreement on Trade and
Intercourse between
China's Tibet and
India 92
Aitchison's Treaties 51, 59,
60, 65
Akas 51
Aksai Chin 1, 2, 17, 19, 21,
22, 28-30, 48, 59,
65, 66, 69, 72, 97,
142, 160, 167, 174,
175, 178, 180
Ali, Mohammed 109
America-China-Pakistan axis
7, 8, 121, 123, 130,
133
American-Chinese relations
114, 155
American-Indian relations
166
American-Indian summit
158, 162
American-Japanese security
treaty 147
American-Pakistani alliance
6
American-Pakistani relations
158, 166
American-South Korean
security treaty 147
American-Taiwan agreement
of joint defense
147
Amur 137
Anderson, Walter 168
Anglo-Afghan convention 48
Anglo-Chinese convention of
1906 57, 65
Anglo-Chinese Pact of 1890
116
Anglo-Russian treaty 48, 49,
57, 65
Anglo-Tibetan Trade
Regulations 85
Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904
65
Ardagh, John 69
Ari District 48
Arunachal Pradesh 2, 47,
142, 167
Asia-Pacific region 125, 151
Asian collective security
regime 108, 114,
122, 125
Asian collective security

treaty 124
 Asian relations conference 83
 Asian Relations Organization
 84
 Assam 2, 18, 47, 50, 54, 95,
 100
 Assam Rifles 33
 Atlas of China 60
 Ayodhya mosque 170
 Azad, Bhagwat Jha 114

B

Bailey, F. M. 52
 Baiyik Peak 72
 Bajpai, G. S. 92
 Balipara Frontier Tract 61
 Bandaranaike 41
 Bandung Conference 5, 109
 Bangkok 100
 Bangladesh 125, 139
 Bara Hoti 97
 Bay of Bengal 113
 Beijing 9, 20, 25, 30
 Beijing University 168
 Belgrade 138
 Bell, Charles 54
 Bharatiya Janata Party 170
 Bhola, P. L. 106
 Bhutan 2, 6, 32, 51, 84, 90
 Bhutto, Benazir 162
 Binder, David 126
 Bombay 134
 Bomdila 36
 Border dispute 3
 Border talks 2, 8, 138, 180
 Border war 6, 42, 116
 Brahmaputra 6, 50
 Brezhnev 108, 122, 124, 128,
 131
 Brezhnev's Tashkent speech
 135
 Britain 5, 39, 40, 48, 170

British India 48
 British Mission 80
 Brower, H. 53, 55
 Brown, Harold 129
 Burma 2, 11, 30, 31, 41, 51,
 84, 100, 125
 Bush, George 152

C

Calcutta 39, 134
 Cam Ranh Bay 136
 Cambodia 41, 127, 128
 Capping proposal 162, 163
 Caroe, Olaf K. 59, 66
 Ceausescue, Nicolae 126
 CENTO 5, 91, 94, 108, 109
 Central Asia 175
 Central Intelligence Agency
 23
 Ceylon 35, 41
 Chakravarti, P. C. 10, 70
 Chamdo 89
 Chang Pass 72
 Changchenmo valley 19, 28,
 65, 68, 180
 Chavan 116
 Chayul Chu 52
 Che Dong 32-34
 Chen, Ivan 55, 56
 Chen, Yi 39
 Cheng, Ruisheng 176
 Chiang Kai-shek 38, 39, 101
 China 1, 3, 5, 7-12, 21, 25,
 36, 37, 49, 79, 112,
 129, 147, 151, 173
 China Council for Promotion
 of International
 Trade 140
 China's MFN status 157
 China-Pakistan axis 149
 China-Sikkim border 111,
 116, 176

- Chinese Communist Party 8,
 80, 83, 134, 150,
 170
 Chinese Mission at Lhasa 87,
 88
 Chinese People's Association
 for Friendship 126
 Chinese People's Liberation
 Army 18
 Chinese Turkestan 72
 Chip Chap River 180
 Chogyal 117
 Christopher, Warren 162
 Chungking 81
 Chusul 67
 Clinton, Bill 155, 157, 160,
 162, 163
 Clinton-Rao summit 163
 Cold War 6, 9, 11, 12, 79,
 80, 90, 149, 150,
 152, 154, 168
 Collapse of the Soviet Union
 151, 168
 Colombo 41
 Colombo conference 41
 Colombo proposals 12, 17,
 42, 139
 Colorado 100
 Communist Party of India
 (Marxist-Leninist)
 8
 Crewe, Lord 71
 Cuban missile crisis 40
 Cultural Revolution 8, 123,
 124
 Curzon, Lord 48, 71
-
- D
 Daflas 51
 Dalai Lama 8, 22-25, 52, 57,
 90, 98, 99, 124,
 155, 170
- Dalvi, J. P. 34, 36
 Damzan 97
 Dane, Louis 65, 71
 Darjeeling 95
 Darma Pass 94
 Darwaza 65
 Dehda 72
 Delei River 52
 Delhi 55
 Demchok 67, 180
 Deng, Xiaoping 3, 123, 125,
 128, 131, 137, 138,
 173, 180
 Desai, Morarji 114, 126, 128
 Dharamsala 8
 Dhola 33
 Dibang River 52
 Dihang River 52
 Dirang Dzong 61
 Dozakh 72
 Drepung Monastery 51
 Dundas, W. C. M. 53
 Durand Line 48, 49
-
- E
-
- East Asia 151
 East China Sea 180
 East European bloc 9
 Eastern Europe 151
 Economic Cooperation
 Organization 166
 Egypt 41, 112
 Elgin, Lord 69, 71
 Europe 151
 European Union 151, 152
-
- F
-
- Federation of Indian
 Chambers of
 Commerce 140
 Fisher, Margaret W. 10

Five Plus Two Plus Two
formula 163
Five points 139
Five principles of peaceful
co-existence 3, 5,
9, 94, 127, 169
Forward policy 10, 17, 26,
29, 31-33, 47
France 85, 170

G

Galbraith, J. K. 39
Gandhi, Indira 7, 107, 112,
113, 121, 125, 130,
131, 132, 133, 138,
175
Gandhi, Mahatma 81, 115
Gandhi, Rajiv 2, 3, 9, 12,
133, 134, 137, 138,
141, 143, 147, 151,
170, 175
Gang of Four 123
Gangtok 92, 117
Gartok 67
Gauhati 32
Geling 52
Geneva Conference 5
Germany 151
Ghana 41
Gopal, S. 66
Gorbachev 134-136, 147,
152, 168
Gorbachev's Beijing tour 150
Gorbachev's Vladivostok
speech 135
Gordon, John 54, 58
Gould, Basil 61, 62
Great Leap Forward 37
Green, L. C. 57
Grim Pass 72
Gromyko 113
Group of Seven 151

Gulf of Tonkin incident 7
Gupta, Karunakar 10
Gyantse 88, 92

H

Hanoi 127
Haq, Zia 130
Hardgrave, Robert L. 106
Hardinge, Lord 49, 56, 71
Hare, Sir Lancelot 50, 52
Harriman, Averell 106
Harvard University library 60
Hayward, G. W. 67
Heilongjiang 137
Himalayas 1, 39, 47, 55, 181
Hindustan Times 39
Hong Kong 89, 155
Hua, Guofeng 125, 130, 138
Huan, Xiang 105
Huang, Hua 125, 127, 129,
130, 139
Hunza 70
Hussain, Zakir 121
Huttenback, Robert A. 10

I

India 1, 5, 7, 9-13, 23, 48,
79, 85, 112, 129,
147, 151, 170, 173
India Office 60, 61, 66, 72
India-Pakistan partition 160
Indian communist parties 170
Indian Communist Party 82
Indian Council of World
Affairs 57, 83
Indian cultural delegation 81
Indian Mission 80
Indian National Congress 7,
8, 80, 134, 150
Indian National Congress(I)
170

Indian Ocean 129
 Indian-Soviet relations 8
 Indira Col pass 175
 Indo-American relations 107,
 157
 Indo-Pakistani relations 107,
 161
 Indo-Pakistani war 7, 106-
 108, 111-114, 116,
 121, 149, 160
 Indo-Russian relations 150
 Indo-Russian treaty 154
 Indo-Sikkimese treaty 116
 Indo-Soviet relations 114
 Indo-Soviet treaty 7, 108,
 114, 130, 149
 Indochina 5, 127, 129
 Indonesia 41
 Indus 67, 68
 Inner line 50
 Instrument of Accession 160
 Iran 48, 125, 166
 Iraq 153
 Italy 85

 J

Jammu and Kashmir
 Liberation Front
 170
 Jan Sangh 116
 Janata 122, 125, 128, 129
 Janata Dal 170
 Japan 124, 129, 151
 Japanese-American security
 treaty 154
 Johnson administration 107,
 112
 Johnson, W. H. 68
 Johnson's boundary proposal
 68
 Johnson-Ardagh Line 69, 71

 K

Kailash 127
 Kalimpong 23, 99, 100
 Kamaraj 112
 Kamla River 52
 Karakash River 72
 Karakash valley 69
 Karakoram 1, 17, 48, 62, 65,
 181
 Karakoram Pass 19, 48, 66,
 67, 68, 70, 72, 110,
 175, 180
 Karakoram range 66, 68, 69,
 72
 Karko 52
 Kasha 22, 83, 85, 98
 Kashgar 68, 70
 Kashmir 1, 17, 28, 48, 65-67,
 81, 89, 90, 109,
 160, 171, 172
 Kashmir dispute 106
 Kashmir issue 109, 130, 160,
 163
 Kathmandu 125
 Kaul, B. M. 32, 34
 Kautiliya 81
 Kazakhstan 166
 Kechilang River 32, 34
 Kechilang valley 33
 Kennedy, John 40, 106
 Keskar, B. V. 93
 Khalistan 157
 Kham 56, 57
 Khasbulatov, Ruslan 166
 Khinzemane 27, 32, 33
 Khotan 68
 Khrushchev 37
 Khunjerab Pass 65
 Kilik 72
 Kinkor 52
 Kirk, Alan G. 39
 Kissinger, Henry 7

- Kizil Jilga 70
 Kongbu 56, 57
 Kongka Pass 17, 28, 29, 180
 Korean War 5, 6, 36, 62, 79,
 90, 96
 Kosygin 128
 Kozyrev, Andrei 154
 Kukahang 72
 Kumar, Krishna 138
 Kungri Bingri Pass 94
 Kunlun range 48, 59, 66, 68,
 70, 71
 Kurils 153
 Kyrghyzstan 166
- L**
-
- Ladakh 1, 19, 28, 42, 48, 67,
 70, 95
 Lak Tsang range 69, 70
 Lall, John 175
 Lamb, Alastair 10, 51, 72
 Lanak Pass 28, 65, 180
 Lansdale, Edward 100
 Lansdowne, Lord
 Lord 68
 Laos 127
 Leh 28, 68
 Lhasa 23, 51, 61, 92, 95, 134
 Lhatsa 52
 Li, Peng 3, 170
 Li, Xiannien 125
 Lightfoot, G. S. 61
 Line of actual control 3, 9,
 171, 174, 176, 177,
 180
 Lingzitang Plain 180
 Lipu Lekh Pass 94, 168
 Lobas 51
 Lohit valley 47, 52, 54, 57,
 180
 Lok Sabha 28, 32, 72, 93,
 114, 121, 139, 175
- Lonchen Shatra 52, 54-56,
 58
 London talks 162
 Longju 17, 27-29, 32, 41, 42
 Lower Zayul 47
 Loyul 47
 Luo, Jialun 85-88
- M**
-
- Macartney, George 69
 Macartney-MacDonald line
 71, 72
 Macartney-McDonald Line
 69
 Machiavelli 81
 Macmillan 106
 Madras 35
 Maharaja of Kashmir 68, 72
 Major, John 161
 Mane Pass 94
 Mansarover 127
 Mansingh, Surjit 142
 Mao, Zedong 38, 82, 121,
 123
 Marxism-Leninism 80
 Matskevich 108
 Maxwell, Neville 10
 McDonald, Sir Claude 69
 McMahan Line 2, 6, 19-21,
 26, 27, 29, 31,
 32-36, 38, 39, 41,
 42, 47, 49, 52, 55,
 56-60, 62, 92, 93,
 95, 97, 142, 143,
 173, 178
 McMahan, Henry 26, 52, 54-
 56, 58
 Mehra, Parshotam 10
 Mehta, Jagat S. 18, 159, 167
 Memorandum on Tibetan
 Question 58
 Menilkrai 54, 180

Menon, K. P. S. 18, 35, 81,
86-88, 100
Migyitun 27, 52
Minto, Lord 71
Mipi 52
Miris 51
Mishmis 51, 52, 53
Mizo 115, 127, 170
Monbas 51
Monyul 47
Moorcroft, William 67
Moscow 112, 127
Moscow-New Delhi-Kabul
axis 130
Mullik, N. B. 81
Mussoorie 23
Mutual Military Assistance
Agreement 108
Muztagh 68
Myanmar 41

N

Naga 115, 127, 170
NATO 91, 153
Naxalbari 115
Naxalbari movement 115
Naxalite uprisings 8
Nehru, Jawaharlal 2, 6, 7, 20,
22, 23, 24, 25, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 35,
40, 58, 65, 66, 72,
81, 83, 84, 86,
88-91, 93, 106
Nepal 1, 31, 84, 90, 125, 139
New Delhi 30, 34
New Delhi summit 29, 30
New Thinking 135
Nilang 97
Niti Pass 94, 97
Nixon, Richard 7, 105, 107,
108, 113, 123
Nonaligned Movement 124

North Vietnam 113, 114
North-East Frontier Agency
2, 47
Northern Territories 153
Nuclear Proliferation issue
161
Nyamka Chu 32-34

O

O'Callaghan, T. P. M. 53
Operation Onkar 26
Outer Line 2, 36, 49-51, 53,
59
Outer Tibet 54, 55, 59, 71

P

Package deal 127, 175, 179
Package offer 139
Pakistan 5, 7, 11, 84, 89, 90,
94, 106, 121, 124,
125, 129, 139, 147,
166, 170
Palit, D. K. 33, 62
Panchen Lama 24
Panchsheel agreement 5, 18,
90
Panggong Lake 67, 180
Panikkar, K. M. 93
Pant, K. C. 137
Partnership for Peace 153
Patel, Sardar 90, 91
Patterson, George 99
Peking Library 60
Peking Review 38
Pentagon's Defense Planning
Guidance 151
People's Daily 23, 24, 39,
129, 130
Persian Gulf 129
Philippines 136
Prasad, Niranjan 33-35

Praval, K. C. 33
 Pravda 134
 Press Trust of India 87
 Pressler Amendment 162,
 165, 166
 Prouty, L. Fletcher 100
 Punjab 1, 170-172

Q

Qian, Qichen 154, 155
 Quemoy 38

R

Radhakrishnan 35
 Rahman, Zia 163
 Rangoon 30
 Rao, P. V. Narasimha 3, 139,
 157, 160, 168, 171
 Rao-Li talks 167
 Raphel, Robin 157
 Raskam 72
 Reagan, Ronald 132
 Red Line 66
 Reid, Sir Robert 49, 61
 Republican revolution 49, 71
 Richardson, H. E. 80, 83, 88,
 89
 Rima 52, 53
 Ringkor 52
 Rose, Leo E. 10
 Rumbold, H. A. F. 72
 Russia 5, 48, 151, 160, 166
 Russian-Japanese territorial
 dispute 154

S

Sadiya 52
 Sandys, Duncan 106
 Sanju 72
 Sargon Pass 72

Sati 52
 Se La range 51, 52, 62, 174
 SEATO 5, 91, 94, 108, 109,
 147
 Sector-by-sector approach
 139
 Sector-by-sector proposal
 141
 Sen, L. P. 34
 Senge Dzong 52
 Senkaku(or Diaoyu) Islands
 180
 Seventh Fleet 113
 Shahidula 69
 Shanghai 134
 Shanghai Communique 7
 Shani, Agha 131
 Shastri 7
 Shaw, Robert 67
 Sheng Pao 60
 Shimshal Pass 65
 Shipki La 94, 97, 168
 Siachen Glacier 175
 Sikh 170
 Sikkim 61, 90, 95, 108, 116,
 117, 121, 176, 177
 Simla 54, 59
 Simla agreement 122, 163,
 177
 Simla conference 1, 54-60,
 142
 Simla Convention 6, 56-58,
 60, 85
 Simon Commission 72
 Simong 52
 Singh, Umrao 34
 Singh, Zail 133
 Sinha 80
 Sino-American relations 7,
 107, 121, 123, 150,
 156
 Sino-Bhutanese border 177
 Sino-British Agreement on

- Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet 84
- Sino-Burmese border 20
- Sino-Burmese boundary treaty 178
- Sino-Indian agreement of 1993 168, 171, 177
- Sino-Indian border 1, 3, 9, 10, 17-21, 29, 30, 33, 34, 39, 47, 62, 66, 73, 80, 97, 111, 116, 160, 179
- Sino-Indian border dispute 4, 5, 10-13, 17, 19, 37, 98, 126, 136, 139, 170, 174
- Sino-Indian border talks 122, 132, 143
- Sino-Indian border trade 134
- Sino-Indian border war 9-12, 17, 28, 39, 62, 79, 105, 106, 113, 114, 149
- Sino-Indian boundary 1, 3, 6, 19, 20, 47, 94, 126, 171
- Sino-Indian cold war 6, 7, 12, 105, 117
- Sino-Indian detente 2, 12, 121, 122, 150
- Sino-Indian entente 12, 79, 101
- Sino-Indian relations 1-6, 8, 9, 11-13, 18, 22, 26, 29, 31, 96, 105, 115, 121, 122, 132, 147, 150
- Sino-Indian summit 9, 123, 137, 143, 150
- Sino-Japanese relations 150
- Sino-Mongolian border 136
- Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement 110, 179
- Sino-Pakistani boundary 110, 175, 176, 177
- Sino-Pakistani relations 109
- Sino-Pakistani trade agreement 111
- Sino-Russian border talks 166
- Sino-Russian relations 167
- Sino-Russian summit 166
- Sino-Sikkimese border 112
- Sino-Soviet border 113, 132, 137, 172
- Sino-Soviet border conflict 6, 113
- Sino-Soviet border talks 136, 150
- Sino-Soviet detente 150
- Sino-Soviet relations 6, 37, 105, 107, 150
- Sino-Vietnamese border war 2, 127
- Six points 139
- Six working principles 140
- Siyom River 52
- South Asia 7, 106, 107, 129, 147, 149, 151, 154, 158, 169, 175
- South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 164
- South China Sea 129
- Southeast Asia 129, 150
- Southwest Asia 129
- Soviet Union 3, 5-7, 9, 11, 37, 38, 79, 105, 107, 112, 124, 147
- Soviet-India alliance 123
- Soviet-Indian agreement 38
- Soviet-Vietnamese alliance 128
- Soviet-Vietnamese-Indian

- alliance 150
 Spanggur 67
 Spanggur Lake 180
 Sri Lanka 35, 41
 START 152
 Straits of Malacca 129
 Subansiri River 52
 Suhrawardy 109
 Sumdurong Chu 136, 142, 143
 Sumdurong Chu crisis 137
 Sumdurong Chu incident 136, 171, 174
 Sundarji, K. 176
- T**
-
- Taghdumbash 72
 Taipei 39
 Taiwan 5, 38, 39, 100, 114, 133, 155
 Taiwan Relations Bill 132
 Taiwan Strait 6, 37, 39
 Taiwan Strait crisis 38
 Tajikistan 166
 Takster Rimpoche 99
 Talbott, Strobe 158
 Talbott's South Asia tour 162
 Tali 52
 Tamaden 27
 Tarim basin 68
 Tashkent 107, 132
 Tashkent conference 7
 Tashkent Declaration 107
 Tatilaev, S. B. 136
 Tawang 35, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 61, 62, 95, 174
 Tawang Monastery 51, 56
 Tawang Tract 36, 47, 50, 51, 55, 57-59, 62, 95, 142
 Taylor, Jay 9
- Taylor, Maxwell 100
 Teickman, Eric 58
 Tezpur 25, 33
 Thagla ridge 32-34, 41, 42, 58, 142
 Thailand 100
 The Earl of Crewe 56
 Thirty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment 117
 Thomas, Lowell 98
 Three-fold frontier 48
 Tibet 1, 5, 18, 21-23, 25-27, 35-37, 39, 49, 65-67, 72, 83, 155, 173, 176, 180
 Tibetan rebellion 22-26, 38, 98, 114
 Tibetan revolt 5, 8, 18, 19
 Tibetan Trade Mission 85
 Tito 138
 Tiwari, N. D. 137
 Transit permit 87
 Trivedi, U. M. 116
 Tsang Chokla Pass 97
 Tsangdhar 32, 33
 Tsari 52
 Tsari River 27
 Tsari Sarpa 52, 56
 Tsari-Subansiri valley 56
 Tseng Jong 34
 Tsepon Shakabpa 85
 Tso Karpo 52, 56
 Tsona 51, 52
 Tsona Dzong 56
 Turkey 125, 166
- U**
-
- U Nu 20
 Udalguri 50
 UN General Assembly 151
 UN Security Council 151, 163

United Kingdom 85
 United Nations 5, 96, 111,
 160
 United States 5-7, 9, 13, 23,
 38, 39, 40, 79, 85,
 94, 95, 99, 105,
 112, 124, 128, 129,
 147, 151, 170
 Ussuri 137
 Usvatov, Alexander 132
 Uttar Pradesh 1

V

Vajpayee, Atal 126, 127,
 138, 170
 Vajpayee's China Visit 125
 Vietnam 124, 127, 129
 Vietnam war 7, 106, 124,
 149
 Vikrant 131, 138
 Vorosilov 37
 Walong 36, 47, 50, 52-54,
 57, 180
 Wan, Li 141
 Wang, Bingnan 126
 Ward, Kingdon 59
 Washington-Beijing-Islamaba
 d axis 122
 Weinberger 136
 West Asia 129
 West Bengal 115
 Western Europe 129
 White Paper 29
 Williamson, Noel 52, 53
 Wisner, Frank 151
 Woodman, Dorothy 10
 Wuje 97

X

Xiao, Ke 130
 Xinjiang 1, 48, 65, 69, 81,

110, 176
 Xinjiang-Tibet highway 17,
 19, 97, 179

Y

Yao, Yiling 133
 Yargi 72
 Yarkand River 72
 Yatung 83, 87, 92, 99
 Yeltsin, Boris 152, 153, 155,
 161
 Yepak River 53
 Younghusband, Francis 68
 Yugoslavia 112, 153
 Yumtsola 34

Z

Zachariah, K. 66
 Zayul 57
 Zayul Chu 53
 Zhang, Guohua 35
 Zhao, Erfeng 52, 53
 Zhao, Ziyang 133, 134, 139,
 141
 Zhou, Enlai 9, 20, 27, 29,
 30, 67, 90, 93, 95,
 109, 111, 123, 139
 Zhou-Nehru summit 31
 Zhou-Nehru talks 17, 30